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Introduction
When students are uncertain about own ability, information might affect their
academic choices. The thesis consists of three self-contained chapters that
explore different facets of this theme.
The first chapter studies theoretically and empirically the role of early grade
assignment in education choice, focusing in particular on mechanisms. The
main argument is that early grading affects differently the choices of students
with different academic ability and socioeconomic status.
The second chapter investigates empirically whether repeatedly surveying
compulsory school students affects their educational choices, attainment, and
long-run labor market outcomes. The basic idea is that educational surveys
might contain information relevant for the choices of the students.
The last chapter studies empirically whether, and how, students’ choices in
compulsory school are affected by peer ability. If students assess their academic
ability in relation to their classmates, peer ability might have an effect on their
academic choices.
A short summary of each chapter follows.
The Impact of Early Grading on Academic Choices:
Mechanisms and Social Implications
Does early grading affect educational choices? To answer this question, I exploit
a curriculum reform which postponed grade assignment in Swedish compulsory
schools. The staggered implementation of the reform allows me to identify
short- and long-term effects of early grading, for students with different aca-
demic ability and socioeconomic status (SES). When graded early on, high-
ability students (especially if high-SES) exhibit higher grades in compulsory
school, and are more likely to choose academic courses. Low-ability students
2react in the opposite way, with particularly negative reactions among low-SES
students. High school attainment increases for high-ability low-SES students;
college attainment decreases for low-ability low-SES students. None of these
effects carry over to the labor market. This suggests that early grades improve
the match between early education choices and academic ability, and reduce
over-investment in education. I show that the short-term effects are consistent
with predictions from a learning model in which children are uncertain about
academic ability, have different priors depending on SES, and use grading infor-
mation to re-optimize educational choices. I find no evidence of demotivating
effects for low-ability students, an alternative mechanism through which grades
might affect education choices, and the main motivation behind the grading
reform.
Rethinking Education Choices:
The Effect of Surveys
(with Juanna Schrøter Joensen and Greg Francisco Veramendi)
Can surveys affect investments in education? This paper examines whether indi-
vidual education choices and outcomes are affected by a survey posing questions
related to expectations and forward-looking behavior. We have administra-
tive data for the whole Swedish population to which an extensive education
survey was administered to randomly drawn samples of 3rd graders. This consti-
tutes a randomized social experiment for testing whether responding to survey
questions alters behavior. We observe complete educational and labor market
histories until the individuals are 31 years old. We have exogenous variation in
the timing of first surveys and when an additional survey was administered to
parents. The causal effect of the survey on both short- and long-run outcomes
is generally not significantly different from zero, independently of parental edu-
cation. We find, however, that being surveyed increases educational attainment
and job stability in the early career for some subpopulations. We will address
more specifically heterogeneity of the effect in future research.
Does Peer Ability Affect Education Choices?
Average classroom ability matters if children assess their ability relative to their
peers. I use detailed survey data on a cohort of Swedish 6th graders to estimate
3the overall effect of classmates’ ability on students’ choices in compulsory
school. I show that variation in class ability within schools is unrelated to own
ability and other determinants of education choice. I find that a one standard
deviation increase in average class ability reduces by 2 percentage points the
probability of taking an advanced math course in grades 7 to 9. Peer ability
does not affect English course choices in grades 7 to 9, and whether students
choose academic tracks in high school. I look at underlying mechanisms and
show evidence that peer ability negatively affects students’ assessment of own
ability. The different reduced-form effects on math and English course choices
reflect different spillovers in performance: students benefit much more from
from having high ability peers in English, an interactive subject, than they do
in math. Finally peer ability does not seem to affect student’s motivation, class
interaction and parental support, but positively affects teacher interaction.

Chapter 1
The Impact of Early Grading on
Academic Choices: Mechanisms and
Social Implications1
1A special thanks to my two advisors, Erik Lindqvist and Juanna Joensen, who provided
excellent guidance and sound advice throughout the paper. I thank John Bound, Charlie
Brown, Kerem Cos¸ar, Susan Dynarski, Tore Ellingsen, Jeffrey Smith and Kevin Stange for
their valuable comments. Lastly I thank seminar participants at Stockholm School of Eco-
nomics, University of Michigan (CIERS and Economics Lunch Seminar), SITE, Brucchi-
Luchino and Collegio Carlo Alberto for their useful feedback. I gratefully acknowledge
financial support from the Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences (Riks-
bankens Jubileumsfond) grant P12-0968 enabling the data collection for this project. The
usual disclaimers apply.
61.1 Introduction
While education is traditionally seen in economics as a form of investment with
known costs and returns (Becker, 1994; Ben-Porath, 1967), recent models of
education choice (e.g., Altonji, 1993) have highlighted the role of uncertainty
in educational investment: the expected return of any education choice depends
ex-ante on the probability of graduation, and thus on academic ability. When
students are uncertain about ability, information, in the form of school grades,
might affect their choices.
The role of grades on education choice has been studied almost exclusively
at the college level (Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2012; Zafar, 2011). Little is
known about how grades affect students at early stages of education, when chil-
dren have less information on their academic ability, and are still unconstrained
by previous choices.
In this paper I investigate how assigning grades in early compulsory school
affects educational choices and attainment of Swedish students. To investigate
mechanisms I compare the empirical results to the predictions of a sequential
choice learning model calibrated to the data.
The institutional setup and the data are particularly suitable to answer
the research question. In Sweden, students used to receive the first formal
grades in school year 3, at age 10. Grades were based on students’ rankings
in national standardized tests, and thus provided different information from
the test scores students received during the year. In 1969 a reform allowed
municipalities to postpone grade assignment to school years 6 or 7. In 1982,
a second reform compelled all municipalities to postpone grade assignment
to school year 8.2 The reforms, gradually implemented over time in different
municipalities, provide a source of exogenous variation in grade assignment.
I use detailed survey and register data on cohorts born in 1967 and 1972.
The 1967 cohort comprises treated students, who were living in municipalities
where grading started in middle compulsory school (school year 6), and control
students, who lived in municipalities where grades were assigned starting from
2In 2012 the reform was reversed, and grades in school year 6 were reinstated. Currently
grading in school year 4 is being discussed.
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late compulsory school (school year 7). Students born in 1972 started receiving
grades in late compulsory school (in school year 8) in both treatment and control
municipalities. If the education choices of students in treatment and control
municipalities trend in the same way over time, it is possible to disentangle the
effect of early grade assignment from pre-existing differences between the two
sets of municipalities. I provide evidence that trends in educational attainment
are the same in treatment and control municipalities, for cohorts who did not
receive early grades. I also show that pre-treatment differences in determinants
of education appear in general to persist over time.
To guide the empirical analysis, I set up a model of early education choice
that captures the most important features of the institutional setup.3 In the
model, ability determines optimal effort and education choices during compul-
sory school. For low-ability students it is optimal to exert low effort and enroll
into vocational high school. For high-ability students it is instead optimal to
exert higher effort and enroll into academic education. Children are uncertain
about their cognitive ability. Their priors reflect aggregate ability distributions:
high-SES children are on average endowed with higher ability than low-SES
children.4 Grades reveal information about true ability, and allow students to
re-optimize educational choices. As in the institutional setup, grades can be
assigned starting from middle or late compulsory school, while they are never
assigned in early compulsory school.
The calibrated model shows that early grade assignment results in better
sorting of students into education, that is, in choices closer to first best. How-
ever, students with the same ability react differently to the ability signals, due
to the different priors about ability. Low (high) SES students who receive
low (high) ability signals confirm their priors, and thus react strongly to the
information. Students who receive signals inconsistent with their priors form
imprecise posteriors, thus their responses are weaker. The model solution im-
plies different reactions to early grading for very low ability students, low ability
students, and high ability students. When they receive early grades, students
with very low ability increase effort in compulsory school, are more likely to
choose vocational high school, and thus less likely to drop out of high school.
3The model builds on the theoretical framework outlined in Altonji et al (2012)
4Re´gner (2002) discusses biases about ability for low SES students in the psychology litera-
ture.
8Low-ability students on average reduce effort in compulsory school, and are
more likely to choose vocational education paths. These responses appear to
be stronger for low-SES students, who are more sensitive to low ability signals.
When graded early on, high-ability students increase effort in late compulsory
school if they are low-SES, and decrease it if they are high-SES. All high-ability
students are more likely to choose academic high school, but only low-SES stu-
dents increase college attainment as a result of early grading: some high-ability
high-SES students fail to access college due to early reductions in effort.
The model guides the empirical analysis: I present the effects of early grades
for students with different SES and academic ability. SES is proxied by parental
education. Ability is measured using cognitive ability tests administered to
both cohorts in school year 6, before grade assignment.
To investigate empirically the effects of early grading on short-term effort, I
focus on two outcomes: grades and academic course choices in late compulsory
school. Higher grades require higher effort; academic courses are more demand-
ing. Results are broadly consistent with model’s predictions: when graded
early on, low-ability students, especially if low-SES, receive lower grades and are
less likely to choose academic courses in late compulsory school. High-ability
students exhibit instead higher grades in late compulsory school, but do not
revise course choices. The pattern found in the model is thus reproduced by the
data, with the difference that high-ability high-SES students are putting more
effort, instead of reducing it.5
I consider thereafter effects of early grades on high school choices and
attainment. I find an increase in high school enrollment for all students.6
Contrary to model predictions, I do not observe changes in high school track
choice. Why is this the case? I propose as an explanation that preferences
for education might attenuate the effects of early grades. My data shows that,
controlling for ability, high-SES students’ academic high school enrollment rates
are 20 percentage points higher than those of low-SES students. At the same time
grade differences in late compulsory school between high- and low-SES students
5The result can be easily reconciled with the model assuming that different college majors
require different ability levels.
6This is due to the increase in effort during compulsory school for high-ability students.
While low-ability students reduced effort, the weakest students could have increased effort
when graded early on.
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are at most one fourth of a grade: SES appears thus to strongly influence high
school choices in Sweden, independently of ability. I find effects on educational
attainment only for low-SES students. Early grading leads to a 3 percentage
points decrease in college attainment for low-ability low-SES students, and a 6
percentage points increase in high school attainment for high-ability low-SES
students (mostly due to a reduction in dropout).
Do the effects found on education carry over to the labor market? I find
that early grades do not affect income at ages 33-40, but they increase upward
income mobility for low-ability low-SES students. These students showed the
strongest reductions in school grades and educational attainment. This suggests
that early grades improved the match between early education choices and
academic ability, and reduced over-investment in education. Methodologically I
confirm the importance of evaluating education policy in the long-run: limiting
the analysis to short-term or intermediate education outcomes would have led
to different conclusions.
The idea that early grades could motivate/demotivate children in compul-
sory school was the main motivation behind the grading reform. I empirically
investigate this alternative mechanism through which grades could affect ed-
ucation choice. I test for effects of early grades on student motivation and
attitudes toward school. These outcomes are measured from survey responses,
in the year in which grades where assigned, and in late compulsory school. I
find no evidence of early grading discouraging or motivating students, which is
consistent with grades simply revealing information to the students.
I conclude that early grades allow students to better sort into education,
and thus lead to an increase in efficiency. At the same time the grading policy
increases inequality in educational attainment, and reduces effort in compulsory
school among low-ability students. The final judgement on the policy depends
on the objectives of the policy-maker.
Early grading has relevant effects in the Swedish education system, in which
students are explicitly sorted into academic tracks that provide access to college
(a tracked education system). To what extent do my results generalize to differ-
ent setups? As knowledge production is cumulative, early education choices
constrain late choices for all students (e.g., college preparation affects college
enrollment). Assigning grades early on might thus affect students’ education
10
choices and attainment also in non-tracked (comprehensive) education systems.7
Results are consistent with the learning mechanism outlined by Stinebrick-
ner & Stinebrickner (2012) and Zafar (2011), who find that college students
react to grading information. Students who get lower (higher) than expected
grades are more (less) likely to drop out/switch to an easier major. A limita-
tion of this literature is that, due to the college setup, it is not possible to tell
whether students are learning from grades about academic ability or previous
preparation. In my setup grades were assigned when children were 13, so there
is less concern that students are learning about previous preparation rather
than ability. Moreover I show that students’ reactions to grade assignment are
consistent with a model in which students learn about ability.
My paper is also related to the grading standards literature, which stresses
the role of ability in students’ responses to grades. Becker & Rosen (1992) and
Betts (1998) show theoretically that higher grading standards encourage high
ability students to put more effort, while students below standard might be
discouraged. Betts & Grogger (2003) empirically confirm the heterogeneous
effects of increasing grading standards at the high school level, while Figlio &
Lucas (2004) find that higher standards lead to positive results on test scores,
with effects that depend on the ability of the student relative to the class. In my
setup untreated students do not observe grades, but only test scores. Absent
grades, low-SES students are likely to have lower grading standards than high-
SES students (for instance because the difficulty of the tests follow class ability),
so that introducing grades should lead to positive effects for high-SES students
and negative effects for low-SES students. My results do not confirm this, as I
find different reactions to grades within SES.
The grading reform I consider has been previously studied in economics
by Sjo¨gren (2010) and in the educational psychology literature by Alli Klapp
(2014, 2015).8 Sjo¨gren’s paper uses administrative data to study long-run effects
(final education and income) of the overall grading reform. She finds evidence
of a positive effect of early grading on educational attainment for girls, and a
negative effect for high-SES students. Differences in educational attainment are
7Early grade assignment has a bigger impact in tracked education systems because students
face early choices, and benefit more of timely information about ability. This point has not
received much attention in the tracking literature (e.g., Brunello & Checchi, 2007).
8Klapp’s papers are descriptive regression-control studies
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found also before and after the reform took place, which casts some doubts on
the robustness of the results. My paper focuses on the mechanisms through
which grades affect education choice, and is motivated by a learning model.
Results appear to be more robust, as tests for parallel trends in educational
attainment do not fail. This is likely due to the different cohorts used: Sjo¨gren
needs to assume parallel trends over two decades, while I only need to assume
parallel trends within a 5-year period.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2 I describe the data, the
education system, and the grading reforms. In Section 1.3 I set up the sequential
choice learning model that guides the empirical analysis, and illustrate the
solution of the model. Section 1.4 discusses the model’s results. In Section
1.5 I turn to the empirical analysis, and discuss identification, inference and
robustness. Section 1.6 discusses empirical results, while Section 1.7 relates
them to the literature. Section 1.8 draws conclusions.
1.2 Institutional Setup
1.2.1 Data
I use survey data matched to administrative data. The surveys are part of Evalu-
ation Through Follow-up (ETF), a longitudinal project which surveys every 5
years representative samples of Swedish students enrolled in compulsory school.
I use waves 3 and 4 of the study, corresponding to cohorts born approximately
in 1967 and 1972.9 The 1967 cohort was followed from 1980, when students
were in school year 6 (most students were 13 at the time). The 1972 cohort was
followed from 1982, when students were in school year 3 (most students were
10 at the time).
Each sample consists of roughly 9000 Swedish compulsory school students
(10% of the targeted population) living in 29 (out of 290)municipalities, the
lowest administrative division in Sweden. Whole classes were systematically
sampled from municipalities, and the same municipalities were extracted in
both waves.10 The final sample is thus a repeated cross-section, which allows
me to implement a difference in differences identification strategy.
9In the following I will refer to the two samples as 1967 and 1972 cohort.
10Municipalities are drawn using stratified sampling. Strata are defined by population, frac-
tion of left-wing voters, fraction working in the public sector and fraction of immigrants.
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The survey data contains relevant information for the analysis. First, sam-
pled students took standard intelligence tests in verbal, logical and spatial ability
in school year 6, before end-of-the-year grades were assigned. The tests are
exactly the same for both cohorts, which grants comparability of the intelli-
gence measures over time. At the time of the tests students were 13, a point in
which IQ should have already stabilized (Cunha & Heckman, 2009). I can thus
investigate the effects of early grading using proper measures of ability, rather
than previous performance measures. Second, grades and course choices in
compulsory school are recored from school registers. This allows me to inspect
the effect of early grading right after grades were assigned. Third, children filled
in detailed surveys in school years 6 and 10 (the first year of high school). They
were asked questions about own ability, courses and high school track choices,
well being and motivation in school. I use children responses about stress,
anxiety, and motivation as outcomes to understand whether early grades had
motivating/demotivating effects on the children, a main concern in the policy
debate. Finally, parents were surveyed when children received their first survey.
They were asked questions about school choices and priorities. This evidence
helps to understand whether and to what extent choices of parents living in
early grading municipalities differ from those of parents living in municipalities
where early grades were abolished.
I match to the sample high quality register data from Statistics Sweden. For
both cohorts I observe parental education, income and demographics. These
variables allow me to test for compositional change in the sample, and allow to
increase precision in the main specification. The registers record educational
attainment, income, and income mobility at ages 33-40 for both cohorts. This
allows me to evaluate how the short- and medium-run effects of early grading
transmit to the labor market.
1.2.2 The Education System
Table 1.1 summarizes the Swedish educational setup for the two cohorts in
my sample. Compulsory school (Grundskola) started at age 7 and lasted 9
years. It was formally divided in three stages, that could also entail physically
The three biggest municipalities in Sweden (Stockholm, Malmo¨, Gothenburg) are always
part of the sample. Further details on the sampling scheme can be found in Emanuelsson
(1979).
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changing schools: early compulsory school (grades 1-3), middle compulsory
school (grades 4-6), and late compulsory school (grades 7-9). Standardized end-
of-the-year grades were released at the end of each education cycle, and in every
year during late compulsory school. Early grades were over time abolished.
The next section provides details about the grades and the grading reforms.
Table 1.1: Structure of Swedish education
Compulsory school Non Compulsory school
Early and
Middle
Late
High
School
College
Age 7-12 13-15 16-19
Selection:
- HS track
- GPA or
SweSAT
Funding:
- Free tuition
and grants
- Loans for liv-
ing expenses
School
Year
1-6 7-9 10-12
Grades (3), (6) (7), 8, 9 10-12
Choices -
General or
advanced
courses
Vocational
or
academic
track
Selection - -
GPA and
course
choices
The education system was tracked. In the spring of school year 6 children
had to choose whether to take math and English at the advanced or general
level in the next school year. Academic electives provided better preparation
for academic tracks in high school. Students were allowed to switch course
type over time. At the end of compulsory school, students could enroll in
either academic or vocational high school tracks. Vocational tracks lasted two
years, provided professional training, and did not allow direct access to college.
Academic high school lasted three or four years, prepared for college, and was
selective.11
After academic high school graduation (or taking one more year of high
school after vocational school) students became eligible to apply to college.
11A high grade 9 GPA and advanced math electives in compulsory school could be used as
admission requirement.
14
A student quota, set by the government, limited access to college. Slots were
competitively assigned to the students with highest GPA or SweSAT (a college
entry test similar to the American SAT).12 College was tuition-free, and a mix
of grants and income-contingent loans allowed admitted students to pay for
living expenses. Higher education was thus both meritocratic and competitive.
Appendix 1.B.2 presents detailed evidence on education choices and attainment
for sampled students.
1.2.3 Grades and the Reform
Standardized grades in math, English and Swedish were assigned at the end of
specific school years during compulsory school. Grades were norm-referenced
at the national level: they represented student performance with reference
to the whole student cohort.13 Given that only homework and test scores
were assigned during the school year, grades provided students with additional
information about school performance. In particular grades provided a first
idea of their chances of admission to college, which was restricted by a quota
system.
The school year in which grades were first assigned was over time postponed
from school year 3, when students were 10, to school year 8, when they were
15.14 Up to 1968 grades were assigned in school years 3, 6, 7, 8 and 9. In 1969 a
curriculum reform (Curriculum Lgr 69) allowed municipal school boards to
abolish “early” grades, that is, grades in school years 3 and 6. As a substitute
for the abolished grades the reform introduced parent-teacher conferences, non-
compulsory biannual meetings in which teachers evaluated pupil improvement
over the year. Sjo¨gren (2010) reports that supporters of early grade abolition
were concerned about early grades harming low SES or poorly performing
12O¨ckert (2002) reports that around 50% of the students were rejected admission to college
in the period I study, confirming the selective nature of Swedish higher education.
13Tests were corrected by the teachers. The government used the scores to determine the
national grade distribution. When assigning final grades, teachers could deviate from test
scores, if they thought the student test performance did not reflect proficiency.
14In 2012 grades were reintroduced in school year 6, and the government is considering as-
signing grades also in school year 4.
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students. The idea behind the reform was that of making the class environment
less competitive and more inclusive.
Since 1969 more and more municipalities took the chance to abolish grades
in the early school years, but the issue was contentious. Left parties (Social
Democrats and Communists) in general favored early grades abolition, while
right-wing parties (Center party and Moderate Party) leaned towards keeping
the early grades (this is confirmed in Figure 1.B.2 on page 86). In the end the
government, led by a socialist majority, chose to abolish “early grading” in all
municipalities: starting from 1982 (Curriculum Lgr 80) end-of-the-year grades
were released only starting from school year 8, when children were 15.
1969 1982
Final reform: no grades 
allowed in school  years 3 
and 6
1984
Early reform: possibility 
to abolish grades in 
school years 3 and 6
school year 6:
1979 1981
1976
school year 3:
Cohort
1967
Cohort
1972
Cohort
1972
Cohort
1967
Figure 1.1: Grading reform timeline and sampled cohorts
Figure 1.1 shows in a timeline how the reforms affected the two cohorts in
the sample. Half of the municipalities in the 1967 cohort sample were assigning
grades in school year 6, while the rest had abolished them.15 Grade assignment
in school year 3 is not recorded in my data for this cohort, as the children were
followed from school year 6. Using information provided in Sjo¨gren (2010), I
can assume that the municipalities assigning grades in year 6 could have been
also assigning grades in year 3. However municipalities not assigning grades
in year 6 should have also abolished grades in school year 3. No municipality
15Figure 1.B.3 shows in a map which sampled municipalities were assigning early grades.
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in the 1972 cohort sample was assigning grades in school year 6. While the
final reform was effective the year after the children born in this cohort were
in school year 3, my data reports that no grades were assigned in school year 3.
Finally end-of-the-year grades were assigned for all cohorts and municipalities
in school years 8 and 9.16
Table 1.2: Grade assignment
1967
Cohort
1972
Cohort
Early Grading
Municipalities
(Treatment)




(Year 3)
Year 6
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 8
Year 9
Late Grading
Municipalities
(Control)
Year 7
Year 8
Year 9
Year 8
Year 9
In the following I emphasize the role of grades in school year 6, rather than
school year 3. First, treatment status in my analysis is based on grade assignment
in school year 6. Second, grades at the age of 13 are arguably more relevant
than grades at age 10, the end of early compulsory school. At that stage, grades
might be more informative of effort, or preferences for education, rather than
academic ability. Finally, after school year 6 students had to choose whether to
take math and English at the general or advanced level. Grades in school year 6
should thus be more relevant for education choices.
Table 1.2 summarizes the grading structure. I label “treatment municipali-
ties” those municipalities that were assigning grades in school year 6 before the
final reform, “control municipalities” those not assigning grades in school year
6 before the final reform. The treatment is thus receiving early grades in school
year 6 (and potentially 3), which holds for students born in 1967 who lived in
early grading municipalities.
16Differently from earlier school years, they were assigned two times per year, at the end of
each semester. Details are taken from Skolverket.
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1.3 Model
The model presented in this section investigates how early grading affects stu-
dents’ education choices and attainment when grades convey information about
ability. The qualitative predictions of the model are compared to empirical
results in Section 1.6.
1.3.1 Structure of the Model
The model focuses on the link between early education choices, educational
attainment, and lifetime income. I model explicitly early phases of education,
and treat non-compulsory education and the labor market as realizations. The
structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Vocational high school
Medium wage High wage (with high ability)
No high school
Low wage
Middle compulsory school:
If grades are assigned, children update priors and, potentially, revise effort choices.
Late compulsory school:
Grades are assigned. Children update priors and, potentially, revise effort and high school choices.
Academic high school
College
Early compulsory school:
No grades are assigned. Children choose effort based on their family background (SES).
Figure 1.2: Structure of the model
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Compulsory education is divided, as in my setup, into three periods: early
compulsory school (t1), middle compulsory school (t2), and late compulsory
school (t3). In each period student i chooses how much effort to exert: eit ∈
{1, 2, 3}. Effort choices and academic ability (ai) determine the stock of knowl-
edge (kit) the student accumulates:17
kit = ωt(αai + βeit) + δkit−1. (1.1)
After the end of compulsory education students have three choices. They can
go to work (E1) and earn low wages (w1). They can enroll into vocational high
school (E2) and study for two years, or enroll into academic high school (E3)
and study for 3 years. Both high school tracks grant medium wage (w2 = w3)
upon graduation. Academic high school is the only option that gives access to
college (E4), which lasts 4 years and grants upon graduation wages that increase
with academic ability: w4 = f(ai).18
Completing higher levels of education and accessing academic high school
requires higher knowledge (and thus higher ability and effort) at the end of
period 3. Notice that knowledge is here not productive per se, as wages fully de-
pend on attained education and ability. This is consistent with a signaling model
where employers are uncertain about workers’ ability, but observe attained
education (Spence, 1974). Higher education is attained in equilibrium only by
high-ability workers, who fetch higher wages in the market. The knowledge
thresholds at time 3 are the following:
k¯E2 < kE3 < k¯E3 < k¯E4 , (1.2)
where kEj and k¯Ej are respectively the entry and attainment requirements for
education level Ej . Failure to meet the thresholds results in dropout (assumed
at the midpoint of each education level), and thus in foregone earnings. Given
that high school grants the same wage independently of track, it is optimal to
enter academic high school only under the expectation to be able to complete
college.19 Academic ability indeed determines optimal education and effort
17The three stages of education have different lengths in my setup. Weights ωt adjust the
length of each stage to mimic the actual setup.
18As this is a stylized model, returns to education do not reflect the substantial wage hetero-
geneity documented in the literature (Arcidiacono, 2004; Hussey et al, 2011).
19Notice also that I do not model entry to college, and simply consider people staying out as
college dropouts.
THE IMPACT OF EARLY GRADING 19
choices. Low-ability students (ai ∈ {1, 2, 3}) optimally choose vocational school,
and put during compulsory school levels of effort inversely proportional to
their ability: to reach the same education level, a weaker student needs to
exert higher effort in school. The optimal education choice of high-ability
students (ai ∈ {4, 5}) is academic high school, and thus college. To attain college
education they need to exert higher effort in compulsory school.
Students are uncertain about academic ability: a˜it ∼ ft(ai). They have pri-
ors reflecting the ability distribution by SES: f1(ai) = f(ai|SES). In particular
low-SES students have on average lower ability than high-SES students. Grades
are unbiased ability signals, and allow students to update their priors about
academic ability. They can be assigned in middle compulsory school, and are
always assigned in late compulsory school, before students choose high school
track:
gi2 = d(ai + 2) with 2 ∼ N
(
0, σ22()
)
, (1.3)
gi3 = d(ai + 3) with 3 ∼ N
(
0, σ23()
)
, (1.4)
where d is a function that maps the normal values into the discrete ability scale.
Grades assigned in late compulsory school are more precise than grades assigned
in middle compulsory school: σ22() > σ23(). This reflects the fact that more
grades are assigned in the last period of compulsory school.
Table 1.3: Information structure
Early grades Late grades
f1(ai) f(ai|SES) f(ai|SES)
f2(ai) f(ai|gi2, SES) f(ai|SES)
f3(ai) f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES) f(ai|gi3, SES)
Table 1.3 makes explicit the information structure in the three periods. If
early grades are not assigned in period 2, students’ beliefs remain unchanged:
f2(ai) = f(ai|SES). Otherwise they are updated: f2(ai) = f(ai|gi2, SES). In
period 3 grades are always assigned, so that f3(ai) = f(ai|gi3, SES) if no grades
are assigned in middle compulsory school, and f3(ai) = f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES) with
early grades. Finally, when students update their priors about ability in period
20
τ , they revise their beliefs about accumulated or future knowledge at time t:
k˜it,τ =
5∑
j=1
Pτ (ai = j)×
[
ωt(αj + βeit) + δk˜it−1,τ
]
. (1.5)
1.3.2 Optimal Choice
Given their information about ability in period τ , students consider optimal
effort and education choices in any subsequent period t ≥ τ . They choose the
education level that gives the highest utility, and the associated optimal effort
level eE?it,τ :
e?it,τ = arg max
eEs?it,τ
{
V E1i (e
E1?
it , V
E2
i,τ (e
E2?
it,τ ), V
E3
i,τ (e
E3?
it,τ )
}
. (1.6)
The value of compulsory school, V 1i , does not depend on ability, and is thus
not indexed by time. It is maximized when effort is set to the lowest level, so
it is a constant: V 1?i = k. As vocational and academic high school have access
and attainment requirements, values V E2i,τ and V
E3
i,τ depend on students’ beliefs
about ability. They are indexed by the time index τ , as k˜i3,τ changes when new
information is revealed:
V E2i,τ =
∑3
t=τ C(e
E2?
it,τ ) + P (k˜i3,τ ≥ k¯E2)× U((L− 2)× w2) (1.7)
+P (k˜i3,τ < k¯
E2)U((L− 1)× w1))
V E3i,τ =
∑3
t=τ C(e
E3?
it ) + P (k˜i3,τ ≥ k¯E4)× U((L− 7)× w3(ai)) + (1.8)
P (k¯E3 ≤ k˜i3,τ < k¯E4)× U((L− 5)× w2)
+P (kE3 ≤ k˜i3,τ < k¯E3)× U((L− 2)× w1) +
P (k˜i3,τ < k
E3)×[
P (k˜i3,τ ≥ k¯E2)× U((L− 2)× w2 + P (k˜i3,τ < k¯E2)× U((L− 1)× w1)
]
.
C is a convex cost function, U is a concave utility function, and L is the number
of working years.
The effect of grades
When students are assigned grades they update their priors in the direction of
their true ability level. Figures 1.A.5 to 1.A.9 in Appendix 1.A.2 show priors
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and posterior distributions of ability after grades are assigned. Updating can
have two effects: an “income” and a “substitution” effect. When the student
realizes she has higher (lower) ability than expected, she revises the level of
knowledge accumulated upward (downward). Provided the optimal education
choice has not changed, the student will need to put weakly less (more) effort
to reach the level of non-compulsory education she was targeting, an “income
effect”:
∂eEs?it
∂a˜it
∣∣∣∣
E?t =E
?
t−1
=
∂k˜ti3
∂a˜it
× ∂e
Es?
it
∂k˜ti3
≤ 0. (1.9)
If after observing the signal expected ability is high (low) enough to alter opti-
mal educational choice, the student will instead revise effort choices upward
(downward), a “substitution effect”:20
∂eEs?it
∂a˜it
∣∣∣∣
E?t 6=E?t−1
=
∂k˜ti3
∂a˜it
× ∂e
Es?
it
∂k˜ti3
≥ 0. (1.10)
1.4 Model’s Results
Before discussing the model’s predictions, it is important to be clear about
the purpose of the model. First, the model is meant to qualitatively assess the
effect of early grades in the specific setup I consider. I calibrate to the data the
key parameters of the model, ability distributions and education payoffs. I
set thresholds for educational attainment such that higher levels of education
require both higher ability and effort. Parameters with no direct counterpart in
the data (knowledge production function, precision of grade signals, and value
function parameters) are fixed to specific values.21 Appendix 1.A.1 contains
further details on calibration, and provides evidence on model assumptions.
Second, I do not estimate the model. While this might be an interesting direction
for future research, my aim here is to generate qualitative predictions of the
effect of early grading in a learning model, rather than fitting the data.
20Higher education levels always require higher knowledge.
21Results remain qualitatively the same when slightly changing the parameters. Extreme pa-
rameterizations lead to different predictions, but are also inconsistent with the data ob-
served.
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Table 1.4: Optimal choices under full information
ai ei1 ei2 ei3 E V
E
i,1
Low-ability
1 Medium Medium Medium Vocational 106.53
2 Medium Medium Low Vocational 112.63
3 Low High Low Vocational 115.84
High-ability
4 High High Medium Academic 126.49
5 Medium High Medium Academic 155.48
I solve numerically the model under three different information setups: late
grade assignment, early grade assignment and, as a benchmark, full informa-
tion.22 In Table 1.4 I show as a reference optimal effort and education choices
by ability level under full information. The “income effect” is clear for both
low- and high-ability students: for higher levels of ability it is optimal to put
less effort. The “substitution effect” appears when ability changes from 3 to 4:
students need to put higher effort early on in order to be able to attain college
education.
1.4.1 Effort in Compulsory School
Figure 1.3 shows optimal effort choices in t1, before grades are assigned. The fact
that additional information will arrive in t2 might change effort choices before
grades are released. This is not the case in the model. Under uncertainty about
ability, it is always optimal for both low- and high-SES students to keep effort
at a medium level. This is due to three reasons. First, uncertainty favors higher
effort early on: putting low effort in the beginning might actually prevent the
student from entering academic high school, and thus college. Second, even
if the student learns that she is high-ability in time, she would then need to
compensate for previous low effort levels: effort cost is convex, so this behavior
would not be optimal. Finally, knowledge production is cumulative, so it is
better to exert higher effort early on, when effort is more productive.
In middle compulsory school students can be assigned grades. Figure 1.A.10
in Appendix 1.A.3 compares posterior distributions of ability for low and high
SES students who get the same grades in t2. While all students update priors in
the right directions, updates differ by SES. Low (high) SES students who receive
22Appendix 1.A.2 presents the simulation and solution methods.
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low (high) grades confirm their priors, and thus their posterior distributions
have higher densities on low (high) ability levels. Students who receive grades
different from their priors form instead posterior distributions with higher
weight on intermediate values of ability. These posteriors are thus also less
precise.
Figure 1.4 shows the effect of early grading on effort choices in t2, by
aggregate (low or high) ability and SES. Results for each ability level, reported
in Appendix 1.A.3, are useful to better interpret the aggregate picture, so in the
following I refer to both pictures. Early grading changes optimal behavior in
middle compulsory school only for high-SES students: students who observe
signals consistent with high-ability put higher effort (see Figure 1.A.11). As
shown in table 1.4, this is consistent with optimal education choice: for high-
ability students it is optimal to exert high effort in middle compulsory school,
and then reduce effort in late compulsory school. Low-SES students do not
react differently at this stage, independently of ability. Their priors are set
lower, and hence posteriors about ability are less sensitive to the high grades
they observe.
In t3 all students are graded. Figure 1.5 shows that high-SES students with
high-ability strongly react to the additional grades, and put lower effort. To-
gether with the reaction in middle school, this can be overall interpreted as a
negative “income effect”. High-ability low-SES students react to early grades
in the opposite way: they increase effort. Against their priors, these students
realize they are high-ability. They thus switch education and effort choices (“a
substitution effect”). Low-ability students reduce effort when graded early on.
Figure 1.A.12 shows that the strongest reductions are found among low-SES
students. The aggregate effect for low-ability students masks a positive “income
effect” among lowest ability students. Figure 1.A.12 shows that, when graded
early on, these students put more effort to reach the same education level they
targeted (an “income effect”). This effect is strongest among low-SES students.
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27.9 43.2 28.9
100.0
31.2 46.8 22.0
100.0
High-SES
Low-SES
Full Info
Uncertainty
Full Info
Uncertainty
Early Effort Choice by Information Regime and SES
Low Medium High
Figure 1.3: Early effort choice by SES and information regime
Note: The Figure plots effort distributions in early compulsory school. Since in this period no
grades are assigned, choices are the same for both low and high ability students, and can only
differ by SES. Assigning early or late grades does not change effort choices in t1.
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100.0
100.0
100.0
54.1 45.9
100.0
100.0
High-ability
Low-ability
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
                              Low-SES
100.0
60.4 39.6
100.0
41.9 58.1
94.8 5.2
100.0
High-SES
Intermediate Effort Choice by Grading Regime, Ability and SES
Medium High
Figure 1.4: Intermediate effort choice by aggregate ability and SES for
different grading regimes
Note: The Figure plots effort distributions in middle compulsory school. Results are presented
for high-ability students, for whom it is optimal to follow an academic education path, and
low-ability students, whose optimal choice is vocational high school. SES affects students’s
priors about ability, and thus optimal choices.
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100.0
27.9 0.1 72.0
28.4 0.2 71.4
81.0 19.0
68.5 20.8 10.6
67.5 19.0 13.5
High-ability
Low-ability
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
                              Low-SES
100.0
17.2 21.7 61.1
19.6 0.1 80.3
87.3 12.7
69.0 12.1 18.9
66.4 12.5 21.2
High-SES
Late Effort Choice by Grading Regime, Ability and SES
Low Medium High
Figure 1.5: Late effort choice by aggregate ability and SES for different
grading regimes
Note: The Figure plots effort distributions in late compulsory school. Results are presented
for high-ability students, for whom it is optimal to follow an academic education path, and
low-ability students, whose optimal choice is vocational high school. SES affects students’s
priors about ability, and thus optimal choices.
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1.4.2 Education
Figures 1.6 and 1.A.13 show high school choices in the three information
regimes. When graded early on, low-ability students are less likely to choose
academic education paths. The effect is stronger for low-SES students. All
high-ability students are instead more likely to choose academic high school
with early grades. Among students with high (but not top) ability, the reaction
is stronger for high-SES students.
Figures 1.7 and 1.A.14 show final education distributions for the different
grading setups. The effects of early grades mirror those observed for education
choice. The main difference is that some high (but not top) ability students
with high-SES fail to attain college, and only complete academic high school.
These students observed signals consistent with top ability early on, lowered
effort, and thus failed to graduate from college (see Figure 1.A.16). No such
effect is found for low-SES students, who are actually less likely to dropout of
both high school (see Figure 1.A.15) and college (see Figure 1.A.16).
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100.0
28.0 72.0
28.6 71.4
100.0
89.4 10.6
86.5 13.5
High-ability
Low-ability
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
                              Low-SES
100.0
17.2 82.8
19.7 80.3
100.0
80.9 19.1
78.8 21.2
High-SES
High School Choice by Grading Regime, Ability and SES
Vocational Academic
Figure 1.6: High school choice by aggregate ability and SES for different
grading regimes
Note: The Figure plots high school choice distributions. Results are presented for high-ability
students, for whom it is optimal to follow an academic education path, and low-ability students,
whose optimal choice is vocational high school. SES affects students’s priors about ability, and
thus optimal choices.
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100.0
28.0 72.0
28.6 71.4
100.0
6.3 83.1 10.6
7.7 78.8 13.4
High-ability
Low-ability
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
Full Information
Early Grades
Late Grades
                              Low-SES
100.0
17.2 3.3 79.5
19.7 80.3
100.0
5.8 75.0 19.1
6.3 72.6 21.1
High-SES
Final Education by Grading Regime, Ability and SES
Compulsory Vocational HS Academic HS College
Figure 1.7: Final education by aggregate ability and SES for different grading
regimes
Note: The Figure plots final education distributions. Results are presented for high-ability
students, for whom it is optimal to follow an academic education path, and low-ability students,
whose optimal choice is vocational high school. SES affects students’s priors about ability, and
thus optimal choices.
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1.4.3 Summary of Results
In Table 1.5 I summarize the effects of early grading (the treatment) on education
choices, educational attainment, and income. The effects are reported for each
ability and SES group, and are compared to the baseline scenario (late grading,
in brackets).
In general early grades lead to an overall reduction in effort.23 Only high-
ability low-SES students - for whom positive “substitution effects” prevail - in-
crease effort when graded early on. While the mean reduction in effort is the
same for all low-ability students, effects are qualitatively different by SES. As
seen before, there are weaker negative “income effects” for high-SES students,
and stronger positive and negative “income effects” for low-SES students. The
biggest negative “income effect” on effort is found for high-ability high-SES
students, who are the most sensitive to high grade signals.
Staying out of high school is never optimal in the model, even when students
realize they have lower ability than expected. The rational choice for these
low-ability students is to enroll into vocational school, and later dropout if they
fall short of the required preparation. This does not change with early grades,
which instead have nontrivial effects on high school track choices: all low
ability-students are less likely to enroll into academic tracks, and the opposite
is true for high-ability students. Positive reactions are strongest for high-SES
students, while negative reactions are more pronounced for low-SES students.
Even if they reduced effort after observing early grades, all low-ability
students benefit of the early information, due to the different choices taken at
the end of compulsory school: dropout rates decrease, in particular for low-SES
students. This translates one to one into an increase in high school attainment.
Finally, college attainment increases for high-ability low-SES students, and
slightly decreases for high-ability high-SES students.
In the long-run the effects of early grades on education translate into small
increases in lifetime income for all students, with the exception of high-ability
high-SES students. Effects on income are pretty small, and close to 0. Most of
the gains in utility are due to the early reductions in effort, so that early grading
improves on average the welfare of all students.
All in all the simulations show that assigning grades earlier leads to choices
23I take a weighted average of middle and late effort choices in order to provide a more com-
plete picture on the effects of early grades on effort choice.
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and education outcomes more consistent with academic ability, with responses
differing by SES. Lowest ability students are more likely to increase effort
when graded early on, especially if low-SES. Low to medium ability students
reduce effort in compulsory school, in particular if low-SES, but are more
likely to choose vocational tracks, which they are able to complete. High-
ability low-SES students increase effort in compulsory school, are more likely
to choose academic paths, and to attain college. For high-ability high-SES
students, “income effects” tend to prevail: these students put less effort when
they observe high grades, which leads some of them to fail to graduate from
college.
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Table 1.5: Summary of the effects of early grade assignment
Outcome: Low-Ability High-Ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Effort in late -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.07
compulsory school [1.92] [1.55] [1.62] [2.36] [2.51]
HS Enrollment 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]
Academic track -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02
HS Enrollment [0.40] [0.13] [0.21] [0.71] [0.80]
HS Dropout -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.04] [0.08] [0.06] [0.00] [0.00]
Attains HS 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.96] [0.92] [0.94] [1.00] [1.00]
Attains College -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01
[0.30] [0.00] [0.00] [0.71] [0.80]
Income (0-1 scale) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00
[0.75] [0.67] [0.68] [0.85] [0.88]
Utility 0.51 0.62 0.39 0.23 0.67
[117.01] [107.83] [107.20] [128.91] [133.17]
Values in brackets represent outcomes when only late grades are assigned. Effort is defined on
a 1-3 scale (1 is low effort). Income is a measure of lifetime income, and assumes everybody
starts working right after finishing their education or dropping out.
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1.5 Empirics
In this section I discuss identification of the effect of early grading on education
choices. I then briefly discuss inference in my setup, and lastly provide evidence
on identifying assumptions.
1.5.1 Identification
The decision to assign early grades was taken by municipal school boards, and,
as previously discussed, correlates with the political color of the municipality.
Treatment assignment is thus likely not random with respect to education
outcomes. A simple comparison of outcomes between grading and non-grading
municipalities would pick up systematic differences between the two sets of
municipalities, and thus bias OLS.
In Appendix 1.B.3 I test for differences in pre-treatment variables between
graded and non-graded municipalities in the 1967 cohort. Table 1.B.7 shows that
in graded municipalities children are less likely to be foreign born, score better
in the ability tests, and are less likely to switch classes over compulsory school.
In terms of school level variables (changes of teachers, class size, kindergarten)
there are no big differences, in line with the homogeneous nature of Swedish
education. Parents in grading municipalities (Tables 1.B.8 to 1.B.12) are less
likely to divorce and more likely to be married. They are slightly poorer, less
educated, and more likely to be employed in low-skill jobs or agriculture. When
asked about how they chose math and English courses, and the priorities of
Swedish education, parents give very similar answers. The only differences, the
weight they put on the role of parents in school choice and critical thinking
in school, do not seem to imply a different preference for children educational
attainment. Altogether it appears that there are some small differences in
determinants of education choice between the two sets of municipalities. The
differences in parental education seem to reflect a different structure of the
economy, rather than different preferences for education.
A simple cross-sectional comparison of outcomes for treated and untreated
municipalities would likely lead to a negative bias, due to the pre-existing dif-
ferences between treated and control units. Given that I observe treatment
and control group before and after the final reform, when early grades were
abolished, I can “control” for any persistent difference between the two sets of
municipalities. If outcomes trend in the same way in the two municipalities
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Figure 1.8: Difference in differences identification strategy
(parallel trends assumption), it is possible to isolate the effect of early grades. This
situation is pictured in Figure 1.8: while the two sets of municipalities exhibit
differences in outcomes unrelated to grade assignment, these differences are sta-
ble over time. Observed outcomes for the 1967 treated cohort can be compared
to the counterfactual outcomes that would have been observed for the same
set of municipalities absent the treatment (early grades). This counterfactual is
given by the trend observed for the ungraded municipalities, assumed to be the
same for treated municipalities. The effect of early grading is represented in
the picture by the white arrow. The empirical specification that implements
the difference in differences identification strategy is the following:
Yimc = α + βasGradedm × 1967c + 1967c + Municm + ∆Ximc + imc (1.11)
a∈{Low ability, High ability}; s∈{Low SES, High SES},
where i indexes the individual,m the municipality, and c the cohort. Municm is a
vector of fixed effects that captures persistent cross-sectional differences between
municipalities. 1967c is a dummy that controls for the trend in outcomes. The
variable Gradedm×1967c picks up any differences in outcomes between grading
and non-grading municipalities, that are not persistent, or the same, over time.
Under the parallel trends assumption βas represents the causal effect of early
grading. Consistently with the model, the effect is allowed to differ by ability
and SES, indexed respectively by a and s in equation 1.11. SES and ability are
measured respectively using parental education and ability tests administered
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in school year 6.24 Notice that any determinant of the outcome that changes
over time in a different way between the two sets of municipalities will also
enter βas, and thus bias the coefficient. Observable compositional change can
be controlled for in the regression by adding Ximc, a vector of time varying
pre-treatment controls. These covariates also increase precision of the estimates.
1.5.2 Inference
Sample size is large (around 18000 observation), but the treatment, grade assign-
ment, varies at the municipal level. There are 29 municipalities in my sample,
and half of them are treated before the reform. I conservatively cluster standard
errors at the municipal level, rather than at the municipal-cohort level, which
would result in twice as many clusters.25 While the standard solution is to
use cluster robust standard errors (Arellano, 1987; White, 1984), the number
of clusters must be high for these standard errors to be unbiased. Cameron
et al (2008) show that cluster-robust standard errors are downward biased in
samples with few balanced (equally sized) clusters. They instead propose to
use Cluster Bootstrap-t methods with null hypothesis imposed, and find that
these methods yield the right p-values even with relatively few clusters (as few
as 20). In a recent working paper MacKinnon & Webb (2014) confirm the good
performance of the Cluster Bootstrap-t in the realistic case in which clusters are
unbalanced. The Cluster Bootstrap-t is shown to perform well when treatment
has enough variance.
My sample consists of 29 municipalities, both small and big. Treatment
is given by the interaction between belonging to the cohort born 1967 and
studying in an early grading municipality, which holds for about a quarter
of the sample. There are thus enough clusters and treatment variation to be-
lieve that the Cluster Bootstrap-t should guarantee unbiased standard errors in
my analysis. So in all my specifications I bootstrap standard errors using the
method suggested by Cameron et al (2008). I also use sample weights to recover
nationally representative estimates.
24Appendix 1.B.1 provides further details on ability and SES measures, and on the way I
discretize them to match the model.
25This is suggested in Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) for the case of panels. My
final dataset is instead a cluster-panel, so there should be less correlation between clusters
over time.
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1.5.3 Testing for Identifying Assumptions
Difference in differences identifies the causal effect of assigning early grades
under a specific set of assumptions. The most important one, as discussed before,
is the parallel trends assumption: outcomes should trend similarly in both
early grading and late grading municipalities. The assumption is more credible
when the treated and untreated populations are not so different, especially in
terms of “characteristics that are thought to be associated with the dynamics
of the outcome variable” (Abadie 2005). This was shown to be the case above.
In Appendix 1.C.1 I use administrative data from Statistics Sweden to test
whether education and its determinants evolve in the same way in the two sets
of municipalities: all tests pass. In particular trends in education for cohorts
who went through compulsory school when all municipalities had abolished
early grades (cohorts born 1969 onwards) appear to be parallel. The evidence
thus supports the main assumption underlying the identification strategy.
A testable assumption of the identification strategy is that differences be-
tween treatment and control group in determinants of the outcome should be
stable over time (e.g., there should be no compositional change). In the same
way, response rates should be the same between treated and controls units over
time (e.g., there should be no differential attrition).26 In Appendix 1.C.2 I test
for differential attrition and compositional change in the sample. First, there
is no differential response to the student surveys and, importantly, I find no
differential attrition in availability of SES and ability data. Second, it appears
that the cross-sectional differences between grading non-grading municipalities
are broadly stable over time. I find compositional change in specific parental
occupations and education levels. Therefore in my final specification I also
control for occupational dummies and parental education.27
A further assumption in the difference in differences setup is that the treated
population should not change as a reaction to treatment assignment. In my setup
this means that the students born 1967 should not enroll into different schools
to get/avoid early grades. As catchment areas determined the compulsory
school the student attended, parents had to relocate to a different municipality
26Both compositional change and differential attrition can lead to biased difference in differ-
ences coefficients (Blundell & Costa Dias, 2009).
27Results are robust to excluding income and parental controls. I include those variables to
increase precision of the estimates.
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if they desired a different grading policy for their children. Alternatively they
could send their children to a private school. The first scenario seems highly
unlikely, while private schools were not common in that period.
Finally it is important for identification that treatment and control group do
not undergo different shocks over time. The presence of concurrent education
reforms would be a problem in my setup if they were implemented at the
municipal level. During the period I consider, schooling was quite centralized,
with national curricula determining most of school policies. There is thus
little scope for additional policies being differentially implemented in the two
sets of municipalities. On top of that, the two cohorts I use in my analysis
received their education in a relatively stable educational system: Sweden had
already implemented the reforms of the 60s for the 9-year inclusive compulsory
school, while the market-oriented school reforms of the 90s did not affect these
cohorts.28
1.6 Empirical Results
The outcomes in the empirical analysis match those of the model. This allows
me to understand whether empirical findings are consistent with students learn-
ing about their academic ability from grades. I thus investigate the effect of
early grades on short-term effort choices, high school choices and attainment,
and, finally, educational attainment and income. I also consider an alternative
mechanism through which grades might affect education choices: grades might
motivate/demotivate students, and thus affect their welfare.
I present difference in differences estimates from specification 1.11, which
I re-parametrize to directly get coefficients for each ability − SES cell. In all
specifications I control for ability (verbal and inductive ability normalized to the
cohort-treatment level), basic demographics (gender, birth year, foreign status,
special education), SES (income, parental occupation dummies, and education)
and school-level variables (class size and teacher changes). For every outcome I
report the point estimate, the p-value in parentheses, and, as a reference, the
sample mean in brackets.29
28The reforms are described respectively by Meghir & Palme (2005) and Bjo¨rklund et al
(2005).
29The wild cluster bootstrap with null imposed does not yield standard errors.
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There are two caveats when interpreting results. First, estimates are not
very precise, so I can not detect very small effects. Second, I test many hypothe-
ses, which in principle creates problems of false null rejection. Notice that
the two problems go in opposite directions, and that the multiple hypothesis
testing problem is less severe than it seems: most of the outcomes are strongly
correlated, or can be considered different proxies for the same underlying vari-
able (e.g., grades and course choices proxy for effort choice). Keeping this in
mind, when I interpret results I focus on the overall picture rather than on
single coefficients.
1.6.1 Effort in Compulsory School
In Tables 1.6 and 1.7 I investigate effects of early grades on school effort. The
first Table reports effects on math and English course choices, which can be
interpreted both as effort choices (academic courses are more challenging), and
as early school choices reflecting future track selection (advanced courses are
good preparation for academic high school). The second Table reports effects
on grades in late compulsory school, which are straightforward measures of
school effort.30
Low-ability students, especially those with low-SES, reacted to early grade
assignment by switching to non-academic English, which can be interpreted
as a reduction in effort (columns 2 and 3 in Table 1.6). The switches appear in
grade 8, the first time in which the students could respond to grades released
at the end of school year 6, and persist in school year 9.31 Switches in course
choice are observed for English, but not for math. One possible explanation is
that parents and children already had feedback in math due to the correction
of exercises. At this proficiency level parents could probably test children’s
math skills more than their English proficiency.32 High-ability students did not
revise course choices when graded early on.
Low-ability low-SES students exhibit worse math performance when graded
early on (see column 2 and 3 of Table 1.7). High-ability high-SES students
30This is especially true of Swedish, a subject that does not involve any additional choice.
31The courses were chosen at the end of school year 6 for year 7, before final grades were
released.
32The parents of the treated students were born in the 40s: at that time English proficiency
was less widespread among parents than it is now the case in Sweden.
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show instead higher English and Swedish grades when they receive the early
grades. One can clearly see from the standardized Swedish test, which has
more variation due to the different scale, that all low-ability students performed
worse after being assigned early grades, while high-ability students performed
better. Negative effects are stronger for low-SES students, positive effects are
instead more pronounced for the high-SES students. In the aggregate no effect
is found, as both positive and negative effects are summed up. This confirms
the importance of looking at heterogeneous effects. The pattern found in the
model is thus reproduced by the data: low (high) ability students are putting less
(more) effort, and effects are stronger for low (high) SES students. However,
high-ability high-SES students are putting more effort, rather than reducing it,
as in the model. This implies that “substitution”, rather than “income effects”,
are prevailing. This can be easily rationalized within the model, assuming that
different majors require different ability levels. Then it is easy to see that these
students would react to high grades by further increasing effort.
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Table 1.6: Effects on course choices (school years 7-9):
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Advanced Math 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04
(school year 7) (0.94) (0.70) (0.84) (0.50) (0.47)
[0.73] [0.54] [0.72] [0.90] [0.95]
Advanced Math -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.00
(school year 8) (0.80) (1.00) (0.26) (0.40) (0.94)
[0.66] [0.43] [0.64] [0.87] [0.96]
Advanced Math 0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.05
(school year 9) (0.64) (0.74) (0.97) (0.58) (0.16)
[0.57] [0.32] [0.53] [0.76] [0.90]
Advanced English 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.05
(school year 7) (0.90) (0.60) (0.88) (0.15) (0.21)
[0.75] [0.57] [0.76] [0.91] [0.97]
Advanced English -0.05** -0.06*** -0.07 -0.01 -0.01
(school year 8) (0.02) (0.01) (0.19) (0.48) (0.63)
[0.73] [0.53] [0.73] [0.91] [0.97]
Advanced English -0.06* -0.07** -0.08 -0.05 -0.01
(school year 9) (0.06) (0.02) (0.12) (0.14) (0.58)
[0.68] [0.46] [0.65] [0.87] [0.95]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. All speci-
fications control for basic demographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the
treatment-cohort level) and parental background.
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Table 1.7: Effects on grades (school years 8 and 9):
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Math Grade -0.02 -0.08* -0.04 0.05 0.07
(school year 8) (0.75) (0.07) (0.64) (0.14) (0.32)
[3.04] [2.70] [2.87] [3.35] [3.59]
Math Grade -0.11 -0.15** -0.13 -0.04 -0.06
(school year 9) (0.12) (0.02) (0.20) (0.68) (0.42)
[3.20] [2.86] [3.03] [3.54] [3.73]
English Grade 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.17***
(school year 8) (0.25) (0.98) (0.11) (0.79) (0.00)
[3.05] [2.70] [2.86] [3.37] [3.61]
English Grade 0.05 -0.03 0.12 0.05 0.16***
(school year 9) (0.21) (0.57) (0.11) (0.48) (0.00)
[3.18] [2.82] [3.05] [3.46] [3.73]
Swedish Grade 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.17***
(school year 8) (0.47) (0.38) (0.58) (0.13) (0.00)
[3.06] [2.64] [2.91] [3.43] [3.68]
Swedish Grade 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.14** 0.18***
(school year 9) (0.17) (0.76) (0.64) (0.01) (0.01)
[3.17] [2.69] [3.03] [3.54] [3.86]
Swedish Test 0.18 -3.64*** -1.54** 4.49*** 6.14***
(school year 9) (0.84) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
[15.84] [13.43] [13.25] [19.96] [18.51]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. Math and English
pool together grades for advanced and general courses. All specifications control for basic
demographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the treatment-cohort level) and parental
background.
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1.6.2 Education and Income
In Table 1.8 I report effects of early grades on high school choices, educational
attainment, and income. Contrary to what the model predicts, early grades do
not lead to different high school track choices. I observe instead an increase in
enrollment for all students. While this can be surprising (on average low-ability
students reduced effort in compulsory school), it is possible that lowest ability
students increased effort early on, and thus decided to enroll into high school.
This “income effect” was discussed in the model in Section 1.4.
When looking at educational attainment, I find an increase in high school
attainment at age 17-20 for high-ability low-SES students, mostly explained by
a reduction in high school dropout. In the long-run this effect becomes smaller
and close to insignificant. In Sweden adult education programs (Komvux) allow
people to complete further education: in the counterfactual scenario of late
grading students might still have been able to finish their high school education.
Moreover, I find that low-ability low-SES students are less likely to attain college.
These effects are qualitatively consistent with model’s predictions: a reduction
in dropout due to higher effort in compulsory school, and less low-ability
students ending up with an academic education.
Why do the short-run effects of early grades do not pass on to high school
track choice, and why is educational attainment not affected for high SES-
students? I propose as an explanation that preferences for education might
attenuate the effects of early grades. In Appendix 1.B.2 I show that, controlling
for ability, academic high school enrollment rates of high-SES students are 20
percentage points higher than those of low-SES students. At the same time
grade differences in late compulsory school between high- and low-SES students
are at most 14th of a grade. SES appears thus to strongly influence high school
choices in Sweden, independently of ability.
While it is important to assess how early grades affect education outcomes
to understand mechanisms, a full evaluation of the policy requires looking at
long-run outcomes. Early grade assignment does not significantly affect income
at ages 33-40, a good proxy of lifetime income in the Sweden labor market
(Bo¨rklund, 1993). This is consistent with the theoretical model, which also
generated very small effects on lifetime income. Early grading leads instead to
an increase in upward income mobility among low-ability low-SES students,
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who displayed the strongest downward revisions in education choices.33 I
conclude that, from the perspective of the labor market, early grades simply
allowed students to better sort by ability into education. For low-ability low-
SES students this implies a reduction of over-investment in education, and
potentially an in increase in total earnings.
33I consider upward mobile a student if she is 15 percentile ranks above the parents’ income
percentile rank.
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Table 1.8:
Effects on high school choices, educational attainment and income:
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
HS Enrollment 0.04** 0.03* 0.06** 0.03* 0.03**
(age 15-18) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)
[0.89] [0.85] [0.92] [0.93] [0.97]
Academic HS Track 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
(age 15-18) (0.55) (0.82) (0.85) (0.68) (0.13)
[0.47] [0.20] [0.44] [0.59] [0.81]
HS Dropout 0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.05** 0.02
(age 17-20) (0.98) (0.46) (0.53) (0.02) (0.34)
[0.13] [0.18] [0.12] [0.10] [0.08]
Attains HS 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.06*** -0.01
(age 17-20) (0.79) (0.49) (0.35) (0.01) (0.82)
[0.79] [0.72] [0.83] [0.86] [0.91]
Attains HS 0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.00
(age 33-40) (0.94) (0.19) (0.10) (0.14) (0.87)
[0.92] [0.88] [0.95] [0.96] [0.98]
College or more -0.02 -0.03* 0.02 -0.04 0.00
(age 33-40) (0.28) (0.06) (0.59) (0.23) (0.94)
[0.43] [0.22] [0.42] [0.52] [0.75]
Gross income 3.28 11.49 -3.64 -6.76 0.78
(age 33-40) (0.61) (0.21) (0.75) (0.62) (0.95)
[259.11] [223.88] [256.31] [269.89] [330.13]
↑ Income mobility 0.04** 0.08*** 0.02 0.01 0.02
(age 33-40) (0.02) (0.00) (0.54) (0.60) (0.60)
[0.34] [0.38] [0.27] [0.45] [0.28]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. HS Enrollment is
measured at ages 16-18, HS attainment at age 40. Income is measured at ages 33-40. ↑ Income
mobility is 1 when student income is 15 ranks above family income rank. All specifications
control for basic demographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the treatment-cohort
level) and parental background.
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1.6.3 Student Welfare
Part of the policy debate in Sweden, and in other countries that considered early
grades abolition, revolved around the concern that grades might demotivate
(motivate) students who put low (high) effort independently of their ability,
and create a competitive environment where weak students fare worse. If this
was the case students would derive disutility (utility) from low (high) grades,
and their preferences for education would be affected by their performance.
To validate this alternative mechanism I investigate the effects of early
grading on self-reported child welfare. Outcomes are taken from the student
surveys. The first survey was administered in school year 6, before final grades
were assigned. It should pick up potential effects due to the more competi-
tive/challenging environment. The second survey was assigned in school year
10, and asked many retrospective questions about how children were feeling
in late compulsory school, when I observe most of the effects of early grades.
Tables 1.9 and 1.10 show that, all in all, early grades did not significantly af-
fect student welfare.34 The only statistically significant effects are found for
low-ability low-SES students, who are less likely to report that they do well
in school before getting the grades, and also are less likely to report that they
enjoyed late compulsory school (school years 7-9). While the first finding is
not negative per se, since it shows that these students were more conscious
of their school performance, the second one might be more concerning for
policy-makers. However similar outcomes pertaining to school welfare show a
0 effect also for these students, so I am more inclined to consider the finding a
spurious effect.
34As explained before I cannot detect small effects, but I can state that there appears to be no
major effect.
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Table 1.9: Effects on behavior in school year 6:
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
I do well in school -0.04 -0.07** -0.08 -0.01 0.03
(0.15) (0.02) (0.13) (0.71) (0.23)
[0.73] [0.61] [0.69] [0.84] [0.89]
Parents think I do -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.03
well in school (0.27) (0.17) (0.11) (0.19) (0.11)
[0.89] [0.84] [0.86] [0.94] [0.96]
I do my best, even -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01
if boring (0.30) (0.29) (0.16) (0.77) (0.88)
[0.71] [0.73] [0.71] [0.71] [0.67]
I want to improve -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.03
in school (0.91) (0.77) (0.53) (0.36) (0.51)
[0.59] [0.71] [0.66] [0.47] [0.44]
I dislike answering -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.04*
questions (0.34) (0.21) (0.79) (0.87) (0.07)
[0.16] [0.21] [0.18] [0.14] [0.10]
I learn useless stuff 0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.01
at school (0.69) (0.33) (0.37) (0.97) (0.80)
[0.38] [0.39] [0.38] [0.40] [0.34]
I get disappointed 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
if I get bad scores (0.65) (0.58) (0.33) (0.34) (0.26)
[0.68] [0.63] [0.70] [0.69] [0.75]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. All specifications
control for basic demographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the treatment-cohort
level) and parental background.
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Table 1.10: Effects on behavior in late compulsory school:
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
I enjoyed grades -0.01 -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 0.01
7-9 (0.41) (0.07) (0.65) (0.69) (0.67)
[0.72] [0.71] [0.71] [0.75] [0.74]
I was worried in 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.01 -0.00
grades 7-9 (0.79) (0.72) (0.65) (0.75) (0.98)
[0.12] [0.13] [0.10] [0.11] [0.12]
I am happy with 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
grades 7-9 (0.81) (0.89) (0.86) (0.65) (0.86)
[0.75] [0.68] [0.71] [0.82] [0.85]
I got help at home -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02
in grades 7-9 (0.66) (0.52) (0.30) (0.62) (0.33)
[0.71] [0.67] [0.75] [0.68] [0.76]
I did my best even 0.01 -0.00 0.05 0.02 -0.00
if boring (0.62) (0.93) (0.14) (0.28) (1.00)
[0.47] [0.50] [0.47] [0.47] [0.45]
I did my best even -0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.02
if hard (1.00) (0.44) (0.17) (0.26) (0.55)
[0.71] [0.71] [0.70] [0.71] [0.74]
I learned useless 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.01
stuff at school (0.19) (0.27) (0.19) (0.17) (0.84)
[0.53] [0.57] [0.52] [0.54] [0.47]
I was stressed at 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
school (0.65) (0.76) (0.86) (0.93) (0.39)
[0.20] [0.20] [0.22] [0.19] [0.19]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. All specifications
control for basic demographics, relative ability measures (standardized at the treatment-cohort
level) and parental background.
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1.7 Discussion
In the following I assess how my results compare to previous literature on the
effects of grading information. Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2012) study
dropout behavior in Berea college, an institution with free tuition and subsi-
dized boarding catering to disadvantaged students. They find that dropout is
strongly explained by students revising downward their priors on academic
perforamnce. Similarly Zafar (2011) finds that Northwestern undergraduates
revise downward their beliefs, and switch to easier majors, when they observe
grades lower than predicted. In Zafar’s paper the deviation between expected
and realized academic performance is taken as an “information metric” that
identifies new information about students’ “own unobserved academic ability.”
In fact this information might reflect, as explicitly recognized in Stinebrickner’s
paper, college preparation rather than academic ability. In both studies it is not
possible to determine whether the updates are on academic ability or the stock
of knowledge accumulated. While both problems signal the need for better
selection into college, from the policy perspective they have quite different
implications.35
The results of my paper are in line with the learning mechanism outlined
by Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2012) and Zafar (2011) at the college level. In
particular, the responses I find along the ability distribution are consistent with
students revising their priors about ability. In my setup grades were assigned
when children were 13 years old, so there is less concern that the update is on
previous preparation, rather than ability. On top of that I show that students
with the same SES (which could proxy for early effort), but different ability
levels, react differently to grade assignment. This is consistent with students
learning about ability rather than previous preparation. My paper shows both
theoretically and empirically that the reaction to grades differs by SES. In the
above-mentioned two papers there is no variation in SES, as sampled students
are either low-SES (Berea college) or high-SES (Northwestern undergraduate
students).
My paper is also related to the grading standards literature, which stresses
the role of ability in students’ responses to grades. Becker & Rosen (1992) and
35Failure in evaluating own ability calls for a revision of grading information. Failure in
college preparation requires to revise curricula in earlier education tiers.
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Betts (1998) show theoretically that higher grading standards encourage high
ability students to put more effort, while students below standard might be
discouraged. Betts & Grogger (2003) empirically confirm the heterogeneous
effects of increasing grading standard at the high school level, while Figlio &
Lucas (2004) find that higher standards lead to positive results on test scores,
with effects that depend on the ability of the student relative to the class. In my
setup untreated students do not observe grades, but only test scores. Absent
grades, low-SES students are likely to have lower grading standards than high-
SES students (for instance because the difficulty of the tests follow class ability).
Introducing grades should thus lead to positive effects for high-SES students
and negative effects for low-SES students. My results do not confirm this, and
are rather consistent with students learning about their ability from grades.
The grading reform I analyze has been previously studied by Sjo¨gren (2010),
who uses administrative data to study long-run effects (final education and
income) of the overall reform using difference in differences. She finds evidence
of a positive effect of early grading on educational attainment for girls, and a
negative effect for high-SES students. Differences in educational attainment are
found also before and after the reform took place, which casts some doubts on
the robustness of the results. My paper focuses on the mechanisms through
which grades affect education choice: the theoretical model I develop shows that
average treatment effects could mask substantial heterogeneity in the response
to grades, which suggests conditioning the analysis at least by ability. I do not
find any negative effect of early grades for high-SES students, while I do not
study effects by gender, as this would exacerbate the multiple hypothesis testing
problem. Results appear to be more robust, as trends in educational attainment
for treated and control municipalities appear to be parallel in the refutability
tests. This is likely due to the different cohorts used: Sjo¨gren’s sample comprises
twenty cohorts, so she needs to assume parallel trends over two decades. My
sample uses cohorts who studied just before and after the final reform. I only
need to assume that trends between the two sets of municipalities are the same
within a 5-year window, which I show to be the case.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the effect of early grades on students’ education choices
and attainment. I exploit the staggered implementation of a curriculum reform,
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which postponed grade assignment in Swedish compulsory schools, to estimate
both short- and long-run effects of early grading. To investigate mechanisms
I compare empirical results to the predictions of a sequential choice learning
model based on the setup.
In the model children are uncertain about academic ability, and their pri-
ors differ by socioeconomic status (SES). Grades are ability signals that allow
children to re-optimize educational choices. The calibrated model shows that
early grading results into choices closer to first best for all students: low-ability
students reduce effort in compulsory school and are more likely to choose voca-
tional high school. High-ability students increase effort in school and are more
likely to choose academic education paths. Stronger responses are found for
students who observe information consistent with their priors, so that effects
differ by SES.
The empirical results of my analysis are in line with the theoretical pre-
dictions for effort choices in late compulsory school. When graded early on,
low-ability low-SES students are more likely to get lower grades and switch to
easier courses in compulsory school than high-SES students with similar levels
of ability. High-ability students, especially if high-SES, are more likely to get
higher grades in late compulsory school when graded early on. Contrary to
what the model predicts, early grades do not affect high school track choices
and educational attainment for high-SES students. I find that high school at-
tainment increases by 6 pp for high-ability low-SES students, while college
attainment decreases by 3 pp for low-ability low-SES students. What explains
the differences between model predictions and empirical findings at the high
school level? The data suggests that SES strongly influences high school choices
in Sweden, independently of ability. This might attenuate the effects of early
grades. None of the effects found on education carry over to the labor market.
In particular I find no effects on lifetime income, measured at ages 33-40. This
suggests that early grading information simply improved the match between
early education choices and ability, and reduced over-investment in education.
Finally I find no evidence of demotivating effects for low-SES students, one of
the main concerns that motivated the grading reforms.
The key economic implication of my results is that students are uncertain
about their ability in early stages of education, when I show that grades affect
their choices. This contrasts with the workhorse models of education choice
(Becker, 1994; Ben-Porath, 1967), that assume complete information and thus
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no ex-ante uncertainty in the returns to non-compulsory education. From the
policy point of view, I establish that early grading leads to a better match between
education and ability, but increases inequality in educational attainment and
reduces effort in compulsory school for low-ability students. Whether early
grading is a desirable policy depends thus on the objective function of the
policy-maker.
With regard to future research directions, it is possible to expand the scope
of the analysis by looking at further sources of heterogeneity, which relate to
different mechanisms. First, as whole classes are sampled in my data, I can look
at differential effects of grading depending on relative ability. If students judge
ability against their immediate peers, average ability students in high-ability
(low-ability) classes might react more positively (negatively) to early grades.
Second, average ability students might get more information out of grades, as
it is less likely that they get top or bottom scores in homework and tests.36
Third, there could be different responses to grading information along the
gender dimension, as boys are found to generally be more overconfident than
girls in ability (Bertrand, 2011). Before exploring these additional sources of
heterogeneity it is however important to correct standard errors for multiple
hypothesis testing. This requires some additional work, as standard errors are
already bootstrapped to deal with the small number of clusters.
Lastly, it is worthy to investigate theoretically alternative mechanisms
through which grades affect education choices, including the ones outlined
above. For instance what happens when ability signals reflect knowledge rather
than ability? This can be the case if parents and students are not able to distin-
guish the ability component of the grade from previous effort choices. I argue
this is a plausible mechanism when parents do not observe children’s effort, but
do observe the final grades.
36Relatedly, Stange (2012) reports that the students for whom college grades, and the option
to dropout in college, have the highest value, are moderate ability students, who have the
strongest uncertainty about finishing college.
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1.A Numerical Model
1.A.1 Evidence on assumptions and calibration
The model makes precise assumptions about choice protocols, the distribution
of ability in the population, school selection, and payoffs to education. In
this section I provide evidence supporting model assumptions, and discuss
calibration.
The basic assumption underlying the model is that students are forward
looking in the education choices. Table 1.A.1 reports summary statistics on the
items that surveyed students considered important when choosing high school.
Apart from preferences for the chosen program, the items that rank highest are
study plans, ability and grades. This shows that students were forward-looking
in their choices, and considered feasibility of the chosen track important in
their choices.
Table 1.A.1: Survey evidence on HS choice,
1967 cohort
Mean Obs
Chose HS after interest 0.80 6195
Chose HS after study plans 0.64 6099
Chose HS after ability 0.60 6093
Chose HS after grades 0.49 6117
Chose HS after parents 0.23 6099
Chose HS after peers 0.07 6098
Data from grade 10 survey. All variables represent
agreement with the statement and are coded from 0
to 1 (1 represents full agreement).
In the model high SES students are assumed to have higher levels of ability
than low SES students. Figure 1.A.1 confirms this empirically.37 While low-SES
students have normal ability distributions, high-SES students display left-skewed
distributions. In Table 1.A.2 I calibrate the data to the discrete distribution in
column 1. The resulting distributions by SES are then used to simulate ability
distributions in the model.
37This is consistent with the evidence on early differences in ability through the socioeco-
nomic gradient shown by Cunha & Heckman (2009).
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Figure 1.A.1: Differences in standardized ability by SES
Note: The SES division is based on parental education. Ability measures are taken
from tests administered in school year 6, and are standardized at the treatment-cohort
level.
Table 1.A.2: Distribution of discretized ability by
SES, 1967 cohort
All Low SES High SES
Lowest ability 0.10 0.13 0.06
Low ability 0.20 0.24 0.14
Medium ability 0.30 0.31 0.28
High ability 0.25 0.22 0.29
Highest ability 0.15 0.10 0.23
The population ability distribution is constrained to the
bins in column 1. The distributions by SES are generated
using the same cut-points.
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Figure 1.A.2 shows ability levels by completed education. Students who
attained high school have higher ability than those who dropped out of high
school school, or never enrolled. Students who have a college education have
much higher ability levels, which is consistent with the assumptions I make in
the model, and is not surprising given that college is highly selective.
Table 1.A.3: Income by Final Education,
1967 Cohort
Completed education Gross Income Premium
Compulsory school 184.40 0.00
Vocational HS 221.21 0.20
Academic HS 226.22 0.23
College 290.67 0.58
Before-tax income measured at ages 33-40, in thousands kronor
Table 1.A.3 summarizes income premia for each education choice. While
these are not causal estimates, they might be representative of the information
that young students use when assessing their education goals. High school
graduates exhibit higher incomes than students with compulsory education.
As assumed in the model, the income of students with academic high school are
not substantially different from those of students with vocational high school.
The wages of college graduates38 are instead quite higher.
In Figure 1.A.3 I plot the wages of the students in the sample by discretized
ability. There is little variation in wages by ability for students with compulsory
school or high school. However there seems to be complementarity between
income and ability for college graduates. In the model I thus allow the wage
premium for college to depend on ability, and use the estimates as payoffs.
38Here including also 2-year short college.
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Figure 1.A.2: Standardized ability by final attained education.
Note: Ability measures are taken from tests administered in school year 6, and are standardized
at the treatment-cohort level.
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I calibrate the knowledge production function, kit = ωt(αai + βeit) + δkit−1,
using the following parameters:
Table 1.A.4: Production
Function Parameters
weights coefficients
ω1 = 4/9 α = 1
ω2 = 1/9 β = 2.5
ω2 = 5/9 γ = 1.1
Table 1.A.5 reports minimum effort and ability levels required to access and
attain each education level. The knowledge thresholds are found substituting
the values for each education level into equation 1.12:
k3 = αa× (ω1γ2 + ω2γ + ω3) + β(ω1γ2 × e1 + ω2γ × e2 + ω3 × e3). (1.12)
The value of vocational school, V E2i,t , was shown in Section 1.3.1 to be:
V E2i,τ =
∑3
t=τ −ωτ × γE(e
E2?
it,τ )
γ¯E + P (k˜i3,τ ≥ k¯E2)× U((L− 2)× w2)(1.13)
+P (k˜i3,τ < k¯
E2)U((L− 1)× w1)).
The parameters I use for effort disutility are: γ
E
= 6 and γ¯E = 1.6. The
parameters for income utility, U(I) = γ
I
(IE2?i )
γ¯I , are: γ
I
= 2.8 and γ¯I = 0.9.
Effort costs are thus convex, and income utility is concave.
Table 1.A.5: Minimum ability and effort
for Educational Attainment
(Knowledge Thresholds)
k¯E2 kE3 k¯E3 k¯E4
a 2 3 3 4
e1 Medium Medium Medium Medium
e2 Medium Medium Medium Medium
e3 Low Low Medium High
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In the model high-ability students are more likely to observe higher grades
than low-ability students do when graded early on. I confirm this in Figure
1.A.4, where I plot grades at the end of school year 6 (the treatment) for treated
students born 1967. The vertical black line represents the average grade for each
SES: it could be considered the prior grade the student is expected to get, before
information about ability is revealed. For low-SES students the average grade is
closer to the mean for low-ability students. The opposite is true for high-SES
students. This reflects the different composition in ability within SES.
Finally In the model I assume that grades are unbiased. In Table 1.A.6 I
try to assess this empirically. While there is a strong relationship between the
standardized test and the final grade (the coefficient is close to 1), it appears
that SES has an independent positive effect on final grades, controlling for
ability. This could be due to a positive bias towards wealthier students, but
could also be related to the fact that high-SES students put more effort into
schooling. Given that final grades corrected for discrepancies between yearly
and test performance, it is still possible that they are unbiased. Notice that
the magnitude of this higher bound effect is actually small: one child over
ten/twenty gets a higher grade if categorized as high-SES with respect to a
low-SES child.
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Figure 1.A.4: Grades by Ability and SES in school year 6
Note: Distributions over-smoothed for illustrational clarity. Dash-dot vertical
lines represent averages for each SES cell. The other vertical lines represent
averages for each ability−SES cell.
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Table 1.A.6: Testing for biases in final grade assignment
Adv Math grade
(year 9)
Adv English grade
(year 8)
Regressor of interest:
High-SES 0.09*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)
Controls:
Normalized test score 0.69*** 0.63***
(0.01) (0.01)
Normalized ability 0.06*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.01)
1967 cohort –0.03 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
R2 0.60 0.60
Observations 6535 8867
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Normalized test score and Ability refer to math tests in column 1, and English
tests in column 2. The SES division is based on parental education. Standard
errors are clustered at the class level.
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1.A.2 Solution Method
Simulation of ability signals
I extract true ability and unbiased ability signals (See Figure 1.A.5) from a
multivariate normal with covariance matrix:1 0 00 σ21() 0
0 0 σ22()

I discretize the normal draws using the SES-specific distributions shown in
Table 1.A.2. I assume the following:
• The grade signals are a sum of true ability and noise:
– gi2 = ai + 2 with 2 ∼ N
(
0, σ22()
)
– gi3 = ai + 3 with 3 ∼ N
(
0, σ23()
)
– cov(ai, 2) = cov(ai, 3) = cov(2, 3) = 0
• Late grades are more precise than grades assigned in school year 6:
– corr(ai, gi2) = 0.7
– corr(ai, gi3) = 0.8
I need to find σ21() and σ22() such that k2 = corr(ai, gi2) = 0.7 and k3 =
corr(ai, gi3) = 0.8: kt = corr(ai, git) = corr(ai, ai + t) =
1 + 0
σ(ai) + σ(ai + t)
=
1
σ(ai)× σ(ai + j) =
1
σ(ai + j)
and σ2(ai + t) = 1 + σ2t (). So kt =
1√
1 + σ2t ()
, thus σ2t () =
1
k2t
− 1. Because σ2(ai + t) = 1
k2t
it follows that corr(gi2, gi3) =
cov(ai + 2, ai + 3)
σ(ai + 2)× σ(ai + 3) =
1√
1
k22
×
√
1
k23
= k2 × k3.
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I simulate the joint ability and grade distributions 1000 times to get three
sets of posterior distributions:
• f(ai|gi2, SES), plotted in Figure 1.A.6
• f(ai|gi3, SES), plotted in Figure 1.A.7
• f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES), plotted in Figures 1.A.8 and 1.A.9
12.93
23.9
31.25
21.99
9.934
1 2 3 4 5
True Ability, Low-SES
13.04
23.89
31.12
21.97
9.984
1 2 3 4 5
Grade in t2, Low-SES
6.087
14.04
27.92 28.85
23.1
1 2 3 4 5
True Ability, High-SES
6.046
13.89
28.1 28.89
23.07
1 2 3 4 5
Grade in t2, High-SES
True Ability and Grade in t2 by SES
Figure 1.A.5: Ability and grade signals in t2
Note: The Figure plots simulated distributions of ability and grades in middle compulsory
school, for low- and high-SES students.
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Solution strategy
I solve by backward induction the optimization problem in three different
information scenarios:
1. In the case of full information about ability (first best). The solution is
found for 5 ability levels. SES has no role in individual choice, but aggregate
outcomes will differ due to the different distribution of ability by SES.
2. When only late grades are released. The solution is found for 2 (SES) x 5
(gi3) = 10 cases.
3. When early grades are released. The solution is found for 2 (SES) x 5 (gi2)
x 5 (gi3) = 50 cases
Solution when early grades are assigned
At the end of t3 choose optimally E?, given any [SES, ei1, gi2, ei2, gi3, ei3] vector.
There are (2 x 3 x 5 x 3 x 5 x 3) x 3 = 4050 cases. 1350 solutions are optimal,
given f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES). In the same stage choose optimally ei3, given any
[SES, ei1, gi2, ei2, gi3] vector. There are (2 x 3 x 5 x 3 x 5) x 3 = 1350 cases. 450
solutions are optimal given f(ai|gi3, gi2, SES).
In t2 choose optimally ei2, given any realized [SES, ei1, gi2] vector. Use
f(ai|gi2, SES) to assign the proper weight to each of the 5 potential grades that
can be assigned in t3. Emax2 thus summarizes 450 cases into 450/5=90 cases,
before gi2 is assigned. There are indeed (2 x 3 x 5) x 3 = 90 cases. 30 solutions
are optimal, given f(ai|gi2, SES).
In t1 choose optimally e1, given [SES]. Use f1(ai) to assign the proper
weight to each of the 5 potential grades that might be assigned in t2. ThusEmax1
summarizes 30 cases into 30/5=6 cases, before grades are assigned. There are
indeed (2) x 3 = 6 cases. 2 solutions are optimal, given f1(ai), one for each
SES. So in the end I find 2 x 25 [e?1, e?2, e?3, E?] contingent plans, for each SES and
ability signal realized.
Solution when late grades are assigned
At the end of t3 choose optimally E?, given any [SES, ei1, ei2, gi3, ei3] vector.
There are (2 x 3 x 3 x 5 x 3) x 3 = 810 cases. 270 cases are optimal, given
f(ai|gi3, SES). In t3 choose optimally ei3, given any [SES, ei1, ei2, gi2] vector.
68
There are (2 x 3 x 3 x 5) x 3 = 270 cases. 90 solutions are optimal given
f(ai|gi3, SES).
In t1 and t2 choose optimally [ei1,, ei2], given SES. Use f1(ai) to assign the
proper weight to each of the 5 potential grades (mirroring ability type) that can
be assigned in t3. Thus Emax1 summarizes 90 cases into 90/5=18 cases, before
grades are assigned. There are indeed (2 x 3) x 3 = 18 cases. 2 solutions are
optimal given f1(ai), one for each SES. So in the end I find 2 x 5 [e?1, e?2, e?3, E?]
contingent plans, for each SES and ability signal realized.
Realizations
I append the datasets created in the simulation phase, and take a random sample.
I merge the final dataset to first and second best solutions. The merge is on
[SES, gi2, gi3] for the solution with early grades, [SES, gi3] for the solution with
late grades, and [ai] for the first best. I use true ability, the knowledge production
function, and education thresholds, to determine final outcomes. This gives me
a distribution of realized outcomes for each SES and ability level. At this point
I can assess how the information structure affects final outcomes.
1.A.3 Additional Simulation Results
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Figure 1.A.15: High school dropout by grading regime
Note: The Figure plots high school dropout rates under early or late grade assignment. Notice
that with full information dropout is never optimal. High-ability students never drop out of
high school, due to their high levels of ability.
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Figure 1.A.16: College dropout by grading regime
Note: The Figure plots college dropout rates under early or late grade assignment. Notice that
with full information dropout is never optimal.
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1.A.4 Model and Institutional Setup
Table 1.A.7 compares the model to the institutional setup in terms of choices,
selection and information. While I designed the model around the institutional
setup, there still are some differences.
Table 1.A.7: Model and empirical setup
Model Empirical setup
Early Compulsory choose e1, no grades choose effort in s.y. 1-5, no grades
Middle Compulsory choose e2, (no) grades choose effort in s.y. 6 (no) grades
Late Compulsory choose e3, grades choose effort/courses in s.y. 7-9, grades
High school Selection k¯E3 GPA, course choices
College Selection E3, k¯E4 Academic HS, GPA, quotas
First, students in the sample have an additional choice with respect to the
model: type of course in late compulsory school. As advanced courses are more
difficult than general ones, this type of choice can be interpreted as an effort
choice. At the same these choices are relevant for admission into academic high
school. Table 1.A.8 confirms this empirically: choosing advanced math in grade
9 and having higher grades substantially affects the probability of admission to
the preferred high school choice. The magnitudes of the coefficients are lower
bounds, as I am including students who only apply to vocational tracks.39
Second, in the model I assume that students need to meet absolute knowl-
edge thresholds to complete college. In my setup a quota system is in place: an
increase in college enrollment could in principle affect the admission thresh-
old for all students. These general equilibrium effects are not captured in my
model, where the number of students who can complete college is a function
of the ability distribution. O¨ckert (2002) finds that the difference in years of
education between students screened out and admitted at college in the early
80s in Sweden is about 0.6. The difference reduces to just 0.20 years when
comparing students with similar number of admission credits.40 This in turn is
a good approximation to the marginal change in admission requirements that
might be triggered by a reshuffling of the pool seeking college admission after
grades are assigned. Given the size of the change results would likely not change
39I have no information on the track the student applied for.
40See O¨ckert (2010), published version of the IFAU working paper.
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significantly allowing for the general equilibrium effect.
Table 1.A.8: Factors Affecting HS admission,
Cohort 1967
Admitted in HS
at first Choice
Adv Math (s.y. 9) 0.05***
(0.01)
Adv English (s.y. 9) 0.00
(0.02)
Math Grade (s.y. 9) 0.04***
(0.01)
English Grade (s.y. 9) 0.02***
(0.01)
Swedish Grade (s.y. 9) 0.03***
(0.01)
Mean 0.83
R2 0.05
Observations 7884
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The data does not record which type of school the
student was applying for. Standard errors clustered
at the class level.
1.B Descriptives
1.B.1 Definition of Ability and SES
In this section I discuss how I measure ability and SES, and describe how I
discretize them to match the model.
Students took during the spring term of school year 6 a battery of three
standardized ability tests: a test of verbal ability, requiring to find the opposite
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to a word among a list of four alternatives; a test of inductive ability, requiring
to complete a number series of 6 terms with two more numbers; a test of
spatial ability, requiring to find the three-dimensional representation of a two-
dimensional picture that can be folded. The tests taken by the two cohorts are
exactly the same, and the distributions look similar over time (see Figure 1.B.1).
Students had respectively 15, 27 and 22 seconds to answer each section of
the test, assuming they wasted no time at all in the test. The fast pace of the test
adds to the quality of the ability measures: Borghans et al. (2008) show that
reducing the time available for completing intelligence tests reduces differences
in effort between students with different non-cognitive traits.
I create a standardized aggregate index of ability from the z-scores of induc-
tive and verbal ability. I label high-ability those students who scored at least
at the 60th percentile of the ability distribution. Consistently with the model,
the cutoff roughly corresponds to the median ability of students who attained
college education.41
When performing the normalization at the cohort level, ability measures
turn out to be 5% of a standard deviation higher in the treatment group, with
respect to the control group. For the 1972 cohort there is no such difference.
While the main treatment is grade assignment in school year 6, in principle
there might be differences in grade assignment also in school year 3, when
students were age 10 (see discussion in Section 1.2.3). Ability could thus have
been affected by the treatment. However the literature (e.g., Heckman et al.,
2007) reports that cognitive ability should be stable by that age. The ability
measures were taken in May of 1981 for the 1967 cohort, quite close to the
final tests used for grade assignment. It is possible that test taking behavior was
instead affected in the treated municipalities. Students may have thought that
the standardized tests were relevant to the final grades, or may have put more
effort in the tests simply because they were affected by the more competitive
environment.42 This is consistent with results from the literature on the effect
of non-cognitive traits on test taking behavior (Borghans et al., 2008). In order
to have more consistent ability measures I thus normalize ability at the cohort-
treatment level, and basically use a measure of relative ability in the analysis.
41I leave out of the index spatial ability, as it poorly correlates with academic choices or out-
comes.
42Jalava et al. (2015) show that rank-based grading positively affects effort during tests
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This avoids any problem of endogeneity or differential reporting caused by
grade assignment.
Extensive investigation of which SES measure is most predictive of educa-
tion choice shows that parental education strongly predicts children’s education
choices. Parental income is less predictive of education choice. Measures based
on parental occupation yield results similar to parental education. My preferred
measure of SES is based on parental education. Occupation-based measures are
more difficult to discretize into dummies, and are recorded in my data using a
definition that slightly changes between cohorts.43 Finally, I consider high-SES
those students who have at least one parent with academic high school (about
40% of my sample).
43Results do not change that much when using the alternative SES definition
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Figure 1.B.1: Absolute ability distributions
Note: Ability measures are taken from tests administered in school year 6.
The tests are the same for both cohorts.
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1.B.2 Education Choices, Grades and Outcomes
In the following I provide descriptive evidence on students’ choices and educa-
tional attainment, the main outcomes in the empirical analysis.
Table 1.B.1: Education choices and outcomes by ability and SES,
cohort 1967
Low-ability High-ability
Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Compulsory:
Adv Math (s.y. 7) 0.56 0.73 0.92 0.97
Adv Math (s.y. 8) 0.44 0.62 0.87 0.95
Adv Math (s.y. 9) 0.32 0.51 0.75 0.88
Adv English (s.y. 7) 0.57 0.77 0.93 0.98
Adv English (s.y. 8) 0.53 0.74 0.90 0.97
Adv English (s.y. 9) 0.47 0.66 0.86 0.95
Non Compulsory:
HS Enroll 0.85 0.92 0.93 0.98
Academic HS Enroll 0.22 0.45 0.60 0.82
HS Dropout 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.09
Attain Academic HS 0.19 0.39 0.56 0.75
Attain College 0.19 0.39 0.48 0.72
Each variable is a dummy. College enrollment is defined as enrolling into a tertiary
education program lasting at least 2 years.
Table 1.B.1 shows that high-ability and high-SES students are more likely to
make choices consistent with an academic education path. This pattern suggests
that the Swedish education system (grading, tracking and funding) successfully
managed to allocate the most skilled students to higher education levels, but
SES remained a relevant factor in the process, possibly distorting the efficient
allocation of skill to human capital. While these differences are less marked
for high-ability students up to compulsory school, low-SES students are 20 p.p.
less likely to choose an academic education, independently of ability. As there
might still be differences in ability between SES categories, in Table 1.B.2 I
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report coefficients for the differences in choices between high- and low-SES
students, controlling for ability. The picture does not change that much, but
it appears that the differences among low ability students are in part due to
low-SES students having less ability. I still confirm that low-SES students are
much less likely (a 18 p.p difference) to choose an academic education path than
their high-SES counterparts.
Table 1.B.2: Differences in choices by SES
controlling for ability, cohort 1967
Low-ability High-ability
Compulsory:
Adv Math (s.y. 7) 0.11 0.04
Adv Math (s.y. 8) 0.12 0.07
Adv Math (s.y. 9) 0.13 0.10
Adv English (s.y. 7) 0.14 0.04
Adv English (s.y. 8) 0.15 0.06
Adv English (s.y. 9) 0.14 0.07
High School:
HS Enroll 0.06 0.04
Academic Enroll 0.19 0.18
HS Dropout –0.05 –0.00
Attain Academic HS 0.17 0.16
College:
College 0.17 0.21
Each variable is a dummy. College enrollment is defined as en-
rolling into a tertiary education program lasting at least 2 years.
To understand whether differences in education choices and educational
attainment are related to school performance, I report in Table 1.B.3 average
grades by ability and SES. Grades are consistently higher for high-ability and
high-SES students. However grade differences between high- and low-SES
students with similar ability levels are not so big. When considering grades
in school year 6, and Swedish grades in school year 9 (which do not reflect
course choice), differences are at most 13th of a grade. Table 1.B.4 reports grade
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differences by SES controlling for ability. The picture remains similar: grade
differences among students with similar ability levels are at most 14th of a grade.
This suggests that SES plays a fundamental role in education choice in Sweden,
potentially reflecting different motivation and preferences for education among
students.
Table 1.B.3: Grades by ability and SES, cohort 1967
Low-ability High-ability
Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Swedish Grade (s.y. 6) 2.64 2.93 3.67 3.97
Swedish Grade (s.y. 7) 2.61 2.86 3.40 3.63
Swedish Grade (s.y. 8) 2.64 2.88 3.46 3.72
Swedish Grade (s.y. 9) 2.69 3.01 3.56 3.89
Math Grade (s.y. 6) 2.66 2.97 3.80 3.98
Math Grade (s.y. 7) 2.64 2.78 3.38 3.61
Math Grade (s.y. 8) 2.69 2.86 3.37 3.61
Math Grade (s.y. 9) 2.83 3.00 3.51 3.72
English Grade (s.y. 6) 2.64 2.98 3.65 4.02
English Grade (s.y. 7) 2.69 2.84 3.33 3.63
English Grade (s.y. 8) 2.68 2.86 3.37 3.63
English Grade (s.y. 9) 2.80 3.06 3.45 3.76
Grades are expressed on a 1-5 norm-referenced scale. Math and English grades in s.y. 8
and 9 pool together advanced and general courses.
Table 1.B.5 shows that many students switch courses over time. Students are
more likely to switch from academic to general courses than the opposite, and
there are more switches in math.44 Switches from one type of course to the other
can be interpreted as revision of choice, and imply that students do not have
full information over own ability (or knowledge). It is also interesting to see
that the switching behavior continues through all grades: most of the students
switch in school year 8, but some also switch in the last year. This is consistent
44This is consistent with research finding that students tend to be overly optimistic about own
ability/preparation in higher education (see Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2012; Zafar,
2011)
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Table 1.B.4: Differences in grades by SES
controlling for ability, cohort 1967
Low-ability High-ability
Swedish Grade (s.y. 6) 0.18 0.21
Swedish Grade (s.y. 7) 0.16 0.15
Swedish Grade (s.y. 8) 0.15 0.17
Swedish Grade (s.y. 9) 0.22 0.24
Math Grade (s.y. 6) 0.18 0.11
Math Grade (s.y. 7) 0.07 0.14
Math Grade (s.y. 8) 0.11 0.16
Math Grade (s.y. 9) 0.10 0.14
English Grade (s.y. 6) 0.22 0.27
English Grade (s.y. 7) 0.07 0.21
English Grade (s.y. 8) 0.11 0.16
English Grade (s.y. 9) 0.20 0.21
Grades are expressed on a 1-5 norm-referenced scale. Math and
English grades in s.y. 8 and 9 pool together advanced and general
courses.
with students revising some sort of prior, with the updating process continuing
over time. In Table 1.B.4 I show how SES affects the choice of switching in
compulsory school from an advanced to a general course. When comparing
the choices of low- and high-SES students with the same grades and ability,
I find that SES still influences switching choices. This suggests that grading
information might affect differently students from different socioeconomic
backgrounds.
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Table 1.B.5: Fraction of students
switching courses, 1967 cohort
Grade 8 Grade 9
Math:
Switches to gen choice 0.12 0.17
Switches to adv choice 0.04 0.01
English:
Switches to gen choice 0.06 0.08
Switches to adv choice 0.07 0.03
Switches are conditional on previous year’s course choice.
Table 1.B.6: Impact of SES on the stability
of course choices, 1967 Cohort
Sticks to adv Math Sticks to adv Eng
Regressors of interest:
High-SES 0.06*** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01)
Controls:
Grade (s.y. 8) –0.00 –0.05***
(0.01) (0.01)
Grade (s.y. 7) 0.21*** 0.18***
(0.01) (0.01)
Standardized verbal ability 0.02** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01)
Standardized inductive ability 0.02** 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Standardized spatial ability 0.04*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.01)
E[Y] 0.73 0.86
R2 0.27 0.21
Observations 5532 5653
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Outcome: the student sticks to the advanced course choice made in s.y. 7. The SES
division is based on parental education. Standard errors clustered at the class level.
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1.B.3 Treated and Control Municipalities
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
töreboda
höganäs
varberg
svalöv
öckerö
eslöv
perstorp
vänersborg
örnsköldsvik
stockholm
örebro
strängnäs
malmö
ånge
mölndal
järfälla
oskarshamn
lidköping
katrineholm
haparanda
hammarö
karlskoga
göteborg
eskilstuna
ludvika
luleå
surahammar
hällefors
älvkarleby
(1979 Municipal Elections)
Percentage of votes won by Right Wing Parties
Ungraded municipality Graded municipality
Figure 1.B.2: Vote share of right-wing parties in municipal elections by
treatment status
Note: This Figure plots the aggregated vote share of right-wing parties in the 1979 municipal
elections. Municipalities assigning early grades had a higher share of right-wing voters.
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Figure 1.B.3: Sampled municipalities
Note: Municipalities assigning early grades before the reform are
colored in black
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Table 1.B.7: Differences in students background
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Female 0.48 0.50 -0.02
(0.62) (0.55) (0.01)
Birth year 66.98 66.97 0.02*
(0.25) (0.24) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.02 0.05 -0.03***
(0.14) (0.24) (0.01)
Both parents not Nordic 0.01 0.02 -0.00
(0.11) (0.13) (0.01)
Verbal ability 23.22 22.70 0.52*
(7.60) (6.60) (0.28)
Inductive ability 22.85 21.78 1.07***
(10.25) (8.92) (0.38)
Spatial ability 23.82 23.41 0.41
(8.94) (7.91) (0.28)
Kindergarten 0.91 0.93 -0.02
(0.34) (0.28) (0.03)
Quiet home environment 0.95 0.95 -0.00
(0.28) (0.25) (0.01)
Switched Class (G6-G9) 0.06 0.08 -0.03***
(0.27) (0.30) (0.01)
Special Education 0.12 0.14 -0.02
(0.41) (0.39) (0.02)
Changes of teacher 0.59 0.53 0.05
(1.20) (1.00) (0.14)
Hours absent in grade 6 7.89 6.82 1.07
(11.94) (8.23) (1.26)
Class size 23.64 23.27 0.37
(6.64) (5.18) (0.75)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Ability measures
are on a 0-40 scale.
THE IMPACT OF EARLY GRADING 89
Table 1.B.8: Differences in parental SES
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Disposable family income (age 11-16) 243.69 253.82 -10.13**
(101.46) (84.98) (4.87)
High Income 0.47 0.54 -0.07**
(0.62) (0.55) (0.03)
High Education 0.36 0.44 -0.08**
(0.60) (0.54) (0.03)
High Income/Educ 0.59 0.68 -0.09***
(0.62) (0.51) (0.03)
High SES 0.41 0.46 -0.05
(0.61) (0.55) (0.04)
Parents: non-skilled workers, goods 0.10 0.09 0.01
(0.39) (0.33) (0.02)
Parents: non-skilled workers, service 0.11 0.09 0.02**
(0.39) (0.31) (0.01)
Parents: skilled workers, goods 0.17 0.19 -0.02
(0.47) (0.43) (0.02)
Parents: skilled workers, service 0.02 0.02 -0.00
(0.18) (0.16) (0.01)
Parents: lower non-manual ii 0.04 0.05 -0.00
(0.25) (0.22) (0.01)
Parents: lower non-manual i 0.09 0.09 0.00
(0.35) (0.30) (0.01)
Parents: intermediate-level non-manual 0.19 0.23 -0.03**
(0.49) (0.46) (0.01)
Parents: higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.11 0.13 -0.01
(0.39) (0.36) (0.02)
Parents: independent professionals 0.00 0.00 -0.00**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.00)
Parents: entrepreneur 0.11 0.10 0.01
(0.39) (0.33) (0.01)
Parents: farmer 0.05 0.02 0.04***
(0.30) (0.16) (0.01)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Income in 1000 kr, measured
when the student was 11-16. Occupation variables are taken from the 1980
Census.
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Table 1.B.9: Differences in father background
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Father not Nordic 0.03 0.03 -0.01
(0.19) (0.20) (0.01)
Married father 0.81 0.77 0.04***
(0.49) (0.46) (0.01)
Father SES, 1 (low) to 3 (high) 1.73 1.75 -0.02
(0.87) (0.79) (0.05)
Divorced father 0.15 0.18 -0.03**
(0.45) (0.42) (0.01)
Father educ: compulsory school or less 0.47 0.41 0.06**
(0.62) (0.54) (0.03)
Father educ: high school 0.38 0.41 -0.04**
(0.60) (0.54) (0.02)
Father educ: college or more 0.16 0.18 -0.02
(0.45) (0.42) (0.02)
Father: in the labor force 0.90 0.90 0.00
(0.36) (0.33) (0.01)
Father: unemployed 0.04 0.04 0.00
(0.24) (0.20) (0.00)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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Table 1.B.10: Differences in mother background
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Mother not Nordic 0.04 0.05 -0.01
(0.21) (0.23) (0.01)
Married mother 0.77 0.72 0.04***
(0.52) (0.49) (0.02)
Divorced mother 0.16 0.19 -0.04**
(0.45) (0.43) (0.01)
Mother SES, 1 (low) to 3 (high) 1.55 1.62 -0.06
(0.76) (0.68) (0.05)
Mother educ: compulsory school or less 0.42 0.41 0.01
(0.61) (0.54) (0.03)
Mother educ: high school 0.41 0.41 0.00
(0.62) (0.54) (0.02)
Mother educ: college or more 0.17 0.18 -0.01
(0.47) (0.42) (0.02)
Mother: in the labor force 0.91 0.90 0.01
(0.36) (0.34) (0.01)
Mother: unemployed 0.04 0.03 0.01*
(0.25) (0.19) (0.00)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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Table 1.B.11: Differences in father occupation
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Father: non-skilled workers, goods 0.12 0.12 0.01
(0.42) (0.35) (0.02)
Father: non-skilled workers, service 0.10 0.08 0.03***
(0.38) (0.29) (0.01)
Father: skilled workers, goods 0.21 0.23 -0.02
(0.50) (0.46) (0.02)
Father: skilled workers, service 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.09) (0.10) (0.00)
Father: lower non-manual ii 0.03 0.02 0.01
(0.21) (0.17) (0.00)
Father: lower non-manual i 0.07 0.07 0.00
(0.32) (0.29) (0.01)
Father: intermediate-level non-manual 0.18 0.22 -0.04**
(0.47) (0.45) (0.02)
Father: higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.11 0.12 -0.02
(0.38) (0.36) (0.02)
Father: independent professionals 0.00 0.00 -0.00*
(0.03) (0.05) (0.00)
Father: entrepreneur 0.11 0.10 0.01
(0.39) (0.32) (0.01)
Father: farmer 0.06 0.02 0.03**
(0.30) (0.17) (0.01)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Occupation variables are taken from
the 1980 Census.
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Table 1.B.12: Differences in mother occupation
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Mother: non-skilled workers, goods 0.05 0.06 -0.00
(0.27) (0.26) (0.01)
Mother: non-skilled workers, service 0.37 0.36 0.02
(0.60) (0.53) (0.03)
Mother: skilled workers, goods 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.14) (0.15) (0.01)
Mother: skilled workers, service 0.06 0.06 0.00
(0.31) (0.25) (0.01)
Mother: lower non-manual ii 0.11 0.14 -0.03*
(0.39) (0.38) (0.01)
Mother: lower non-manual i 0.09 0.11 -0.02
(0.34) (0.33) (0.01)
Mother: intermediate-level non-manual 0.16 0.16 -0.00
(0.47) (0.40) (0.01)
Mother: higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.04 0.04 0.00
(0.25) (0.21) (0.01)
Mother: independent professionals 0.00 0.00 -0.00*
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00)
Mother: entrepreneur 0.05 0.04 0.00
(0.28) (0.23) (0.01)
Mother: farmer 0.05 0.02 0.03***
(0.28) (0.15) (0.01)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Occupation variables are taken from
the 1980 Census.
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Table 1.B.14: Differences in parental school preferences
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
School priority: Teach Math and Swedish 8.21 8.06 0.14**
(1.73) (1.63) (0.06)
School priority: Develop collaborative skills 6.64 6.70 -0.06
(2.26) (2.02) (0.09)
School priority: Teach other subjects 6.03 6.01 0.02
(2.35) (1.99) (0.07)
School priority: Develop critical thinking 5.95 6.17 -0.22**
(2.62) (2.33) (0.10)
School priority: Teach Foreign languages 5.46 5.61 -0.16
(2.57) (2.19) (0.14)
School priority: Inform about working life 4.53 4.64 -0.11
(2.36) (2.20) (0.11)
School priority: Teach children to obey adults 3.65 3.42 0.23*
(2.93) (2.49) (0.13)
School priority: Cope in a competitive society 3.57 3.62 -0.05
(2.58) (2.23) (0.08)
School priority: Select for higher education 1.79 1.80 -0.01
(1.84) (1.66) (0.07)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Variables are on a 1-9 scale (9 = top
priority).
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Table 1.B.13: Differences in parents choice protocols
by treatment status, 1967 cohort
Graded Ungraded Difference
Electives chosen for: child ability 0.62 0.61 0.02
(0.60) (0.53) (0.02)
Electives chosen for: child preferences 0.37 0.39 -0.02
(0.61) (0.53) (0.02)
Electives chosen for: more choice in HS 0.37 0.38 -0.00
(0.61) (0.53) (0.02)
Electives chosen for: entrance requirements 0.24 0.26 -0.01
(0.53) (0.48) (0.01)
Electives chosen for: teacher suggestion 0.04 0.07 -0.03***
(0.24) (0.28) (0.01)
Electives chosen for: classmates choice 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.12) (0.13) (0.00)
Electives chosen for: other 0.01 0.01 -0.00
(0.12) (0.12) (0.00)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Variables represent agreement
with the statement on a 0-1 scale.
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1.C Refutability Tests
1.C.1 Tests for Parallel Trends
The following Figures show tests for parallel trends between treatment and
control municipalities in determinants of education and educational attainment.
For each outcome I plot in the upper panel trends for the grading and non-
grading municipalities that are part of my sample. The two dashed lines mark
the years in which the 1967 and 1972 cohorts were in school year 6: the tests
close to this period are thus more relevant. In the lower panel I show coefficient
and 95% confidence interval from difference in differences placebo regressions.
In the regressions I control for a linear trend, and run tests over a 5-year window
centered on the year marked in the picture. This way I test precisely the
assumption that underlies my specification: over a 5-year window there should
be no differential trend in education (or related variables) between treated and
control municipalities.45
In Figure 1.C.1 and Table 1.C.1, I test for parallel trends in the aggregate
vote share of right wing parties in municipal elections, held every 4 years in
Sweden. It is reassuring to see that the differences in vote share, which can
be considered as the “treatment assignment,” are quite stable over time. In
Figures 1.C.2 to 1.C.4 I consider educational attainment in the population aged
38-74, corresponding to cohorts who completed their education before the
first grading reform, likely including also the parents of the students in the
sample. This avoids picking up any effect of the reform. Trends appear to be
parallel for all education levels, while there seems to be some catching up on the
part of the graded municipalities in high school attainment. That coefficient
however is small and marginally significant only in 1989, after the period I
consider.46 Figures 1.C.5 to 1.C.7 consider flows in educational attainment
45Difference in differences is functional form dependent (Lechner, 2011), and the functional
form assumed for the trend should be consistent with the data (Mora & Reggio, 2012). In
my analysis I can only control for a linear trend, but this should not be problematic as I use
cohorts just 5 years apart.
46Notice that administrative education data is only available starting from 1985.
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for cohorts born 1969 onwards. These cohorts were all studying under the
reformed school system, and thus they started getting grades in school year
8. The first of the pictures plots the fraction of students who graduate from a
2-year high school, which up to the early 90s corresponds to vocational high
school.47 The fraction of students who completes vocational education is higher
in grading municipalities, but the diff-in-diff coefficients in the tests are all close
to 0, implying that differences remained stable over time. This is one of the
key education variables I will be using as an outcome in my analysis, hence it is
particularly reassuring to see that the test passes. A similar picture emerges for
high school attainment and college.48
Table 1.C.1: Test for parallel trends in pro-grade vote
share
Vote share of pro-grades parties (%)
Graded x Year –0.05
(0.08)
Graded 111.89
(160.44)
Year –24.62
(25.11)
Mean 35.23
R2 0.32
Standard errors clustered at the municipality level.
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
47A reform in the 90s increased the length of vocational training to three years.
48Statistics Sweden was changing the classification of education in the last part of the panel,
a thus there are breaks in the trends. A dashed line marks the first and last year in which
estimates are affected by the break, which may lead to spurious rejections in the tests.
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Figure 1.C.1: Test for parallel trends in treatment assignment
Note: The Figure plots aggregate vote share of right-wing parties (in general favoring early grade
assignment) in municipal elections, held every 4 years in Sweden, for grading and non-grading
municipalities in the sample. Dashed vertical lines mark the period in which the two cohorts
in the sample were in school year 6.
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Trends in: Compulsory School (%, ages 38-74)
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Figure 1.C.2: Test for parallel trends in education:
Compulsory school (graded cohorts)
Note: The Figure plots in the upper panel trends in 9-year-compulsory-school attainment
for people aged 38-74, who studied before the initial reform, for grading and non-grading
municipalities in the sample. Dashed vertical lines mark the period in which the two cohorts
in the sample were studying. The lower panel presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval
from diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are run over a 5-year window centered on the marked
year, and control for a linear trend.
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Trends in: High School (%, ages 38-74)
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Figure 1.C.3: Test for parallel trends in education:
High school (graded cohorts)
Note: The Figure plots in the upper panel trends in high-school attainment for people aged
38-74, who studied before the initial reform, for grading and non-grading municipalities in the
sample. Dashed vertical lines mark the period in which the two cohorts in the sample were
studying. The lower panel presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff
placebo regressions. Tests are run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, and
control for a linear trend.
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Trends in: College (%, ages 38-74)
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Figure 1.C.4: Test for parallel trends in education:
College (graded cohorts)
Note: The Figure plots in the upper panel trends in college attainment for people aged 38-74,
who studied before the initial reform, for grading and non-grading municipalities in the sample.
Dashed vertical lines mark the period in which the two cohorts in the sample were studying.
The lower panel presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo
regressions. Tests are run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, and control for a
linear trend.
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Figure 1.C.5: Test for parallel trends in education flows:
Short HS (ungraded cohorts)
Note: The Figure plots in the upper panel trends in vocational high school attainment for
cohorts who studied when early grades were abolished, for grading and non-grading munici-
palities in the sample. The lower panel presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from
diff-in-diff placebo regressions. Tests are run over a 5-year window centered on the marked
year, and control for a linear trend.
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Figure 1.C.6: Test for parallel trends in education flows:
High school (ungraded cohorts)
Note: The Figure plots in the upper panel trends in high school attainment for cohorts who
studied when early grades were abolished, for grading and non-grading municipalities in the
sample. The lower panel presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff
placebo regressions. Tests are run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, and
control for a linear trend. The dashed line marks a break in the time series due to reclassification
of education by Statistics Sweden.
104
5.
00
10
.0
0
15
.0
0
20
.0
0
25
.0
0
196
9
197
0
197
1
197
2
197
3
197
4
197
5
197
6
197
7
197
8
197
9
Cohort
Graded Ungraded
Cohort Trends: College (%, age 26)
-2
-1
0
1
196
9
197
0
197
1
197
2
197
3
197
4
197
5
197
6
197
7
197
8
197
9
Tests for parallel linear trends (5-year window estimates)
Figure 1.C.7: Test for parallel trends in education flows:
College (ungraded cohorts)
Note: The Figure plots in the upper panel trends in college attainment for cohorts who studied
when early grades were abolished, for grading and non-grading municipalities in the sample.
The lower panel presents coefficient and 95% confidence interval from diff-in-diff placebo
regressions. Tests are run over a 5-year window centered on the marked year, and control for a
linear trend. Estimates within the dashed lines are affected by a break in the time series due to
reclassification of education by Statistics Sweden.
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1.C.2 Tests for Differential Response and Compositional Change
Intelligence and SES data is missing for 18% of my sample, but attrition does
not change over time between grading and non-grading municipalities (see
Table 1.C.3). It is thus possible to explore heterogeneous effects by ability and
SES. There appear to be no issues for the surveys taken in grades 6 and 10, but
parental surveys display differential attrition (see Table 1.C.2). Thus I can not
use variables from these surveys in the final specification. Finally, among the
standardized tests that end-of-the-year grades are based upon, only the Swedish
test does not exhibit differential attrition. So this will be the only standardized
test I will be using as an outcome.
In Tables 1.C.3 to 1.C.8 I test for differential compositional change in the
two sets of municipalities for a large set of pre-treatment variables. As I run
the tests for many outcomes and for both the whole sample and the individual
ability-SES cells I am likely to find spurious rejections. I thus comment on how
the tests perform on average.49 All demographic and school-level variables pass
the tests (see Tables 1.C.4 and 1.C.5). The placebo tests for relative verbal and
inductive ability fail in some cases within cell, but are by definition 0 in the
sample since I normalized ability at the treatment cohort level.50 The cross-
sectional differences in marriage and divorce rates found for parents seem to
persist over time (Tables 1.C.6 and 1.C.7). Both income (Table 1.C.5) and a
broad measure of parental education (SES, in Table 1.C.3) pass the tests. Finally
most of the occupational categories (Table 1.C.8) pass the tests for compositional
change, confirming that the cross sectional differences in occupation remained
constant over time. When looking at parental educational attainment, it appears
that the fraction of students with college educated mothers (Table 1.C.6) and
fathers (Table 1.C.7) increases less in early grading municipalities with respect
to the late grading municipalities. These differences are consistent with the
two tests that fail for compositional change in occupation: the share of parents
involved in non-manual occupations increased less over time in early grading
municipalities.
49In some cases the tests pass in the sample, but not within ability-SES cell. This could be due
to compositional change that I find in the ability measures used for the cell. In my analysis
I thus always control for ability.
50See the discussion in Appendix 1.B.1.
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Table 1.C.2: Tests for differential response:
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Student survey -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(school year 6) (0.73) (0.50) (0.16) (0.83) (0.56)
[0.90] [0.99] [0.99] [0.99] [0.99]
Student survey 0.02 0.02 0.04* 0.05** 0.03
(school year 10) (0.26) (0.37) (0.05) (0.02) (0.19)
[0.76] [0.69] [0.77] [0.83] [0.88]
Parent survey -0.06 -0.01 -0.06** -0.01 -0.05***
(0.15) (0.67) (0.05) (0.81) (0.01)
[0.74] [0.71] [0.78] [0.82] [0.87]
English Test 0.13* 0.10 0.09 0.17* 0.14
(school year 8) (0.08) (0.20) (0.31) (0.09) (0.13)
[0.24] [0.27] [0.21] [0.20] [0.18]
Swedish Test 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.07
(school year 9) (0.45) (0.34) (0.56) (0.34) (0.52)
[0.33] [0.34] [0.32] [0.30] [0.30]
Math Test -0.26** -0.29*** -0.26** -0.28*** -0.31***
(school year 9) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
[0.27] [0.30] [0.25] [0.23] [0.22]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table 1.C.3:
Tests for compositional change:
SES and ability.
Summary of diff-in-diff estimates
All Sample
No SES or ability data 0.03
(0.64)
[0.18]
High-SES 0.00
(0.84)
[0.44]
Low-ability Low-SES -0.00
(0.87)
[0.38]
Low-ability High-SES -0.04*
(0.07)
[0.21]
High-ability Low-SES 0.01
(0.55)
[0.17]
High-ability High-SES 0.03**
(0.04)
[0.23]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parenthe-
ses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table 1.C.4: Tests for compositional change: Demographics.
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Female -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.04
(0.52) (0.50) (0.19) (0.71) (0.42)
[0.49] [0.47] [0.48] [0.52] [0.50]
Birth year 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02**
(0.53) (0.36) (0.74) (0.19) (0.03)
[1,969.39] [1,969.20] [1,969.65] [1,969.18] [1,969.63]
Verbal ability 0.01 0.02 -0.09* -0.10 -0.06
(0.85) (0.54) (0.07) (0.13) (0.32)
[-0.00] [-0.53] [-0.33] [0.60] [0.77]
Inductive ability 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.12***
(0.86) (0.95) (0.60) (0.23) (0.00)
[0.00] [-0.53] [-0.41] [0.70] [0.75]
Spatial ability 0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05
(0.91) (0.47) (0.13) (0.10) (0.25)
[0.00] [-0.33] [-0.15] [0.34] [0.45]
Special Education -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.02
(0.68) (0.72) (0.44) (0.30) (0.36)
[0.16] [0.25] [0.21] [0.03] [0.03]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table 1.C.5: Tests for compositional change: School and SES.
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Switched Class -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.00
(0.98) (0.75) (0.41) (0.78) (1.00)
[0.12] [0.09] [0.14] [0.07] [0.12]
Changes of teacher 0.03 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.09
(0.80) (0.75) (0.37) (0.81) (0.54)
[0.55] [0.59] [0.53] [0.52] [0.46]
Hours absent (s.y. 6) -0.79 -2.65 2.26 -0.16 2.13
(0.86) (0.55) (0.59) (1.00) (0.65)
[26.19] [26.16] [26.40] [24.15] [25.98]
Class size 0.44 0.16 1.08 0.24 0.60
(0.50) (0.89) (0.31) (0.71) (0.40)
[21.39] [21.14] [21.54] [21.62] [21.58]
Parents not Nordic 0.00 -0.02** 0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.86) (0.03) (0.11) (0.90) (0.44)
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01]
Quiet home envir. -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 0.02
(0.75) (0.46) (0.87) (0.35) (0.27)
[0.95] [0.93] [0.95] [0.96] [0.96]
Family income 0.42 0.30 0.26 0.30 -0.02
(0.36) (0.46) (0.66) (0.68) (0.98)
[272.37] [245.29] [297.31] [248.11] [316.44]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets. Family income
measured when the child is 11-16.
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Table 1.C.6: Tests for compositional change: Mother.
Summary of difference in differences estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Not Nordic 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
(0.43) (0.21) (0.49) (0.87) (0.11)
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04]
Married -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.04
(0.52) (0.54) (0.27) (0.95) (0.20)
[0.74] [0.72] [0.75] [0.74] [0.79]
Divorced -0.01 -0.02 -0.04* -0.03** 0.01
(0.44) (0.40) (0.07) (0.04) (0.78)
[0.18] [0.17] [0.19] [0.15] [0.17]
Compulsory or less -0.03 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.02 -0.07***
(0.14) (0.76) (0.00) (0.62) (0.00)
[0.35] [0.53] [0.16] [0.48] [0.11]
High school -0.01 -0.02 0.04* -0.02 0.04
(0.82) (0.64) (0.10) (0.61) (0.42)
[0.44] [0.47] [0.43] [0.52] [0.36]
College or more 0.04* 0.03** 0.03 0.03* 0.02
(0.06) (0.05) (0.28) (0.05) (0.69)
[0.21] [0.00] [0.41] [0.00] [0.53]
In the labor force -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.03
(0.89) (0.91) (0.19) (0.65) (0.34)
[0.89] [0.86] [0.93] [0.88] [0.95]
Unemployed 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.47) (0.26) (0.37) (0.99) (0.81)
[0.05] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table 1.C.7: Tests for Compositional Change: Father.
Summary of difference in difference estimates
Outcome: Low-ability High-ability
All Sample Low-SES High-SES Low-SES High-SES
Not Nordic 0.01 -0.01 0.02* 0.00 0.01
(0.53) (0.32) (0.10) (0.69) (0.37)
[0.03] [0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [0.03]
Married 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
(0.78) (0.98) (0.88) (0.53) (0.30)
[0.77] [0.75] [0.78] [0.79] [0.82]
Divorced -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.00
(0.57) (0.74) (0.16) (0.91) (0.85)
[0.17] [0.17] [0.17] [0.14] [0.15]
Compulsory or less -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.05**
(0.32) (0.64) (0.78) (0.39) (0.03)
[0.41] [0.67] [0.13] [0.63] [0.09]
High school -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.06* 0.02
(0.20) (0.50) (0.67) (0.09) (0.57)
[0.40] [0.33] [0.51] [0.37] [0.44]
College or more 0.04*** 0.03** -0.00 0.03** 0.03
(0.00) (0.04) (0.87) (0.04) (0.22)
[0.19] [0.00] [0.36] [0.00] [0.47]
In the labor force -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02*
(0.24) (0.70) (0.33) (0.32) (0.06)
[0.88] [0.85] [0.91] [0.88] [0.93]
Unemployed 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.04**
(0.60) (0.91) (0.32) (0.19) (0.01)
[0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wild Cluster Bootstrap p-values in parentheses; sample averages in brackets.
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Table 1.C.8: Tests for Compositional Change:
Best of parent occupation.
Summary of difference in difference estimates
Diff-in-Diff
(p-value)
Parents: non-skilled workers, goods -0.01
(0.69)
Parents: non-skilled workers, service 0.01
(0.46)
Parents: skilled workers, goods -0.06***
(0.00)
Parents: skilled workers, service 0.01
(0.17)
Parents: lower non-manual ii 0.00
(0.96)
Parents: lower non-manual i 0.03***
(0.00)
Parents: intermediate-level non-manual 0.02
(0.45)
Parents: higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.02
(0.21)
Parents: independent professionals -0.00*
(0.09)
Parents: entrepreneur -0.01
(0.42)
Parents: farmer -0.00
(0.60)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Standard errors clustered at the municipal level. Occupation variables are
taken from Census 1980.
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2.1 Introduction
Empirical work in the social and health sciences depends crucially on the use of
survey data. Surveying individuals may draw their attention to risks, returns,
or choices previously not salient to them. This may change their subsequent
behavior. If so, it may bias parameter estimates and any conclusions drawn
from survey data. In this paper, we assess whether surveys can causally affect
educational investments. We also assess for whom and how surveys can change
education choices and outcomes.
Does responding to a survey designed to evaluate own performance in
school and reflect on future education opportunities cause individuals to re-
think their educational choices? We answer this question by linking survey
data to comprehensive administrative data for the whole Swedish population.
The extensive education survey was administered to a randomly drawn sample
of three cohorts of 3rd graders in the 80s and early 90s. The survey thus consti-
tutes a randomized social experiment for testing whether reflecting on survey
questions alters behavior. We observe education and labor market outcomes
when individuals are 28-31. Importantly, these are from administrative registers
and not reported by the individuals themselves. This means that measurement
error is minimal in our data, we can conduct balancing tests on a rich set of
pre-determined characteristics of surveyed and non-surveyed individuals to
corroborate the success of random assignment, and we can analyze the impact
of the survey on both shorter- and longer-term outcomes.
If being surveyed changes behavior, then it has implications for both the ex-
ternal and internal validity of studies based on survey data. The total “treatment”
effect of being surveyed is thus interesting per se. Most countries administer
Household and Labor Force Surveys (LFS). Much of the research on education,
labor market, household finance, health, and retirement choices is based on
survey data. For example, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) which
is a longitudinal household survey which began in 1968 with a nationally repre-
sentative sample of US households, and the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and 1997 (NLSY97). These surveys comprise samples of
the cohorts born in 1957-64 (1980-84) and respondents were aged 14-22 (12-17)
when first interviewed in 1979 (1997). The construction of these panel surveys
has been crucial for many of the recent methodological advances in microecono-
metrics and applied microeconomics more generally. The empirical issues of
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dealing with measurement error and validation have been extensively studied.2
The fact that repeated surveying can alter individual survey response patterns
has also been well-established. For example, related to the monthly Current
Population Survey (CPS) rotation group bias and its impact on unemployment
estimates (Bailar, 1975; Solon, 1986). However, whether responding to surveys
can actually alter behavior is still an open question. The only study we know
of (Duflo et al., 2011) finds mixed evidence. Duflo et al. (2011) randomly assign
individuals in five field experiments (three on health and two on micro-lending)
to respond to survey questions on health and/or household finance. They find
that responding to health-related questions significantly altered health-related
behavior. Those randomized to take the health survey had significantly higher
take-up of medical insurance and increased use of water treatment products.
They also find that this leads to biased estimates of their estimated impact of
improved water source quality - despite random assignment to higher water
source quality. These results indicate that researchers should be cautious when
administering extensive and repeated surveys, since they may alter the estimated
treatment effects of those surveyed by changing their behavior. However, these
results seem to be context-dependent.
This paper differs from Duflo et al. (2011) in five important aspects. First,
we merge the random survey sample to administrative data for the whole
Swedish population. Our sample size is therefore much larger and the mea-
surement errors in education choices and outcomes are minimal. Second, we
analyze the effect of being surveyed in a developed (rather than developing)
country. Third, we examine the domain of education (rather than health and
lending). This is important if impacts are context-specific. For example, if
survey effects only arise in settings where individuals previously ignored some
of their potential choices and opportunities (e.g. enrolling in high school or
college). In such settings, the survey can make these choices more salient, divert
the focus to rethink priors, and spur individuals to take otherwise missed op-
portunities (e.g. more rewarding educational paths). Fourth, we have access to
complete medical birth records and a range of measures of family composition
and resources to conduct balancing tests of pre-determined characteristics of
surveyed and non-surveyed individuals. Lastly, we are able to follow individuals
for 18-21 years after random survey assignment. This allows us to analyze both
2See e.g. Bound et al. (2001) for an extensive survey of the literature.
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shorter- and longer-term outcomes, which is important if the strength of the
effect of being surveyed diminishes or amplifies over time.
Surveys may affect education choices through providing information to
rethink education choices and potentially change expectations. Our paper is
therefore also related to the literature analyzing the effects of information on the
returns to investment in education. Jensen (2010) finds that his sample of 8th
grade boys in the Dominican Republic significantly underestimate the returns to
schooling. Informing a random subset of them about higher measured returns
leads to a significant increase in perceived returns and 0.20-0.35 more years
of schooling. Similarly, Nguyen (2008) finds that informing a random subset
of primary school students in rural Madagascar about the average returns to
schooling increased their attendance rates by 3.5 percentage points and their
test scores by 0.2 standard deviations on average. Students whose priors were
below the informed average return, had an even higher increase in test scores
of 0.37 standard deviations. These studies analyze very short term effects of
providing specific information on the population distribution of the returns to
education on educational attainment four months (Nguyen, 2008) to four years
later (Jensen, 2010). Relatedly, Wiswall and Zafar (2015) estimate the effects
of providing information on college major-specific characteristics on major
choice during the college years, and Jalava et al. (2015) estimate the effects of
information on test assessment on immediate test effort and performance. In
this paper, we are also able to access longer term effects on completed schooling
and realized labor market returns.
The “treatment” of being surveyed is a bundle of different types of infor-
mation. This means that there are several potential channels through which
the survey can affect education choices. We try to disentangle these channels
exploiting variation in respondents, questions, and timing of questions. Three
potential channels are: first, the children need to evaluate themselves and their
abilities - also relative to their peers’ abilities. They also take one or multiple
cognitive aptitude tests. Even if they are not informed of their test scores, the
test situation may still convey information to those in the tails; e.g. if they
could not reach the end of the test, were not able to answer many test items,
or finished before their peers and confidently solved all test items. Second, the
survey required them to state their preferences; e.g. their desired occupation
and spell out their future education plans. This can be seen as a “nudge” to
rethink and evaluate goals (i.e. desired education and jobs), means, and costs in
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a forward-looking manner.3 This could lead to more well-considered choices
and less “mismatch” between individual abilities, education, and career choices.4
Third, the survey could increase awareness or the salience of choices not pre-
viously considered. The education system and institutional setting may not
be clear to the child and the parents. Particularly, the connection between
early academic choices and the tracked school system. There may also be an
informational asymmetry in that parents with higher education may be better
informed than parents who dropped out of school after compulsory schooling.
The survey asks for reflection on these education choices, including continuing
to high school and college. This information could affect choices by increasing
awareness of choices not previously considered; especially for parents who never
themselves took these educational paths. If so, this has substantive implications
for how to model educational choices. Limited attention models, where indi-
viduals simplify complex choice settings by only considering a limited subset
of choices, have existed at least since Simon (1955).5 However, such models
have not yet been considered in the context of human capital accumulation
and education choice. Fourth, parents also respond to questions about school
inputs, school choices, and how much of their time they devote to their children
– in particular to their schooling investments. This could lead parents to invest
more time in their children’s skill accumulation and schooling.6
3In the survey wave the year after compulsory schooling completion (10th grade) they are
also asked how they made their education choices of elective courses and how they decided
to enroll in high school or not. This is also “nudging” them to evaluate the optimality of
their past choices. Some who may otherwise have dropped out after compulsory schooling
may thus decide to enroll in high school after having stopped out of school for a year or two.
4Several studies find considerable uncertainty about abilities and room for learning through
grades and other feedback in education (Altonji, 1993; Arcidiacono, 2004; Arcidiacono et al.,
2011, 2012; Zafar, 2011; Facchinello, 2016). More information on educational tracks may
also improve outcomes in terms of more sorting on test scores across high school tracks and
less dropout (Goux et al., 2014).
5See e.g. Barberis and Thaler (2003) and DellaVigna (2009) for reviews on contexts in finance
and economics where limited attention has been found important.
6More parental involvement in their child’s schooling is found to improve their child’s, and
even their child’s peers’, school attendance (Avvisati et al., 2014). Cunha et al. (2010) find
that measured parental investments account for 15% of the variation in educational attain-
ment. Heckman and Mosso (2014) provide a recent comprehensive review of this emerging
124
We shed light on the potential channels by assessing heterogeneity in
treatment effects estimated under different identifying assumptions (a within-
municipality, a within-school, and two between-school estimators) across sub-
groups with different levels of parental education.
The causal effect of being surveyed on both short- and long-run outcomes
is generally not significantly different from zero, independently of parental edu-
cation. We find, however, that being surveyed increases educational attainment
and job stability in the early career for some subpopulations. We thus think it is
worth investigating in future research whether being surveyed affects education
choices for specific subpopulations. We will try to disentangle the mechanisms
by examining whether it makes a difference when and who is surveyed - in 6th
grade or also in 3rd grade, the children themselves or also their parents. First,
we have variation in when children responded to the survey, whether and when
parents also responded to the survey, and in the type and intensity of survey
questions. Second, we are able to merge data on siblings in order to estimate
potential information spillover effects. Siblings who were not directly affected
by the survey, could only be affected if there are information spillovers through
social interaction with their siblings and parents – a potentially important de-
terminant of educational choice (Joensen and Nielsen, 2015). We will exploit
that the parent is surveyed when their non-surveyed children (i.e. the siblings
of the surveyed child) are at different stages of their educational paths. Some
older siblings may be about to make critical decisions on whether to enroll in
high school or in college. Therefore, the importance of education may become
particularly salient for these siblings as the parent reflects on career choices.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section spells out the
details of the institutional setting, survey sampling scheme, and how we ex-
ploit these in our empirical strategy. Section 2.3 presents the data, descriptive
statistics, and balancing tests. Section 2.4 presents the results, while Section 2.5
concludes.
literature.
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2.2 Institutional Setting and Empirical Strategy
This section first provides some background on the institutional setting and
the Swedish schooling system the surveyed individuals and their cohorts were
facing. Second, we describe the sampling scheme of the Evaluation Through
Follow-up (ETF) cohort-sequential longitudinal survey. Third, we describe the
empirical strategy we use to identify the effect of surveys on education choice.
2.2.1 Survey Sampling Scheme
The ETF survey was administered by the Department of Education and Special
Education, Gothenburg University.7 The survey was constructed through
a multistage sampling scheme with stratification at the municipal level: (1)
systematically draw two municipalities at random per stratum (13 strata) plus
the three largest municipalities (Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo¨), (2)
randomly draw classes within sampled municipalities, and (3) survey all students
in each sampled class.
More specifically, the survey sample selection design was as follows. In stage
(1) the three largest municipalities (Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo¨) were
selected with probability one, while the remaining 2818 Swedish municipalities
were categorized into 13 strata according to their population (above or below
25,000 inhabitants), proportion of “socialist” mandates (above or below 50%),
the share employed in public administration (above or below 25%), and the
proportion of immigrant pupils (above or below 8%).9 Within each stratum, the
municipalities were assigned a sampling probability weight, pm, proportional to
their share of pupils in the relevant school cohort. Finally, two municipalities
were sampled at random (conditional on pm) from each stratum. Thus, a total
of 29 municipalities were sampled and larger municipalities were more likely to
be sampled. Figure 2.2.1 displays a map of Sweden with each of the sampled
municipalities in stage (1) for each of the three cohorts.
In stage (2) Statistic Sweden’s (SCB) class register was used to randomly sam-
ple classes: 3rd graders in the school-years 1981/82 (ETF72), 1986/87 (ETF77),
7Ha¨rnqvist (1998) provides additional details on the construction of the survey.
8283 in the last wave.
9The exact procedure of selecting municipalities is extensively documented in Emanuelsson
(1979).
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(a) 1972 cohort (b) 1977 cohort (c) 1982 cohort
Figure 2.2.1: Sampled municipalities
Note: The Figure displays a map of Sweden with the sampled municipalities in each ETF-cohort
1972, 77, and 82, respectively, shaded.
and 1991/92 (ETF82). Unfortunately, these class registers have not been kept in
SCB’s archives. This means that we can not perfectly measure “treatment” and
“control” group assignment, since we can not perfectly measure who is in the
“control” group: i.e. those who attended 3rd grade in the sampled municipalities
in the same year, but were not in a sampled class. The sample selection criteria
for the classes were that: (2.i) 17 classes in each sampled municipality were
selected at random, but with the two exceptions that (2.ii) all classes in small
municipalities with 17 or fewer classes were sampled and (2.iii) 29 classes were
selected at random in the three largest municipalities (Stockholm, Gothenburg,
and Malmo¨). The class sampling was made in January in the relevant school-
year (1981/82, 1986/87, and 1991/92). In stage (3), all students registered in the
sampled classes were surveyed on April 15 in the relevant school-year, hence
“treated”. The first two cohorts (ETF72 and ETF77) were surveyed in 3rd, 6th,
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and 10th grade (the year after compulsory schooling was finalized) whereas the
last cohort (ETF82) was only surveyed in 6th grade.10 The students’ parents
were also surveyed once: in 3rd grade for the first cohort (ETF72) and in 6th
grade for the last two cohorts (ETF77 and ETF82). Table 2.2.1 provides an
overview of the administered surveys and tests for each cohort.
Table 2.2.1: Treatment Assignment Overview
Parent Child Aptitude
survey survey test
3rd 6th 3rd 6th 10th 3rd 6th
1972 cohort T T T T T T
1977 cohort T T T T T
1982 cohort T T T
The Table displays an overview of the variation in treatment
assignment over grades for each of the three ETF-cohorts 1972,
77, and 82.
2.2.2 Control and Treatment Group Assignment
With the data we have, we can make two approximations of the “control” group.
First, those who were in 9th grade in 1987/88, 1992/93, 1997/98. The
two main drawbacks with this selection method is that it assumes no grade
retention and no students selecting in and out of classes during the six-year
period from grade 3 to grade 9. This seems to be an especially problematic
assumption for those not born in Sweden, since the surveyed (i.e. the “treatment”
group) will not contain any students who have immigrated after grade 3, but
the “control group” will. Also students who may re-take or skip a grade will
be misclassified according to this assumption. However, grade retention was
extremely rare for these cohorts. For the last two cohorts born in 1977 and 1982,
we also have information on the municipality of birth from the medical birth
registry as well as the municipality of residency of the parents in December
1990 (when the ETF77 cohort attended 7th grade) and in December 1991 (when
the ETF82 cohort attended 3rd grade and were sampled). This allows us to
10Note that randomization also happened in 3rd grade for the ETF82 cohort despite them
not being surveyed until 6th grade.
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almost perfectly measure who was in the “control” group in the ETF82 cohort
and more accurately measure who was in the “control” group in the ETF77
cohort.
Second, those who are born in 1972, 1977, and 1982. This drops everyone
from the “control group” who started school a year “early” or “late” compared
to the ordained schooling track. That is all the students not born in these three
years, but who still were part of the three relevant schooling cohorts.
We discuss additional sample selection criteria and refinements to the ap-
proximation of treatment and control groups in Sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.
2.2.3 Empirical Strategy
We now turn to describing the empirical strategies we use to identify the effect of
surveys on education choice. Particularly, how we exploit the survey sampling
scheme to identify the causal effect of being surveyed. This section highlights
how – despite successful randomization – we need to deal with non-random
sorting across units of randomization.
First, we simply compare the outcomes of those surveyed and those non-
surveyed within each municipality. This is given by the linear regression:
Yismc = δ0 + δ1Surveyismc + γm + εismc (2.1)
where Yismc is the educational outcome for individual i in school s in cohort
c and municipality m, Survey is an indicator for whether the individual was
surveyed, and γm is a municipality fixed effect. Given the survey sampling
scheme (cf. Section 2.2.1), δ1 can be interpreted as a causal effect of being
surveyed if (a) individuals, classes and schools are randomly sampled and (b)
there is full compliance as everyone assigned to the survey responded to the
survey. In other words, if individuals are neither assigned to sampled classes
nor refusing to respond to the survey based on the unobservables, εismc, in (2.1)
which affect the educational outcome of interest.
Second, we use both a within- and a between-school estimator to deal with
potential non-random sampling across schools as well as non-random individual
non-response. The within-school strategy is ideal if (a’) individuals and classes
are randomly sampled within schools and (b) there is full compliance in student
survey response. Random assignment to classes conditional on school (a’) is
a more credible assumption than (a) if the schools sampled are systematically
different from the schools not sampled. The between-school strategy also
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assumes (a) random sampling of schools (and classes), but tries to get at potential
violations of (b) non-random student non-response by measuring “treatment”
at the school level. However, the benefit of not having to assume (b) comes at
the cost of the estimated treatment effect being attenuated towards zero.
The following two sub-sections are devoted to providing more details on
the within- and between-school estimators we apply. Overall, the empirical
strategies trade-off precision and bias in different ways by imposing different
identifying assumptions and measuring “survey treatment” at different unit
levels. We will discuss the threats to interpreting each of these “survey effects”
as causal in even more detail when presenting the data and empirical results in
Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
2.2.3.1 Within-School
The within-school strategy simply compares the outcomes of individuals who
were in the treated classes to those who were in the control classes within
each school where some students were assigned to treatment. Figure 2.2.2 (a)
illustrates this identification strategy. Municipality A has three schools of which
three classes in School A and one class in School B are assigned to treatment
(marked with light shading). The within-school strategy essentially compares
the students in the three treated classes in School A to the students in the four
control group classes in School A and the students in the treated class in School
B to the students in the remaining three classes in School B. In contrast, the
within-municipality specification (2.1) simply compares four treated classes in
Municipality A with the nine control classes in Municipality A. This distinction
is important if there is significant sorting across schools or if there are influential
unobserved school-specific factors affecting educational outcomes. The within-
school estimates are given by the linear regression:
Yismc = β0 + β1Surveyismc + γs + εismc (2.2)
where Yismc is the educational outcome for individual i in school s in cohort c
and municipalitym, Survey is an indicator for being assigned to the survey when
in 3rd grade, and γs is a school fixed effect. β1 can be interpreted as the causal
effect of being surveyed if treated classes are not selected based on unobservables,
εismc, in (2.2) that affect the educational outcome. This seems reasonable based
on the class selection criteria outlined in Section 2.2.1. However, there are a
few empirical issues we need to deal with. First, we only partially observe class
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assignment in 3rd grade as it is only observed for those who are assigned to
treatment and comply. Thus we need to impute 3rd grade school assignment by
survey response and 9th grade school.11 Second, there may be attrition due to
some students moving after randomization occurred. Third, some students may
also have been in a different class, school, municipality, or abroad at the time of
randomization but otherwise followed the sampled class. Fourth, many students
switch schools between 3rd and 9th grade simply because some schools specialize
in either younger or older grades. Fifth, some students (more realistically their
parents) might have opted out of the survey for privacy reasons. Therefore,
both student non-response and mobility between 3rd and 9th grade pose threats
to the identification of β1. In Section 2.3.2.1, we assess the credibility of the
identifying assumptions by testing for balance on a range of variables determined
pre-treatment. When possible, we also try to control for location in 3rd grade
and whether the student is foreign born in (2.2) – which seems to be a good
proxy for mobility.
(a) Within-School (b) Between-School
Figure 2.2.2: Within- and Between-School Variation in Treatment Assignment
Note: The Figure displays the two types of exogenous variation we exploit in the data. The
left panel (a) displays how we compare treated and control (light shading) units within each
school when employing the within-school identification strategy. The right panel (b) displays
how we compare schools who have some classes assigned to treatment and no classes assigned
to treatment, respectively, in the between-school identification strategy.
11Section 2.3.1.1 provides more detail on the imputation of schools.
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2.2.3.2 Between-Schools
To deal with some of the potential threats to identification of a causal survey
effect using the simple and the within-school strategy, we also use a between-
school empirical strategy. To this end, we compare the outcomes of individuals
who were in ETF schools (i.e. schools where there was at least one treated class)
to those schools who did not have any classes assigned to treatment. Figure 2.2.2
(b) illustrates this identification strategy. Municipality A has three schools of
which School A and School B are ETF schools (marked with light shading) and
School C is a non-ETF school. The between-school strategy essentially compares
the average outcomes of the students in the two ETF schools (School A and
School B) to the students in the non-ETF school (School C). The between-school
estimates are given by the linear regression:
Yismc = α0 + α1ETFschoolsmc + γm + εismc (2.3)
whereETFschoolsmc is an indicator for whether school s in municipalitym is an
ETF school for individuals in cohort c. α1 can be interpreted as the causal effect
of being in a school where some students were surveyed. In this sense, α1 can be
thought of as an intent to treat effect (ITT). Causal inference naturally rests on
the assumption that schools are not sampled based on student unobservables,
εismc, in (2.3).
The main advantage of this between-school estimator is that there is no
need to impose assumptions on student survey non-response. There are two
main drawbacks. First, as classes were systematically sampled bigger schools
are overrepresented within municipality, due to the fact that they have more
classes. This problem is particularly severe in small municipalities, where the
majority of classes were sampled. This induces a mechanical bias, as small
special schools are less likely to be assigned to the treatment. This bias can be
corrected controlling for school size or restricting the sample to municipalities
where a non-trivial fraction of schools has been left out of the sample (bigger
municipalities). Second, some schools – particularly larger schools – have
few surveyed students. This means that the estimated “survey effect” will
be attenuated towards zero, since the average outcome in “surveyed” ETF
schools is an average over a few surveyed students and many non-surveyed
students. To accommodate this, we also estimate a specification of (2.3) where
we replace ETFschoolsmc with the fraction of students in the school who were
assigned to the survey, FractionSurveyedsmc. This specification captures the
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intensity of treatment in each school, which minimizes the attenuation bias.
However, FractionSurveyedsmc may be correlated with the number of students
not responding to the survey. To deal with this potential issue, we rather include
the predicted fraction of students surveyed in the school, ̂FractionSurveyedsmc,
in (2.3). We predict the number of classes sampled in each school by: First, using
Maimonides’ rule (with a 30 students per class cap) for 9th grade enrollment to
predict the average class size.12 Second, given the number of students surveyed,
approximate how many classes were sampled in each school. There were very
few cases in which whole classes did not comply to the survey assignment. Thus,
this specification of (2.3) should minimize selective non-response bias while
also providing a reasonable measure of the intensity of treatment at the school
level.
Finally, it should be noted that we assume no spillover effects on untreated
units (i.e. individuals, classes, and schools) when making causal inference
throughout the paper. That is, we impose the stable unit treatment value assump-
tion (SUTVA) of any unit’s outcome being unaffected by another unit’s treat-
ment assignment. If this assumption does not hold because there are spillovers
from those surveyed to their non-surveyed peers in the same school, then both
the simple within-municipality (δ1) and the within-school estimate (β1) of the
“survey effect” may be attenuated towards zero, while the between-school esti-
mate (α1)will encompass these spillovers. This attenuation bias will presumably
be stronger for the within-school estimate (β1) than for the within-municipality
estimate (δ1). We can get a sense of the presence and strength of potential
spillovers by comparing the different estimates. If there are strong spillovers on
peers within schools, then the “control classes” in the within-school strategy
are partially “treated”. This means that the estimated “survey effect” will be
attenuated towards zero as the average outcome of those in surveyed classes is
compared to the average outcomes of those not surveyed in the same school, but
potentially affected by their surveyed peers. For the between-school estimates,
these peer spillovers would work in the opposite direction by attenuating the
estimated “survey effect” less towards zero, since they compare the average
outcomes in schools where some classes are assigned to the survey treatment to
the average outcomes in schools where no students are assigned to treatment.
12Several papers have used Maimonides’ rule to estimate the effect of class size on student
achievement (Angrist and Lavy, 1999) and long-term outomes (Fredriksson et al., 2013).
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2.3 Data
In this section, we describe the data and the sample selection.
We merge the ETF survey data to several administrative registers via the
unique Swedish individual identifier. Our measures of educational choices and
outcomes originate from several registers administered by Statistics Sweden
(SCB). We have detailed data on educational choices and outcomes from the 9th
grade registry (incl. grades in individual courses), the High School registry (incl.
grades in individual courses, grade point average (GPA), track and specialization
choices), and the Higher Education registry (incl. detailed educational codes
for all enrollment spells, course credits accumulated during enrollment, and
acquired degrees).
The Multigeneration registry allows us to link children to their parents. It
also contains information on family size and composition. Additional back-
ground variables are obtained from the longitudinal integration database for
health insurance and labour market studies (LISA) from which we have yearly
observations during the period 1990-2013. The parental background variables
we observe include age, civil status, highest completed education, employment,
earnings, and disposable family income. We supplement this with earnings
information from the Register Based Labor Market Statistics (RAMS) for the
years 1986-89 and information on disposable family income from the Income
and Tax registry (IoT ) for the years 1978-89. This means that we can measure
disposable family income (parental earnings) from birth (age 3) to age 31 for
the youngest cohort and from age 6 (age 14) to 41 for the oldest cohort in our
sample.
2.3.1 Sample Selection
We focus on the cohorts who completed compulsory schooling (9th grade)
in the school-years 1987/88, 1992/93, 1997/98. For children who followed
the ordained educational path, this corresponds to the cohorts born in 1972,
1977, and 1982. 95.99%, 95.48% and 5.18% of students ordained to graduate
from compulsory school grade 9 in 1988, 1993, 1998 were born in 1972, 1977,
and 1982, respectively. For each birth cohort, we also focus exclusively on the
sampled municipalities.
For the samples used in the within- and between-school empirical strategies,
we further exclude those attending very small schools in 9th grade; i.e. schools
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with a graduating cohort of 20 or fewer students. It is difficult to make a
reasonable ETF school imputation for these small schools, since we do not
know whether a few surveyed students switched to the school or were part of a
very small sampled class. This restriction only drops 0.6%, 0.7%, and 1.78% of
the sample for the ETF72, ETF77, and ETF82 cohorts, respectively.
2.3.1.1 ETF School Imputation
We observe which school everyone attends at the end of compulsory schooling;
i.e. in 9th grade. However, we only observe earlier class and school choices for
those surveyed. In order to impute school status for the whole sample – which
we need for the within and between-school strategies – we need to approximate
how each observed 9th grade school corresponds to each 3rd grade school. To
this end, we use (class) school codes in (6th) 3rd grade for those assigned to the
survey for the (ETF72) ETF77 and ETF82 cohorts. These codes are linked to
the school codes we observe for everyone in 9th grade. The information on
(class) school codes thus reveals how many surveyed students in the same 3rd
grade (class) school are also in the same 9th grade school. The details of the
ETF school imputations are as follows:
ETF72 cohort. We use the information on classes in grade 6 to approximate
whether the grade 9 school code corresponds to an ETF school. Note that most
students attend the same school in grades 6 and 9, but most students change
school from grade 3 to 9 (or the school code itself changes). We impute ETF
schools as follows: (i) For each grade 9 school code, sum the number of students
with each grade 6 class code, N6s . (ii) If there are at least two students from a
surveyed 6th grade class in the 9th grade school, then we divide N6s by the total
number of surveyed students in the 9th grade school. This yields the fraction of
students from the same 6th grade class who also attend the same school in 9th
grade. A high fraction means that the 9th grade school was a destination school
for those attending an ETF school in 3rd grade. We assign ETF school status to
the schools for which this fraction was above 0.5. This changes assignment of
30 schools – most of which are very small and drop out of the restricted sample
in the between-school analysis; see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.
ETF77 and ETF82 cohorts. Our imputation procedure is as follows: (i) For
each grade 9 school code, find the modal grade 3 school code. (ii) Sum the
number of students with the modal school code, N3s . (iii)DivideN3s by the total
surveyed students in the 9th grade school, s. For each grade 9 school code, this
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yields the fraction of students with the modal grade 3 school code. (iv) Change
school status if fewer than a third of students are coming from the modal grade
3 school. This changes assignment status for one school in the ETF77 cohort
and 17 schools in the ETF82 cohort. Note that the number of schools increases
over time, but this does not affect school assignments much.
Once control group students are matched up, we calculate the fraction of
surveyed students in each grade 9 school. We classify a school to be a non-ETF
school if: there are five or fewer surveyed students in the grade 9 school and
they represent at most 5% of the school. This changes status for 3, 62, and 35
schools in the ETF72, ETF77, and ETF82 cohort, respectively.13
2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.3.1 shows that survey response was high – initially above 90% – but
there was also some attrition as response rates fell by about 20 percentage points
over the seven year period from 3rd to 10th grade.
Table 2.3.1: Percentage of students and parents
responding to the survey
Child Survey Parent Survey
Grade 3 Grade 6 Grade 10 Grade 3 Grade 6
Cohort 1972 93 85 72 75 –
Cohort 1977 95 91 73 – 77
Cohort 1982 – 87 – – 75
Table 2.3.2 displays the number of students and schools in the sampled
municipalities. Around 80% of schools were sampled in the 72 and 82 cohorts,
while only 55% of schools were sampled for the 77 cohort. The fraction of stu-
dents sampled within each sampled school is also highest (38%) in the 72 cohort
and lowest (26%) in the 77 cohort. Overall, the table shows that there should
be enough variation in survey assignment within-municipalities to estimate
(2.1) and within-schools to estimate (2.2).
13Future versions of the paper will provide sensitivity analysis of the importance of the chosen
thresholds. We also intend to use Maimonides’ rule in order to exclude only municipalities
who had almost all classes sampled in expectation.
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To assure that there is enough variation between schools for the between-
school estimates of (2.3), we also conduct the analysis on a restricted sample
of municipalities where at most 85% of students are assigned to the survey
treatment. This retains mostly big municipalities; see Section 2.2.1 for details.
Table 2.3.3 presents the equivalent variation to Table 2.3.2 for this restricted
sample. Naturally, both the fraction of sampled schools within the municipality
and the fraction of sampled students within each sampled school are lower in
this sample of larger municipalities and schools.
Table 2.3.2: Students and schools sampled - Unrestricted sample
Students
Sampled
Schools
Schools
Fraction in
Sampled Schools
Fraction Surveyed
in Sampled Schools
Cohort 1972 23305 143 184 0.82 38.2
Cohort 1977 24692 120 235 0.55 25.8
Cohort 1982 28709 225 290 0.79 28.1
Table 2.3.3: Students and schools sampled - Restricted sample
Students
Sampled
Schools
Schools
Fraction in
Sampled Schools
Fraction Surveyed
in Sampled Schools
Cohort 1972 9232 39 79 0.56 15.8
Cohort 1977 16198 45 155 0.33 15.7
Cohort 1982 19883 143 204 0.71 24.4
Sample restricted to municipalities where at least 85% of the students are not part of an EFT
school
2.3.2.1 Balancing Tests
To corroborate the randomness of the sampling scheme, we perform a number
of balancing tests on the pre-determined characteristics of the “treatment” and
“control” groups.
Tables 2.A.1 to 2.A.13 in Appendix 2.A display the balancing tests for
each of the cohorts, under different sample restrictions, and for each of the
four empirical strategies. Each table displays control group means in the first
column. We also present three sets of balancing tests. First, regression tests
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without and with controls. Second, standardized difference, the difference
between the treatment group mean and the control group mean of each observed
characteristic, X, scaled by the pooled variance.
The balancing tests indicate that assumption (b) in Section 2.2.3 of ran-
dom survey non-response is more of an empirical issue – especially for the 72
cohort and to some extent for the 82 cohort – as there are some systematic
and significant differences in observed characteristics between “treatment” and
“control” groups for the within-school strategy that are not present for the
between-school strategy. Particularly, having divorced parents and being for-
eign born are predictive of group assignment. Students with disrupted families
might have been more likely to drop out of the survey. Being foreign born
presumably introduces issues of selective mobility affecting the within-school
“survey effect” estimate. To get a sense of how important selective mobility may
be, we also control for location in 3rd grade (when possible) and whether the
student is foreign born in (2.2) – which seems to be a good proxy for mobility.14
92%, 93%, and 95% of the students in the 72, 77, and 82 cohorts, respectively,
remain in one of the sampled municipalities. Thus mobility should not have a
major impact on the analysis. Nevertheless, we also perform the analysis on
a restricted sample of Swedish born students only. This improves balance on
pre-determined characteristics, particularly for the 1977 and 1982 cohort.
All in all it appears that different identification strategies work for different
cohorts. In particular, when restricting the sample to Swedish born students,
there are no statistically significant differences between surveyed and non-
surveyed students within municipality for the 1977 and 1982 cohorts (see Tables
2.A.6 and 2.A.11). Controlling for school size and restricting the sample to the
bigger municipalities, there are no statistically significant differences between
students in sampled and non-sampled schools for the 1972 and 1982 cohorts
(see Tables 2.A.4 and 2.A.13).
14Whether parents divorced is also related to student mobility and may even be related to stu-
dent educational outcomes. In future versions of the paper, we plan to explore the impor-
tance of this and other mobility channels further as we have data on the timing of parental
divorce and the timing of migration – in and out of Sweden as well as between Swedish
municipalities.
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2.4 Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results. We observe complete educational
spells from the last year of compulsory schooling (9th grade) as well as individual
employment status and earnings throughout the early careers. We focus on
shorter- and longer-term outcomes. The short-term outcomes are 9th grade
GPA, and indicators for whether advanced Math and English were chosen in
9th grade for the 72 and 77 cohort, while the short-term outcomes for the 82
cohort are the individual grades in 9th grade Math, English, and Swedish.15 The
long-term outcomes include highest completed educational attainment as well
as average earnings and days unemployed during the year when the individuals
are 28-31. Tables 2.B.1 to 2.B.12 in Appendix 2.B display the empirical results
for each of the cohorts, and each of the four empirical strategies. Each table
presents estimates of the “survey effect” on a short- and a long-term index in
order to assess whether the survey had any effect on educational choices and
subsequent outcomes. These indexes are constructed by standardizing each
variable that enters the index to the control mean and standard deviation, and
then taking the average of the standardized variables with signs such that larger
is better. For the within-school strategy, indexes are constructed at the school
level; i.e. the control group is the students who have not been sampled in each
school.16
We focus for each cohort on the specifications that pass the robustness
tests, and conclude that there is overall no effect of the survey on short and
long-term effects, for both students with low and highly educated families. We
find no effect of the treatment on the main indexes and their components for
the 1972 cohort (between-school specification, Tables 2.B.3 and 2.B.4), and for
the 1982 cohort (within-municipality specification, Table 2.B.9). However we
do find some reduction in unemployment days for surveyed students from low-
education families for the 1972 cohort (within-municipality specification, Table
2.B.5), and an increase in the graduation rate from short-college for the 1982
cohort for students with educated parents (between-school specification, Table
15The short-term outcomes differ across cohorts because of institutional changes in schools
and data availability. Bjorklund et al. (2005) provide more details on these institutional
changes that also drive the increased number of schools for the youngest cohort.
16This way of constructing outcome indexes builds on Kling et al. (2007).
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2.B.11). The latter result is not consistent with what we find with the within-
municipality specification, but the two samples are not directly comparable due
to the different restrictions.
2.4.1 Future directions
To understand whether, beyond the general zero effect, there actually is an
heterogeneous effect of being surveyed, we need to consider the problem of
multiple hypothesis testing. In the next step of the analysis we will use the
testing procedure outlined in List et al. (2016), which builds on the stepwise
procedures developed in Romano and Wolf (2005a,b, 2010) and was extended
to heterogeneous treatment effects by Lee and Shaikh (2014) in the context of
the PROGRESA program.17 This testing procedure asymptotically controls
for the familywise error rate (i.e. the probability of one false rejection) and is
asymptotically balanced such that all marginal probabilities of rejecting any
true null hypothesis are approximately equal. This testing procedure has bet-
ter power properties as it incorporates information on the joint dependence
structure of the test statistics when determining which null hypotheses to reject.
Thus at a significance level of α, all rejected null hypothesis are actually false
with probability 1− α. We will use this procedure to adjust the standard errors
when making inference for multiple outcomes (three short- and six long-term)
and multiple subgroups (low and high parental education).
Secondly, we might be finding a zero effect of being surveyed for the simple
reason that our surveys were assigned after students had taken important choices
(elective courses, high school enrollment and track choice). In future versions
of this paper, we will focus on whether the parent survey had an impact on the
education choices of non-surveyed siblings. We will present separate estimates
for siblings who were ordained to attend grades g = 10, 11, 12 (17-19 years old)
and thus high school bound. These siblings are at a critical junction on their
17Chapter 15 in Lehmann and Romano (2006) provides an overview of these testing proce-
dures. Similar adjustments for multiple testing have been made in recent analysis of the
HighScope Perry Preschool Program (Heckman et al., 2010, 2011, 2013), Anderson (2008)
who analyzes early childhood interventions, and Kling et al. (2007) who analyze the Mov-
ing to Opportunity (MTO) experiment when drawing inference about the effect of the
program on multiple outcomes using closely related results on stepwise multiple testing
developed in Westfall and Young (1993).
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schooling trajectory. Thus they may be particularly sensitive to the influence
of their parents becoming more aware of the importance of schooling.
Thirdly, to investigate potential spillover effects we will provide separate
estimates for non-surveyed siblings who are attending compulsory schooling
grades g = 1, 2, ..., 9 (7-16 years old)when their parent was administered a survey
(at random) because they had a sibling in one of the ETF cohorts.
2.5 Conclusion
Most empirical advances in the social and health sciences over the past decades
have depended crucially on the use of survey data. If surveying individuals
draws their attention to risks, returns, or choices previously not salient to them
and this changes their subsequent behavior, then it may bias parameter estimates
and conclusions drawn from survey data.
We assess whether surveys causally changed educational choices and out-
comes of students attending compulsory school in Sweden in the 80s and early
90s. We do not find strong reasons to worry about extensive surveying changing
educational choices and subsequent outcomes. This is reassuring for both the
external and internal validity of estimates based on (this) survey data.
There are, however, some cases for which the survey increased educational
attainment and job stability of the surveyed individuals. We thus think it is
worth investigating in future research, after properly correcting for multiple
hypothesis testing, whether being surveyed affect choices for specific subpop-
ulations. To further get at mechanisms, we will also extend our analysis to
the siblings of the surveyed students, for whom parental surveys might have
revealed information at critical junctions on their schooling trajectory.
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2.A Balancing Tests
2.A.1 1972 Cohort
Table 2.A.1:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1972 cohort - All students
Variable Control Mean Difference(Sch) Difference(Munic) Cohen’s d
Female 0.49 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.07 -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.19
(0.26) (0.00) (0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.05
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.25 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.18
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 153.03 2.20 2.84 0.06
(51.79) (1.46) (2.05)
Mother’s disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 94.26 -1.08 -0.87 0.25
(49.71) (1.02) (1.11)
Father with low SES 0.36 0.02* 0.01 -0.12
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.23 -0.02** -0.01 0.12
(0.42) (0.01) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.44 -0.02 -0.02* 0.03
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.26 -0.02* -0.01 0.14
(0.44) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: in the labor force 0.92 0.01*** 0.01** -0.10
(0.27) (0.01) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.37 0.00 -0.00 -0.17
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.51 0.01 0.01 0.09
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.12 -0.01 -0.00 0.12
(0.33) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 0.00 0.01 -0.07
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.29 -0.01 -0.01 0.14
(0.45) (0.01) (0.02)
Mother: in the labor force 0.92 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.06
(0.26) (0.01) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 413.69
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
No sample restriction. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11€.
Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.A.2:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1972 cohort - Swedish born
Variable Control Mean Difference(Sch) Difference(Munic) Cohen’s d
Female 0.49 -0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19
(0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
(0.00)
Divorced parent 0.24 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.18
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 157.13 2.20 2.62 0.06
(51.56) (1.51) (1.91)
Mother’s disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 92.17 -1.97* -1.73 0.25
(50.20) (1.05) (1.17)
Father with low SES 0.32 0.02** 0.01 -0.12
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.43 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.24 -0.02* -0.01 0.12
(0.43) (0.01) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.44 -0.01 -0.02 0.03
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.28 -0.03** -0.01 0.14
(0.45) (0.01) (0.02)
Father: in the labor force 0.95 0.01** 0.01* -0.10
(0.22) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.33 0.01 0.00 -0.17
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.09
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.13 -0.01 -0.00 0.12
(0.33) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.43 0.01 0.01 -0.07
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.30 -0.01 -0.01 0.14
(0.46) (0.01) (0.02)
Mother: in the labor force 0.95 0.01* 0.01 -0.06
(0.22) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 339.22
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
Sample restricted to Swedish born students. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014:
1 SEK = 0.11€. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.A.3:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1972 cohort - All students
No controls Controls
Variable Control Mean Difference Difference Cohen’s d
Female 0.49 -0.01 -0.01* 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.09 -0.03* -0.02 0.11
(0.28) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.13 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.10
(0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.28 -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.15
(0.45) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 153.79 -2.69 -4.51 0.05
(55.36) (2.83) (3.09)
Mother’s disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 101.41 -14.18*** -12.54*** 0.29
(52.21) (2.52) (2.66)
Father with low SES 0.37 0.01 0.03 -0.03
(0.48) (0.02) (0.03)
Father with medium SES 0.42 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.21 -0.01 -0.02 0.02
(0.41) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.44 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.25 -0.01 -0.03 0.03
(0.43) (0.02) (0.03)
Father: in the labor force 0.92 0.02* 0.01 -0.06
(0.28) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.34 0.08*** 0.09*** -0.16
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother with medium SES 0.54 -0.06*** -0.07*** 0.12
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with high SES 0.12 -0.02 -0.02 0.05
(0.33) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.29 -0.02 -0.04 0.06
(0.45) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother: in the labor force 0.92 0.01 0.00 -0.03
(0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 291.91
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
No sample restriction. The specification with controls includes a control
for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11 €. Standard errors
clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.A.4:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1972 cohort - Restricted sample
No controls Controls
Variable Control Mean Difference Difference Cohen’s d
Female 0.49 -0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.11
(0.28) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 0.10
(0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.28 -0.01 0.01 0.15
(0.45) (0.02) (0.02)
Father’s disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 153.67 5.70 2.04 0.05
(55.88) (4.12) (4.81)
Mother’s disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 101.85 -3.59 -0.62 0.29
(52.19) (3.28) (3.37)
Father with low SES 0.37 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03
(0.48) (0.04) (0.04)
Father with medium SES 0.42 -0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Father with high SES 0.21 0.06* 0.03 0.02
(0.41) (0.03) (0.04)
Father educ: high school 0.44 -0.03 -0.02 0.02
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: college or more 0.25 0.08** 0.04 0.03
(0.43) (0.04) (0.04)
Father: in the labor force 0.91 -0.00 -0.01 -0.06
(0.28) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.34 -0.02 -0.01 -0.16
(0.47) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother with medium SES 0.54 -0.02 -0.02 0.12
(0.50) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother with high SES 0.12 0.04* 0.03 0.05
(0.33) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 -0.04** -0.02 -0.02
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: college or more 0.29 0.06 0.03 0.06
(0.45) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother: in the labor force 0.92 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03
(0.27) (0.01) (0.02)
Hotelling’s T-squared 100.44
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Sample restricted to municipalities where less than 85% of the students
are in sampled schools. The specification with controls includes a control
for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11 €. Standard errors
clustered at the school level.
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2.A.2 1977 Cohort
Table 2.A.5:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1977 cohort - All students
Variable Control Mean Difference(Sch) Difference(Munic) Cohen’s d
Female 0.49 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.09 -0.02*** -0.02*** 0.18
(0.28) (0.01) (0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.10 0.00 -0.00 0.06
(0.30) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.18 -0.02** -0.02* 0.11
(0.38) (0.01) (0.01)
Father Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 179.96 -1.65 -1.13 0.06
(83.14) (1.66) (1.91)
Mother Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 129.60 -0.08 0.41 0.12
(50.87) (1.11) (1.10)
Father with low SES 0.37 0.01 -0.00 -0.08
(0.48) (0.01) (0.02)
Father with medium SES 0.40 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.23 -0.02 -0.01 0.11
(0.42) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.43 0.01 0.00 -0.02
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.29 -0.01 -0.00 0.10
(0.45) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: In labor force (1990) 0.94 0.01* 0.01** -0.10
(0.24) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.38 0.03** 0.01 -0.11
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.51 -0.02 -0.01 0.05
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.12 -0.01 -0.00 0.08
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.44 0.01 -0.00 -0.06
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.30 -0.01 -0.00 0.08
(0.46) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: In labor force (1990) 0.93 0.01* 0.01 -0.08
(0.26) (0.00) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 95.78
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality. No
sample restriction. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK= 0.11€. Standard
errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.A.6:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1977 cohort - Swedish born
Variable Control Mean Difference(Sch) Difference(Munic) Cohen’s d
Female 0.48 0.02 0.01 -0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18
(0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06
(0.00)
Divorced parent 0.16 -0.02** -0.01 0.11
(0.37) (0.01) (0.01)
Father Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 186.94 -2.23 -1.66 0.06
(84.36) (1.58) (1.77)
Mother Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 127.47 -0.28 0.24 0.12
(49.09) (1.26) (1.24)
Father with low SES 0.34 0.00 -0.00 -0.08
(0.47) (0.01) (0.02)
Father with medium SES 0.42 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.24 -0.02 -0.01 0.11
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.43 0.01 0.01 -0.02
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.30 -0.01 -0.00 0.10
(0.46) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: In labor force (1990) 0.97 0.00 0.00 -0.10
(0.18) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.34 0.02 0.01 -0.11
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.54 -0.02 -0.01 0.05
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.12 -0.00 0.00 0.08
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.45 0.01 -0.00 -0.06
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.32 -0.01 0.00 0.08
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: In labor force (1990) 0.96 0.01 0.01 -0.08
(0.21) (0.01) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 89.16
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
Sample restricted to Swedish born students. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014:
1 SEK = 0.11€. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.A.7:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1977 cohort - All students
No controls Controls
Variable Control Mean Difference Difference Cohen’s d
Female 0.49 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.11 -0.03** -0.03** 0.10
(0.31) (0.01) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.12 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.09
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.19 -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.08
(0.39) (0.01) (0.01)
Father Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 180.21 -2.49 -4.08 0.03
(92.25) (3.76) (3.80)
Mother Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 133.34 -7.96*** -8.13*** 0.16
(51.63) (1.84) (1.85)
Father with low SES 0.36 0.05** 0.05*** -0.09
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Father with medium SES 0.40 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.24 -0.04*** -0.05*** 0.11
(0.43) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.43 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.31 -0.04** -0.05*** 0.10
(0.46) (0.02) (0.02)
Father: Time in labor force 0.93 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.08
(0.26) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.36 0.05** 0.05*** -0.10
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with medium SES 0.51 -0.02* -0.03* 0.05
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.13 -0.02** -0.03*** 0.07
(0.33) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 0.03** 0.03** -0.05
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.32 -0.04** -0.05*** 0.10
(0.47) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother: Time in labor force 0.92 0.01* 0.01* -0.06
(0.27) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 228.37
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
No sample restriction. The specification with controls includes a control
for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11 €. Standard errors
clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.A.8:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1977 cohort - Restricted sample
No controls Controls
Variable Control Mean Difference Difference Cohen’s d
Female 0.49 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.11 -0.00 0.00 0.10
(0.32) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.12 -0.02** -0.02* 0.09
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.19 -0.01 -0.01 0.08
(0.40) (0.01) (0.01)
Father Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 180.58 -2.19 -5.40 0.03
(93.15) (5.27) (5.19)
Mother Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6-9) 133.90 -4.97** -4.47* 0.16
(51.74) (2.48) (2.52)
Father with low SES 0.35 0.04 0.06** -0.09
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Father with medium SES 0.40 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.25 -0.03 -0.04* 0.11
(0.43) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.43 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.31 -0.03 -0.04 0.10
(0.46) (0.03) (0.03)
Father: Time in labor force 0.93 0.01 0.00 -0.08
(0.26) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.36 0.03 0.04 -0.10
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother with medium SES 0.51 -0.02 -0.02 0.05
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with high SES 0.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.07
(0.33) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 0.01 0.02 -0.05
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: college or more 0.32 -0.02 -0.04 0.10
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: Time in labor force 0.92 0.01 0.00 -0.06
(0.28) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 78.32
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Sample restricted to municipalities where less than 85% of the students
are in sampled schools. The specification with controls includes a control
for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11 €. Standard errors
clustered at the school level.
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2.A.3 1982 Cohort
Table 2.A.9:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1982 cohort - All students
Variable Control Mean Difference(Sch) Difference(Munic) Cohen’s d
Female 0.50 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.13 -0.04*** -0.05*** 0.21
(0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.11 0.02*** 0.01** -0.01
(0.31) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.14 -0.01* -0.01** 0.07
(0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 206.55 8.06** 6.52** 0.01
(146.21) (3.87) (3.15)
Mother’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 162.47 -0.41 -1.17 0.09
(73.93) (1.00) (1.29)
Father with low SES 0.36 -0.02** -0.01 -0.08
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.25 0.02** 0.01 0.09
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.41 0.00 0.01 -0.06
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.36 0.02* 0.01 0.10
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: In labor force (1991) 0.92 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.10
(0.27) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.37 -0.00 0.01 -0.12
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.49 0.00 -0.00 0.05
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.14 -0.00 -0.00 0.10
(0.34) (0.01) (0.00)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 0.01* 0.02** -0.09
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.37 0.01 0.01 0.09
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: In labor force (1991) 0.90 0.01*** 0.02** -0.06
(0.30) (0.00) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 145.03
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality. No
sample restriction. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK= 0.11€. Standard
errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.A.10: Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1982 cohort - Same municipality in grades 3 and 9
Variable Control Mean Difference(Sch) Difference(Munic) Cohen’s d
Female 0.49 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.08 -0.01** -0.01* 0.21
(0.28) (0.00) (0.01)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.11 0.01** 0.01* -0.01
(0.31) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
(0.34) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 207.32 7.51* 6.11* 0.01
(147.56) (4.05) (3.49)
Mother’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 162.80 -0.46 -1.26 0.09
(74.41) (1.02) (1.34)
Father with low SES 0.36 -0.02* -0.01 -0.08
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.40 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.24 0.02** 0.01* 0.09
(0.43) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.41 0.01 0.01 -0.06
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.37 0.01 0.01 0.10
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: In labor force (1991) 0.93 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.10
(0.26) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.37 0.00 0.01 -0.12
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.49 -0.00 -0.00 0.05
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.14 -0.00 -0.00 0.10
(0.34) (0.01) (0.00)
Mother educ: high school 0.42 0.02* 0.02** -0.09
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.37 0.01 0.00 0.09
(0.48) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: In labor force (1991) 0.91 0.01* 0.01* -0.06
(0.29) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 123.88
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
Sample restricted to students living in the same municipality in grade 3 and 9. Controls:
none. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK= 0.11€. Standard errors clustered at the school
level.
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Table 2.A.11:
Differences in student background by treatment status:
Within-school and municipality specifications
1982 cohort - Swedish born, same municipality in grades 3 and 9
Variable Control Mean Difference(Sch) Difference(Munic) Cohen’s d
Female 0.49 -0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21
(0.00)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.00)
Divorced parent 0.11 -0.01 -0.00 0.07
(0.31) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 221.58 7.48 4.80 0.01
(161.91) (4.90) (4.10)
Mother’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 164.03 -1.14 -2.04 0.09
(63.93) (1.12) (1.70)
Father with low SES 0.33 -0.01 -0.00 -0.08
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with medium SES 0.41 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.26 0.02* 0.01 0.09
(0.44) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: high school 0.41 0.01 0.01 -0.06
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.39 0.01 -0.01 0.10
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father: In labor force (1991) 0.97 0.01* 0.00 -0.10
(0.18) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother with low SES 0.34 0.01 0.02 -0.12
(0.47) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with medium SES 0.52 -0.01 -0.01 0.05
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with high SES 0.14 -0.00 -0.01 0.10
(0.35) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: high school 0.43 0.02 0.02 -0.09
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.40 0.00 -0.01 0.09
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother: In labor force (1991) 0.95 0.01 0.00 -0.06
(0.22) (0.00) (0.00)
Hotelling’s T-squared 129.66
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Column 2 and 3 test for differences respectively within school and municipality.
Sample restricted to Swedish born students living in the same municipality in grade
3 and 9. Controls: none. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11€. Standard errors
clustered at the school level.
152
Table 2.A.12:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1982 cohort - All students
No controls Controls
Variable Control Mean Difference Difference Cohen’s d
Female 0.50 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.16 -0.04* -0.04* 0.11
(0.37) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.15 -0.02* -0.02* 0.05
(0.35) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 207.28 -2.38 -2.27 0.01
(196.96) (7.69) (7.73)
Mother’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 163.85 -4.73** -4.69** 0.07
(63.60) (2.25) (2.32)
Father with low SES 0.37 0.01 0.00 -0.01
(0.48) (0.02) (0.02)
Father with medium SES 0.39 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.24 -0.01 -0.01 0.02
(0.43) (0.02) (0.02)
Father educ: high school 0.41 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.34 0.00 0.00 -0.01
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Father: Time in labor force 0.90 0.02** 0.02** -0.09
(0.30) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.37 0.02 0.02 -0.05
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother with medium SES 0.48 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with high SES 0.14 -0.02 -0.02 0.05
(0.35) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: high school 0.41 0.02 0.02 -0.05
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother educ: college or more 0.36 -0.01 -0.01 0.01
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: Time in labor force 0.89 0.01 0.01 -0.05
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 40.70
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Between-school specification. No sample restriction. The specification with
controls includes a control for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK =
0.11€. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.A.13:
Differences in student background by treatment assignment:
Between-school specification
1982 cohort - Restricted sample
No controls Controls
Variable Control Mean Difference Difference Cohen’s d
Female 0.50 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.01) (0.01)
Foreign born 0.16 -0.02 -0.02 0.11
(0.37) (0.02) (0.02)
Swedish born, foreign parent 0.11 -0.00 -0.00 0.03
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Divorced parent 0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.05
(0.36) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 207.56 -1.27 -1.10 0.01
(202.76) (8.69) (8.69)
Mother’s Disp. income (1000 kr, age 6 to 9) 164.19 -2.73 -2.69 0.07
(64.39) (2.59) (2.64)
Father with low SES 0.37 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Father with medium SES 0.38 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father with high SES 0.24 -0.00 -0.00 0.02
(0.43) (0.03) (0.03)
Father educ: high school 0.41 0.00 0.00 -0.00
(0.49) (0.01) (0.01)
Father educ: college or more 0.35 0.01 0.01 -0.01
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Father: Time in labor force 0.90 0.02 0.02 -0.09
(0.30) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother with low SES 0.37 0.01 0.01 -0.05
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother with medium SES 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.50) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother with high SES 0.14 -0.01 -0.01 0.05
(0.35) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: high school 0.41 0.01 0.01 -0.05
(0.49) (0.02) (0.02)
Mother educ: college or more 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.48) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother: Time in labor force 0.88 0.00 0.01 -0.05
(0.32) (0.01) (0.01)
Hotelling’s T-squared 13.34
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Between-school specification. Sample restricted to municipalities where less
than 85% of the students are in sampled schools. The specification with
controls includes a control for school size. Prices adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK =
0.11€. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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2.B Results
2.B.1 1972 Cohort
Table 2.B.1: Effect of surveys: Within-municipality specification
1972 cohort - Swedish born
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.13** 0.12**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Advanced Math in grade 9 0.02* 0.02** 0.02 0.01* 0.07** 0.06**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Advanced Eng in grade 9 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
GPA grade 9 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.11*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Long-term Index 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06* 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Short high school -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
High school 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Short college 0.01** 0.01** 0.01* 0.01* 0.04* 0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
College -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 2.29 -7.05 4.46 -7.15 -2.34 -6.22
(26.48) (22.74) (30.21) (25.34) (60.79) (55.71)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -1.18 -1.06 -1.06 -0.93 -2.23 -1.94
(0.92) (0.96) (1.05) (1.09) (1.90) (1.81)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a dummy for “being surveyed”, including municipality fixed effects. The main outcomes
are standardized indexes for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational
attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are presented
below the index row. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are
adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11 €. The sample is restricted to Swedish born students with
Swedish parents. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.B.2: Effect of surveys: Within-school specification
1972 cohort - Swedish born
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index 0.03 0.04* 0.01 0.02 0.15*** 0.13**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Advanced Math in grade 9 0.02** 0.03*** 0.02 0.02* 0.08*** 0.07**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Advanced Eng in grade 9 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08** 0.07**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
GPA grade 9 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.11** 0.09**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Long-term Index 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Short high school -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.07** -0.07**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
High school 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Short college 0.02* 0.02** 0.01 0.01 0.04** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
College -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 0.42 -2.31 0.67 -6.72 27.07 19.94
(28.64) (27.53) (32.17) (31.52) (72.47) (66.56)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -1.99** -1.86** -1.76** -1.60* -4.00 -3.63
(0.83) (0.82) (0.84) (0.84) (2.45) (2.46)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome on a
dummy for “being surveyed”, including school fixed effects. The main outcomes are standard-
ized indexes for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational attainment and
labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are presented below the
index row. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to
2014: 1 SEK = 0.11€. The sample is restricted to Swedish born students with Swedish parents.
Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.B.3: Effect of assignment to sampled school:
1972 cohort - Restricted sample
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.03
(0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Advanced Math in grade 9 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Advanced Eng in grade 9 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
GPA grade 9 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00
(0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06)
Long-term Index -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Short high school 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
High school 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Short college -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
College 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) -2.53 -20.60 2.86 -15.16 -88.46 -76.23
(60.65) (44.93) (54.73) (42.34) (110.65) (93.87)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) 1.84 1.86 1.99 1.98 1.60 1.48
(1.54) (1.37) (1.53) (1.37) (3.02) (2.94)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome on
aa dummy for “studying in a sampled school”. The main outcomes are standardized indexes
for short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-term educational attainment and
labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are presented below the
index row. All specifications control for school size. Specifications in the “Control” column
include controls for family background and parental education. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is
expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11€. The sample is restricted
to municipalities where less than 85% of the students have been sampled. Standard errors
clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.B.4: Effect of being surveyed in school:
1972 cohort - Restricted sample
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index -0.00 -0.11 -0.05 -0.13 0.03 0.05
(0.18) (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.24) (0.22)
Advanced Math in grade 9 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.08 0.02 0.01
(0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13)
Advanced Eng in grade 9 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.05
(0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.13) (0.13)
GPA grade 9 -0.06 -0.13 -0.10 -0.15 -0.06 -0.02
(0.19) (0.11) (0.16) (0.10) (0.29) (0.27)
Long-term Index 0.07 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 0.15 0.14
(0.15) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.23) (0.21)
Short high school -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.14 -0.15
(0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.13) (0.13)
High school -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11) (0.11)
Short college 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08)
College 0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00
(0.09) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 198.48 60.16 159.13 39.37 208.66 128.85
(213.12) (167.95) (181.62) (144.35) (521.93) (465.93)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) 1.28 2.46 3.15 4.06 -7.99 -7.45
(5.14) (4.57) (5.20) (4.72) (9.23) (9.10)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a variable measuring the fraction of the school-cohort surveyed. The main outcomes
are standardized indexes for short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-term
educational attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index
are presented below the index row. All specifications control for school size. Specifications in
the “Control” column include controls for family background and parental education. GPA is
on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11
€. The sample is restricted to municipalities where less than 85% of the students have been
sampled. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
158
2.B.2 1977 Cohort
Table 2.B.5: Effect of surveys: Within-municipality specification
1972 cohort - Swedish born
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Advanced Math in grade 9 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Advanced Eng in grade 9 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
GPA grade 9 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Long-term Index -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.06 -0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Short high school -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
High school 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02* -0.03 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Short college -0.01* -0.01* -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
College -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) -34.17 -22.79 -29.57 -18.37 -91.77 -83.40
(31.35) (27.44) (33.35) (30.40) (63.23) (59.89)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -1.11* -1.01 -1.20* -1.09* -0.24 -0.33
(0.60) (0.62) (0.61) (0.62) (2.54) (2.64)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a dummy for “being surveyed”, including municipality fixed effects. The main outcomes
are standardized indexes for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational
attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are presented
below the index row. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are
adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11 €. The sample is restricted to Swedish born students with
Swedish parents. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.B.6: Effect of surveys: Within-school specification
1977 cohort - Swedish born
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08)
Advanced Math in grade 9 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
Advanced Eng in grade 9 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
GPA grade 9 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
Long-term Index -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 -0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
Short high school -0.01 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
High school 0.03** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** -0.05 -0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Short college -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
College -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) -35.71 -13.92 -35.13 -11.43 -94.15 -98.42
(33.68) (30.54) (36.57) (33.54) (87.40) (85.60)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -1.24 -1.27* -1.23 -1.29 -2.60 -2.30
(0.75) (0.76) (0.80) (0.80) (2.70) (2.71)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome on a
dummy for “being surveyed”, including school fixed effects. The main outcomes are standard-
ized indexes for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational attainment and
labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are presented below the
index row. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to
2014: 1 SEK = 0.11€. The sample is restricted to Swedish born students with Swedish parents.
Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.B.7: Effect of assignment to sampled school:
1977 cohort - Restricted sample
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Advanced Math in grade 9 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04* -0.03 0.05 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Advanced Eng in grade 9 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
GPA grade 9 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.06
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Long-term Index -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Short high school -0.02** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.01** -0.07*** -0.07***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
High school 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Short college -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
College 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.03** 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) -50.70 -35.07 -55.79 -34.98 28.90 -38.42
(50.17) (39.74) (50.71) (40.19) (92.08) (82.18)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) 0.42 0.13 0.88 0.66 -4.00 -3.44
(1.02) (0.91) (0.99) (0.90) (2.74) (2.56)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome on
aa dummy for “studying in a sampled school”. The main outcomes are standardized indexes
for short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-term educational attainment and
labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are presented below the
index row. All specifications control for school size. Specifications in the “Control” column
include controls for family background and parental education. GPA is on a 0-5 scale. Income is
expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11€. The sample is restricted
to municipalities where less than 85% of the students have been sampled. Standard errors
clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.B.8: Effect of being surveyed in school:
1977 cohort - Restricted sample
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index -0.26*** -0.13** -0.27*** -0.14** -0.05 -0.05
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15)
Advanced Math in grade 9 -0.13** -0.08 -0.14*** -0.09* 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
Advanced Eng in grade 9 -0.13*** -0.07 -0.13*** -0.07* -0.06 -0.04
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09)
GPA grade 9 -0.11 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.00 -0.07
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10)
Long-term Index 0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.26** 0.16
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.11)
Short high school -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.13*** -0.13***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
High school 0.12*** 0.06** 0.11*** 0.05* 0.14** 0.10
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07)
Short college -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
College 0.01 0.08** 0.02 0.09** 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) -51.22 -20.09 -84.23 -42.78 282.80 140.37
(99.58) (85.35) (98.81) (85.69) (175.47) (141.93)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) 1.50 1.42 2.93 2.65 -11.64 -6.74
(2.35) (2.26) (2.16) (2.08) (7.19) (7.01)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a variable measuring the fraction of the school-cohort surveyed. The main outcomes
are standardized indexes for short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-term
educational attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index
are presented below the index row. All specifications control for school size. Specifications in
the “Control” column include controls for family background and parental education. GPA is
on a 0-5 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11
€. The sample is restricted to municipalities where less than 85% of the students have been
sampled. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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2.B.3 1982 Cohort
Table 2.B.9: Effect of surveys: Within-municipality specification
1982 cohort - Swedish born, same municipality in grades 3 and 9
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.03
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Swedish S.Y. 9 Grade 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
English S.Y. 9 Grade 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Swedish S.Y. 9 Grade 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03* -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Long-term Index 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
Short high school 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.04 0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
High school -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
Short college -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
College 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 17.83 14.03 14.96 12.69 42.32 59.70
(18.81) (18.42) (19.27) (19.02) (75.63) (68.03)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -0.61 -0.55 -0.44 -0.42 -1.82 -2.02
(0.52) (0.52) (0.57) (0.57) (1.78) (1.76)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a dummy for “being surveyed”, including municipality fixed effects. The main outcomes
are standardized indexes for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational
attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are presented
below the index row. Grades are on a 0-4 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices
are adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11€. The sample is restricted to Swedish born students with
Swedish parents living in the same municipality in grades 3 and 9. Standard errors clustered at
the school level.
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Table 2.B.10: Effect of surveys: Within-school specification
1982 cohort - Swedish born, same municipality in grades 3 and 9
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index 0.04* 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10)
Swedish S.Y. 9 Grade 0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.08) (0.07)
English S.Y. 9 Grade 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08)
Swedish S.Y. 9 Grade 0.04** 0.03 0.03* 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Long-term Index 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Short high school -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.03)
High school -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.09* -0.10*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
Short college -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
College 0.02* 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 52.09* 42.56 48.07 39.63 88.75 65.46
(31.05) (29.59) (32.33) (30.91) (113.20) (104.37)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) -1.29* -1.10* -1.28* -1.16* -1.30 -1.28
(0.66) (0.66) (0.69) (0.69) (3.03) (2.98)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome on a
dummy for “being surveyed”, including school fixed effects. The main outcomes are standard-
ized indexes for short-term educational attainment and long-term educational attainment and
labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index are presented below the
index row. Grades are on a 0-4 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to
2014: 1 SEK = 0.11€. The sample is restricted to Swedish born students with Swedish parents
living in the same municipality in grades 3 and 9. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.B.11: Effect of assignment to sampled school:
1982 cohort - Restricted sample
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Swedish S.Y. 9 Grade 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
English S.Y. 9 Grade 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Swedish S.Y. 9 Grade 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.00
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Long-term Index 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.06
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Short high school 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.02)
High school 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.05 0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Short college 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.03** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
College 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.00 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) 34.23 26.70 31.83 27.42 36.32 21.61
(48.32) (40.22) (49.03) (43.24) (76.19) (70.47)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) 0.65 0.78 1.16 1.15 -2.30 -1.67
(1.15) (0.85) (1.00) (0.82) (2.64) (2.47)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome on
aa dummy for “studying in a sampled school”. The main outcomes are standardized indexes for
short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-term educational attainment and labor
market performance. Effects on each component of the index are presented below the index
row. All specifications control for school size. Specifications in the “Control” column include
controls for family background and parental education. Grades are on a 0-4 scale. Income is
expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK = 0.11€. The sample is restricted
to municipalities where less than 85% of the students have been sampled. Standard errors
clustered at the school level.
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Table 2.B.12: Effect of being surveyed in school:
1982 cohort - Restricted sample
All Low Educ High Educ
No control Control No control Control No control Control
Short-term Index -0.09 0.04 -0.07 0.05 -0.07 -0.04
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Swedish S.Y. 9 Grade -0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.08 -0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09)
English S.Y. 9 Grade -0.01 0.08 -0.02 0.07 0.14 0.14
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10)
Swedish S.Y. 9 Grade -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.06
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
Long-term Index -0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.22** 0.13
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10)
Short high school 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
High school 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.13** 0.09
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
Short college -0.03** -0.03* -0.03* -0.03* -0.02 -0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
College -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Gross income (27-31 yrs old) -81.90 -76.43 -106.97 -85.16 141.69 -27.45
(80.30) (67.52) (82.21) (72.16) (168.89) (168.29)
Days/year unemp. (27-31 yrs old) 3.71* 3.64** 5.50*** 5.14*** -9.62* -5.40
(2.04) (1.65) (1.88) (1.64) (5.19) (5.04)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table presents coefficient and standard error from the regression of each row outcome
on a variable measuring the fraction of the school-cohort surveyed. The main outcomes
are standardized indexes for short-term educational choices and attainment, and long-term
educational attainment and labor market performance. Effects on each component of the index
are presented below the index row. All specifications control for school size. Specifications in
the “Control” column include controls for family background and parental education. Grades
are on a 0-4 scale. Income is expressed in 100 SEK, and prices are adjusted to 2014: 1 SEK =
0.11 €. The sample is restricted to municipalities where less than 85% of the students have
been sampled. Standard errors clustered at the school level.
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Chapter 3
Does Peer Ability Affect Education
Choices?1
1A special thanks to my two advisors, Erik Lindqvist and Juanna Joensen, who provided helpful
comments throughout the paper.
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3.1 Introduction
Most of the literature on peer effects in the economics of education focuses on
how peer performance affects individual school achievement. The literature,
recently reviewed by Sacerdote (2011), finds either positive, zero or non-linear
effects.2
To make sense of the mixed results recent work has started to focus more
explicitly on mechanisms. An emerging literature highlights how better peers
can negatively affect student performance and academic choices due to rank
concerns. Murphy & Weinhardt (2014) find that students who rank high in
their school develop higher confidence, and perform better in class. Tincani
(2015) shows that rank concerns and academic competition generate positive
peer effects in academic performance among Chilean 8th graders. Elsner &
Isphording (2015) find that ranking higher in high school significantly affects
perceived intelligence, teacher support and long-run educational outcomes of
students.
In this paper I investigate how classmates’ ability affects the school choices
of Swedish 6th graders. Instead of considering only peer effects in performance
or pure rank effects, I look at the overall effect of peer ability on education
choices. I then proceed to study underlying mechanisms.
The institutional setup is particularly suitable to answer the research ques-
tion. Swedish students do not get formal grades during the academic year, and
start to be assigned end-of-the-year grades relatively late during compulsory
school (typically in grade 7, at age 14). Class interactions might play an impor-
tant role for the formation of beliefs about own ability in such an environment.
At the same time students need to asses their academic ability when they choose
whether to take advanced or general courses in grades 7 to 9. Advanced courses
are more challenging and prepare for academic high school tracks, the only
2 Hanushek et al. (2003), Ammermueller & Pischke (2009) and Imberman et al. (2012) find
positive peer effects on student performance in primary or secondary school. Sund (2009),
Lavy et al. (2012a), Burke & Sass (2013), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) and Tincani (2015) find
instead non-linear or zero effects.
DOES PEER ABILITY AFFECT EDUCATION CHOICES? 173
option to access college.
These choices are the main outcomes in my analysis. They are recorded in
my dataset, together with IQ-like ability tests, for a representative sample of
Swedish 6th grade classes.
I identify the effect of interest by exploiting variation in average class ability
within schools. I show that this variation is orthogonal to different measures
of own ability, parental occupation, special education status, gender, and class
size. This is evidence of students being allocated to classes independently of
their ability, which is credible given school administrators lack early measures
of academic performance.
I find that a one standard deviation increase in average class ability reduces
by 2 percentage points the probability of taking an advanced math course in
grades 7 to 9. Peer ability does not affect English course choices in grades 7 to 9,
and whether students choose academic tracks in high school.
Children’s survey responses and administrative data allow me to look at the
underlying mechanisms. First, I find that peer ability negatively affects students’
assessment of own ability. Second, I look at how peer ability affects academic
performance. I show that students benefit much more from from having high
ability peers in English, a subject involving group interaction, than they do
in math. Assuming that academic performance positively affects education
choices, this could explain why I find a negative effect of peer ability on course
choices only in math. Finally peer ability does not seem to affect student’s
motivation, class interaction and parental support, but positively affects teacher
interaction.
In terms of mechanisms, results are consistent with Elsner & Isphording
(2015), who find that higher school rank improves perceived intelligence and
teacher support. The same paper however also finds a positive effect on long-run
academic choices and performance. I find no evidence of an overall increase in
student confidence (“motivation” in my analysis), as in Murphy & Weinhardt
(2014), or lower academic performance, as predicted by Tincani’s model of
rank concerns. I cannot however exclude that these two effects might be at
play, when keeping ability fixed. All the cited papers indeed look at a pure rank
effect. If peer ability affects performance in the opposite direction, as shown in
my results, the overall effect on performance and motivation will systematically
differ.
The main contribution of the paper is indeed estimating the net effect of
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peer ability on academic choices. Ultimately this is the relevant parameter
policy makers should consider when designing tracking and streaming policies.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 I describe the data, the educa-
tion system, and present descriptives. In Section 3.3 I discuss potential mech-
anisms and identification, and present the main results. Section 3.4 presents
additional results related to the mechanisms. Section 3.5 draws conclusions.
3.2 Setup
3.2.1 Data
I use data from Evaluation Through Follow-up (ETF), a longitudinal project
surveying every five years representative samples of Swedish students enrolled
in compulsory school. I use wave three of the study, which sampled whole
classes of 6th graders from 29 municipalities.3 Most students were born in 1967,
and were around 13 at the time of sampling. While classes obviously change
over time, all students, apart from those who moved abroad, were followed up.
The most important piece of information in my analysis, the “treatment”,
is the cognitive ability of the students. During the spring term of school year 6
most students (89% of the final sample) took a battery of three standardized
ability tests: a test of verbal ability, a test of inductive ability, and a test of spatial
ability. Students had respectively 15, 27 and 22 seconds to answer each section
of the test, assuming they wasted no time at all. The fast pace of the test adds to
the quality of the ability measures: Borghans et al. (2008) show that reducing
the time available for completing intelligence tests reduces differences in effort
between students with different non-cognitive traits. Moreover at the time of
the tests students were 13, a point in which IQ should have already stabilized
(Cunha & Heckman, 2009).
A unique feature of the data is the detailed survey that most children (92.5%
of the final sample) filled in in grade 6. Among the questions asked, children
3Municipalities were drawn using stratified sampling. Strata are defined by population, frac-
tion of left-wing voters, fraction working in the public sector and fraction of immigrants.
The three biggest municipalities in Sweden (Stockholm, Malmo¨, Gothenburg) are always
part of the sample. Further details on the sampling scheme can be found in Emanuelsson
(1979).
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had to evaluate own ability in different domains, and were asked to rank them-
selves in the class. The same survey also asked many questions about school
motivation, parental support at home, perceived teacher helpfulness, and class
environment. These questions allow me to test how peer ability affects education
choices, and thus to better clarify mechanisms.
Finally the ETF data contains basic demographics taken from Statistics
Sweden (gender, parental occupation, socioeconomic status, foreign status) and
detailed school level data up to college (course choices, absences, changes of
teachers and grades in compulsory school, tracks and grades in high school).
This allows me to look both at choices taken during grade 6 (course choices in
grades 7) and choices taken some years after (course choices in grades 8 and 9,
track in high school). Test scores data allows me to inspect potential spillovers
in performance of class ability.
The original sample consists of roughly 9000 Swedish compulsory school
students (10% of the targeted population) living in 29 (out of 290)municipalities,
the lowest administrative unit in Sweden. I exclude from my sample classes
with less than 10 students, which are are more likely to cater exclusively to
special education students. This reduces the sample by 8%. About 15% of the
students misses ability data, so the final sample consists of 7913 students, 373
classes, and 257 schools. My preferred specification uses school fixed effects.
This sample, from now on the restricted sample, uses only schools where more
than one class was sampled. It consists of 4452 students, 204 classes, and 88
schools (50% of the final sample).
3.2.2 Education System
Compulsory school in Sweden starts at age seven, and lasts nine years. In this
period it was formally divided in three stages, which could also entail students
changing schools: early compulsory school (grades 1-3), middle compulsory
school (grades 4-6), and late compulsory school (grades 7-9). While the data
does not report whether students were in the same class starting from grade 1,
the majority of sampled students should have stayed for at least 3 years in the
same class, from age 10 to 13.
Whether students rely on peer interaction to assess own ability depends also
on the feedback information they receive in class. In Sweden students are not
assigned formal grades during the school year. They instead receive homework
and test scores (without a pass or fail threshold). End of the year formal grades,
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based on standardized national tests, were assigned to all students in grades
7-9. About half of the sample received grades also at the end of school year 6,
and, less likely, of grade 3. The decision to assign early grades was taken by
municipal school boards.4
What is relevant for the analysis is that up to the grade considered students
had only a limited amount of information to assess their ability, especially in
relation to a national benchmark, or a proper criterion. Classroom peers might
thus have played a bigger role in how these students were forming beliefs about
own ability.
In the spring of school year 6, children chose whether to take math and En-
glish at the advanced or general level in the next school year. Advanced courses
provided better preparation for academic tracks in high school. Students were
allowed to switch course type over time - the most common switch was from an
advanced to a general course. At the end of compulsory school, students could
enroll in either academic or vocational high school tracks. Vocational tracks
lasted two years, provided professional training, and did not allow direct access
to college. Academic high school tracks lasted three or four years, prepared for
college, and could be selective.5
After academic high school graduation (or after taking one more year of
high school after vocational school) students became eligible to apply to college.
A student quota, set by the government, limited access to college. Slots were
competitively assigned to the students with highest GPA or SweSAT (a college
entry test similar to the American SAT).6 College was tuition-free, and a mix of
grants and income-contingent loans allowed admitted students to pay for living
expenses. Higher education was thus both meritocratic and competitive.
4Sjo¨gren (2010) provides details on the implementation of the reform that abolished “early
grades” - grades in school years 3 and 6. Facchinello (2016) focuses on the cohort born 1967
to evaluate the effects of the reform in the short and long-run.
5A high grade 9 GPA and advanced math electives in compulsory school could be used as
admission requirement.
6O¨ckert (2002) reports that around 50% of the students were rejected admission to college in
the period I study, confirming the selective nature of Swedish higher education.
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3.2.3 Descriptives
Table 3.2.1 shows ability, demographics and class level information for the final
and restricted sample. The sample restricted to schools where more than one
class was sampled appears to be very similar to the final sample. The only
differences are a slightly lower level of ability and marginally larger classes.
40% of the students come from a working class family (coded as low SES), and
around 13% receive special education. The fraction of students with foreign
parents is quite low, 6%. There is variation also at the class level, which appears
to be particularly the case for class average ability, the share of students who are
immigrant, low SES and special education (see columns four and eight). This
implies that the education system is not uniform, with some segregation at the
class level.
Table 3.2.1: Background: whole and restricted sample
All sample Final sample
Mean Median Sd Class Sd Mean Median Sd Class Sd
Ability
Standardized verbal ability 0.00 0.01 1.00 0.36 –0.02 0.01 1.00 0.37
Standardized inductive ability –0.00 0.08 1.00 0.38 –0.01 –0.04 0.99 0.35
Standardized general ability 0.00 0.06 1.00 0.39 –0.02 0.06 0.99 0.37
Demographics
Male 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.10 0.52 1.00 0.50 0.12
Low SES 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.17 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.17
Parent not Nordic 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.06
Special education 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.34 0.12
Class
Changes of teacher 0.50 0.00 0.81 0.82 0.51 0.00 0.84 0.84
Class size 24.00 25.00 4.46 4.87 24.54 25.00 3.61 3.91
The restricted sample includes only those schools where multiple classes were sampled. Class sd is the
standard deviation of the class average. Ability measures are IQ-like scores taken at the end of grade 6.
General ability is the average of inductive and verbal ability.
Table 3.2.2 presents descriptives for the main outcomes in the analysis. In
terms of school choices, about three quarters of the students select advanced
courses in grade 7. However over time many switch to the easier general courses.
This pattern is more pronounced for math. 85% of the sample proceeds into
high school education. Of the enrolled students, 56% choose an academic track,
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which grants eligibility, but not necessarily admission, to college.
Apart from the English and math test scores, all variables in the second
part of the table use the answers given by students in the grade 6 questionnaire,
filled in by 92.6% of the sample.
Students were asked to assess their skills in the class on a 1-9 scale, with
9 representing the top in the class. I interpret this as a measure of relative
evaluation of skills. Apparently students tend to over-rank themselves when
they evaluate their skills: the distribution would be normal and centered on the
mean value if evaluations were unbiased. Evaluation of skills is an index derived
from yes/no questions asking students whether they are good at math, spelling,
reading and at school in general. While the average student answers positively
to most questions, there is quite some variation in the answers.
The English and Math scores are the results of the national tests, and deter-
mine end-of-the-year grades. Notice the substantial amount of variation at the
class level.
Motivation, Class environment and Teacher helpfulness are indexes built
from survey questions asking respectively students: to evaluate own ability
in different domains (math, spelling, reading, etc), their motivation in school
(if they put effort in school tasks, if they give up easily, etc), availability and
helpfulness of the teacher, and how they get along with their classmates. While
teacher helpfulness and especially class environment are rated highly by most of
the students, there appears to be more variation in student motivation. Finally
most students appear to receive help at home with homework, though there is
some variation at the class level.7
7Appendix 3.A presents the distribution of the discrete variables and provides details on the
constructions of the indexes used in the analysis.
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Table 3.2.2: Outcomes: whole and restricted sample
All sample Final sample
Mean Median Sd Class Sd Mean Median Sd Class Sd
Choices
Advanced math in grade 7 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.14 0.75 1.00 0.43 0.13
Advanced math in grade 8 0.66 1.00 0.47 0.15 0.67 1.00 0.47 0.14
Advanced math in grade 9 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.16 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.17
Advanced English in grade 7 0.77 1.00 0.42 0.13 0.77 1.00 0.42 0.13
Advanced English in grade 8 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.13 0.74 1.00 0.44 0.13
Advanced English in grade 9 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.14 0.69 1.00 0.46 0.15
Academic track in high school 0.56 1.00 0.50 0.17 0.55 1.00 0.50 0.16
Mechanisms
Evaluation of skills in class (1-9) 5.75 6.00 1.59 0.42 5.77 6.00 1.58 0.42
Evaluation of skills (1-9) 6.68 7.00 2.43 0.77 6.71 7.00 2.42 0.76
Math std test score, Grade 9 0.01 0.06 1.00 0.52 0.01 0.06 0.97 0.53
English std test score, Grade 8 0.01 0.11 1.00 0.43 0.01 0.11 0.99 0.46
Motivation in school (0-9) 5.66 6.00 2.05 0.62 5.68 6.00 2.04 0.62
Class environment (1-9) 7.91 9.00 1.65 0.48 7.93 9.00 1.62 0.57
Teacher helpfulness (0-9) 7.07 7.50 1.86 0.62 7.03 7.50 1.87 0.67
Help at home with homework 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.12 0.80 1.00 0.40 0.12
The restricted sample includes only those schools where multiple classes were sampled. Class sd is the standard
deviation of the class average. Evaluation of skills in class is the answer to a question asking where the student is
in terms of skills in the class distribution. Evaluation of skills, Motivation, Class environment and Teacher help-
fulness are indexes built from survey questions asking respectively students: to evaluate own ability in different
domains (math, spelling, reading, etc), their motivation in school (if they put effort in school tasks, if they
give up easily, etc), availability and helpfulness of the teacher, and how they get along with their classmates.
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3.3 Empirics
In this section I first discuss the mechanisms through which I expect peer ability
to influence individual choices. I then consider identification issues, and finally
present the main results.
3.3.1 Mechanisms
The empirical model I would like to estimate is the following:
Yics = α + βAbility−i,c + γAbilityi + ics (3.1)
where i indexes the student, c the classroom, and s the school. I am interested
in β, the reduced form effect of peer ability on individual choices. While peer
ability might affect students in many different ways, the net effect might be
more interesting for a policy maker when considering class formation and
streaming policies.
Different mechanisms might indeed contribute to the final effect. Among
the ones that might affect positively education choices there are performance
spillovers and peer imitation. Higher peer ability implies higher peer perfor-
mance. Many studies find positive spillover effects from being surrounded by
better performing peers.8 Positive peer effects in performance translate into
a lower cost of education. In a simple model of education choice this leads to
more investment in education.
Higher peer ability also implies more students choosing academic education.
If there are imitation or role model effects, students’ education choices would
be positively affected.
On the negative side students could make inferences about own ability
using the class as a benchmark. They could for instance judge their ability
in relation to their rank in the class.9 Average ability students surrounded
8Studies that find positive peer effects on student performance in primary or secondary
school are Hanushek et al. (2003), Ammermueller & Pischke (2009), Imberman et al. (2012).
Studies that find a non-linear or zero effect effect are Sund (2009), Lavy et al. (2012), Burke
& Sass (2013), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) and Tincani (2015).
9Recent literature shows that children have imperfect knowledge of their ability. See for in-
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by high ability peers rank low in the class, might conclude that they are low
ability, and thus revise downward their education choices. The opposite would
be true for students who interact with low ability classmates. This might
be particularly important in the educational setup here considered, as most
students up to grade 6 do not have any formal grades. In appendix 3.B I show
that student ability percentile rank within the class can differ substantially from
the national percentile rank (a more objective measure of ability). Moreover
student percentile rank can differ substantially between classes.
Secondly, peer ability might affect student motivation. This is related, but
different from the point above: even if students are not “framed” by their peers’
ability, they might feel less enthusiastic about school when their performance
is systematically lower than the one of their peers. To what extent this might
be true depends on both the education setup (how competitive the education
system is) and social norms (to what extent people are affected by social com-
parisons). Swedish school curricula specifically emphasize cooperation and
integration, at the expense of class competition, so this effect might be less
important here.
Other mechanisms that might affect education choices in less clear ways
are responses from classmates, teachers and parents. A class with higher ability
might have less disruptive kids, and thus offer a better learning environment. At
the same time, being surrounded by higher ability peers might create frictions
between the children and their peers, for instance due to a more competitive
environment. In higher ability classes teachers might make classes more chal-
lenging, but could also devote more time to low ability students. Finally it
is not clear whether parents are substitutes or complements in the education
production function, so they might either counteract or amplify any of the
effects listed above.
Ultimately which of these mechanisms prevails is an empirical question.
In my analysis I will be able to look separately at most of the mechanisms I
mentioned.
stance Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner (2012, 2014), Zafar (2011), Bobba & Frisancho (2014),
Facchinello (2016). Murphy & Weinhardt (2014), Tincani (2015) and Elsner & Isphording
(2015) find that school and class rank matters for performance and education choices.
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3.3.2 Identification
The effect I aim to estimate is called in the peer effects literature a “contextual
effect”: the effect of a pre-determined peer characteristic on an individual
outcome. Identification of this effect requires exogenous, or conditionally
exogenous variation in peer ability.
If peer ability is randomly assigned at the cohort level, then β in equation
3.1 has a causal interpretation. This is likely not to be the case, as peer ability is
likely to correlate with many other factors that also affect education choices
(own ability, SES, school quality, etc). However, if school administrators do
not observe ability when they form classes, variation in peer ability might still
be random within school. This is likely to be the case in Sweden, where there
are no formal grades (proxying for ability) in early stages of education. My
identification strategy relies on this exogenous variation. My final specification
is:
Yics = α + βAbility−i,c + γAbilityi + Schools + ∆Xics + ics (3.2)
where Xics contains controls at the individual level.
Two issues specific to the identification of peer effects are “multiplier effects”
(because individual i’s behavior is affected by peer behavior, peer behavior will
also be affected by i’s behavior) and correlated shocks (rather than a genuine
peer effect, the estimated effect might reflect some specific shock common to
the group, in this case the class).
If peer ability affects students’ choices at ages 14 to 16, those choices cannot
have an effect on the ability of the students, measured when students were
13. It is still possible that peer ability in past grades affected students’ own
characteristics, like own ability. In this case I estimate the effect of “final peer
ability” on later education choices, disregarding the effect of peer ability on
own ability in earlier stages. This is not a threat to identification, but affects
the interpretation of my estimates.
In terms of correlated shocks, the choices of the students and the ability
composition of the class are not measured at the same time, so the problem
should not be there. However class level characteristics, for instance teachers,
might affect both choices and peer ability. The literature (e.g., Heckman et al.,
2007) seems to support the idea that ability at age 13 is stable, so I can exclude
this type of effects.
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Another important point is that ability measures typically contain mea-
surement error. In my specific case I use an average measure of ability, so there
should be very little measurement error. As long as peer ability is uncorrelated
with own ability, which instead is going to be affected by measurement error,
there should be no bias in β.
In Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 I test whether peer ability affects predetermined
factors that might affect education choices. Column 1 and 2 report respectively
the coefficient β from the following two regressions:
Yics = α + βAbility−i,c + ics (3.3)
Yics = α + βAbility−i,c + γAbility−i,s + Schools + ics (3.4)
Equation 3.4 adds school fixed effects to Equation 3.3, and a control for average
ability of peers in the same school, excluding i. This test correction has been
suggested by Guryan et al. (2009), who show that in tests of peer ability a
mechanical negative bias is induced by the fact that higher peer ability in a
group implies lower own ability within the group.
Column 1 of Table 3.3.1 confirms the selection problem mentioned above:
higher peer ability is positively correlated with higher own ability, kindergarten
attainment, SES (which is reflected in parental occupation in Table 3.3.2), and
is negatively correlated with having foreign parents and teacher turnover.
Column 2 of Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 shows that within-school variation in
peer ability is not correlated with these variables. However I still find that
one occupational dummy out of ten, higher civil servants and senior salaried,
is positively associated with peer ability. This suggests that parents with high
social status might still be able to place their children in better classes.10
An important caveat is that I have no data on teachers, so I cannot test
whether more qualified or experienced teachers are systematically assigned to
classes with higher or lower ability. It is however reassuring to see that the
test for teacher turnover passes. This suggests that teacher assignment does not
change with class ability.
10In the results section I perform robustness tests to understand whether this potential devi-
ation from random assignment affects the coefficient of interest.
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Table 3.3.1:
Does peer ability predict student background?
Outcome OLS School FE
Standardized general ability 0.68*** 0.02
(0.02) (0.03)
Standardized verbal ability 0.56*** 0.06
(0.03) (0.04)
Standardized inductive ability 0.62*** 0.00
(0.03) (0.04)
Male -0.01 -0.02
(0.01) (0.02)
Parent not Nordic -0.01* 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
Low SES -0.17*** -0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
Kindergarten 0.04** 0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
Hours of absence in grade 6 11.61 -53.28
(56.48) (57.56)
Special education -0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
No ability data 0.05 0.08
(0.03) (0.05)
Changes of teacher -0.31*** -0.17
(0.11) (0.17)
Class size 0.24 0.03
(0.58) (0.58)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports the coefficient from regressions of each
outcome variable on standardized class ability (excluding
student i). Column 1 corresponds to equation 3.3, col-
umn 2 adds school FE and corresponds to equation 3.4.
Standard errors are clustered at the class level.
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Table 3.3.2:
Does peer ability predict parental occupation?
Outcome OLS School FE
non-skilled workers, goods -0.04*** 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
non-skilled workers, service -0.04*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.02)
skilled workers, goods -0.06*** -0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
skilled workers, service -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
lower non-manual ii -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
lower non-manual i -0.01* -0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
intermediate-level non-manual 0.05*** -0.01
(0.02) (0.02)
higher civil servants and senior salaried 0.12*** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)
entrepreneur 0.02** 0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
farmer 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports the coefficient from regressions of each out-
come variable on standardized class ability (excluding student
i). Column 1 corresponds to equation 3.3, column 2 adds
school FE and corresponds to equation 3.4. Standard errors
are clustered at the class level.
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3.3.3 Results
Table 3.3.3 summarizes the main empirical results. I report the coefficient β
from equation 3.2 for each outcome, under different specifications. Specification
(1) does not include controls apart from the pool correction (here school peer
ability) suggested in Guryan et al. (2009). Specification (2) adds a control for
own ability. Specification (3) is my preferred specification, and adds individual
level controls for gender, parental occupation (10 dummies), foreign parents
and special education. Specification (4) adds class level controls: number of
teacher changes, class size, and fraction of students without ability data in the
class. This specification is added as a robustness check. Class level controls
might correlate with class ability, and are not necessarily exogenous. While they
might introduce some bias into the coefficient of interest, it is still important to
check whether the coefficient of interest changes significantly after controlling
for these variables. Finally the last column reports the mean of each outcome
variable for the estimation sample as a reference.
Before interpreting results it is important to highlight again some points.
First, the fixed effects specification uses the subsample of schools where at
least two classes were sampled. In section 3.2.3 I showed that this restricted
sample is very similar to the final sample. Sample selection should not be an
issue. However I use half of the original sample, and exploit only within school
variation in average class ability. This negatively affects the precision of the
coefficient of interest, which implies I cannot detect small effects. Second, I
normalize all ability measures at the cohort level. When interpreting the effect
of higher peer ability, it is important to recall that the standard deviation of
mean class ability is around 40% of the national standard deviation (see Table
3.2.1). Lastly, I cluster standard errors at the level at which the “treatment”
changes, that is at the class level.
I find a statistically significant negative effect of peer ability on the choice
of advanced math courses. This effect appear to persist over late compulsory
school, and is stable across specifications. An increase of one standard deviation
in class ability reduces by 5.6 percentage points the probability that a student
takes an advanced course in math. This is a nontrivial effect, and corresponds
to a 2.2 percentage points reduction for a one standard deviation increase of
average class ability. Class ability instead does not significantly affect the choice
of an advanced course in English. The point estimate is negative, as expected,
but much smaller than the coefficient for math. Finally, peer ability does not
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seem to affect high school track choice.11
Table 3.3.3: Main results
Outcome variable Class ability coefficient Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Advanced math in grade 7 -0.065** -0.069*** -0.056** -0.056** 0.752
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Advanced math in grade 8 -0.068*** -0.073*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 0.665
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Advanced math in grade 9 -0.060** -0.066** -0.060** -0.056** 0.563
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Advanced English in grade 7 -0.027 -0.031 -0.017 -0.017 0.765
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024)
Advanced English in grade 8 -0.014 -0.018 -0.005 -0.008 0.735
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Advanced English in grade 9 -0.036 -0.041* -0.026 -0.030 0.686
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Academic track in high school -0.008 -0.012 -0.014 -0.017 0.554
(0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.027)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients from a regression of each outcome variable on standardized class
ability (excluding student i), controlling for school fixed effects. Specification (1) does not
include any controls apart from the pool correction (here school peer ability) suggested in
Guryan et al. (2009). Specification (2) controls for own ability. Specification (3) adds individual
level controls (parental occupation dummies, foreign parents, gender, special education status)
to specification (2). Specification (4) adds class level controls (teacher changes, class size, fraction
of the class without ability data) to specification (3). Standard errors are clustered at the class
level.
11Facchinello (2016) shows that high performance and academic choices in late compulsory
school do not necessarily translate into choosing academic tracks in high school. Control-
ling for ability, enrollment into academic tracks appears to be strongly related to SES.
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3.4 Mechanisms
In this section I present additional results, in order to better understand which
of the potential mechanisms outlined in Section 3.3.1 explain the main findings.
I summarize these results in Table 3.4.1, which follows the same structure of
Table 3.3.3. All outcomes, apart from the test scores, are derived from the
survey questions given by students in grade 6.12
3.4.1 Beliefs
The first two rows of Table 3.4.1 relate in different ways to student self-assessment.
Evaluation of skills in class is the answer to a question asking students to rank
themselves in their class on a 1-9 scale. Students are asked to assess their skills,
rather than their ability in class, so I do not expect a one to one relationship
with average class ability. Finding an effect on this variable simply implies that
students are aware of their peers’ performance. This is a necessary condition
for any mechanism that involves students assessing themselves with reference to
their peers. I confirm that average peer ability negatively affects how students
rank their school performance within the class. The effect is stable over all the
specifications. An increase of a standard deviation in ability reduces student
evaluation by half a point in a 1 to 9 scale. This corresponds to one fifth of a
point reduction for an increase of one standard deviation in average class ability
(about half of the between class standard deviation of the outcome).
The previous result does not imply that students’ beliefs about own ability
are affected by peer’s ability. I can test whether this is the case looking at the
effect of peer ability on the variable Evaluation of skills, an index based on
a battery of yes/no questions asking students whether they perform well in
different domains (sums, spelling, reading, school in general). I find a negative
and statistically significant effect, comparable in magnitude to the one estimated
for Evaluation of skills in class. This confirms that students assess their skills in
relation to their peers.
12See Section 3.2.1 for a description, and Appendix 3.A for more details on the indexes used.
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3.4.2 Performance feedbacks
Another important channel through which peer ability might affect choices
is academic performance. Positive peer effects in school performance could
positively affect the choices of students. This effect works thus in the opposite
way of the belief channel. It is important to assess this effect in the light of the
different results I find in math and English choices: do different peer effects in
performance explain the different effects I find? Rows 3 and 4 of Table 3.4.1
suggest this might be the case. I find statistically significant positive effects in
English, but not in Math performance. The magnitude of the coefficient in
English is much larger than the one in math: a one standard deviation increase
in class average ability leads to a 7% standard deviation increase in the national
English test score. This suggests that the two subjects are qualitatively different:
there are more positive spillovers in performance in English rather than math.
It might simply be easier to learn from better peers when studying a language
- which generally involves group work and conversation - rather than when
studying math, where learning should be more individual.
3.4.3 Motivation and imitation
Peer ability might also affect students through changes in student preferences
and willingness to put effort in school. This in turn relates to two conceptually
different mechanisms. On the one hand, having better students in class might
trigger imitation, and thus positively affect school engagement. On the other
hand if students’ beliefs about skills are positively related to school engagement,
the effect might go in the opposite direction. I look at the overall effect by
building a motivation index, scaled 0-9, using yes/no survey questions asking
students how engaged they were in school. Row 5 of Table 3.4.1 suggests that
peer ability does not affect motivation. Notice however that all the regressions
from which this effect was estimated exhibit very low R2, and thus also suffer
more from precision issues.
3.4.4 Classmates, teacher and parental responses
Finally I look at whether students report in the surveys different behavior from
their classmates, parents, and teachers, when assigned to higher ability classes. It
is hard to establish the direction in which peer ability should affect the behavior
of these important inputs (see the discussion in section 3.3.1), so these empirical
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findings are quite interesting to better understand mechanisms.
I find that higher ability classes do not significantly affect students’ interac-
tions with their classmates. They also do not seem to affect parental support. I
find instead that higher peer ability positively affects teachers’ helpfulness. A
class with smarter children might be easier to manage and to teach. This could
improve teacher effectiveness for all students, independently of their ability.
Notice that the effect could have gone in the opposite direction if teachers
adapted to the average ability of the class. In the setup considered this is not
very likely: in this period national curricula establish in detail the educational
goals the class has to achieve.
DOES PEER ABILITY AFFECT EDUCATION CHOICES? 191
Table 3.4.1: Mechanisms
Outcome variable Class ability coefficient Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Evaluation of skills in class (1-9) -0.524*** -0.539*** -0.522*** -0.522*** 5.770
(0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078)
Evaluation of skills (1-9) -0.598*** -0.610*** -0.557*** -0.554*** 6.711
(0.163) (0.162) (0.160) (0.162)
Math std test score, Grade 9 0.105 0.099 0.110 0.083 0.013
(0.082) (0.079) (0.078) (0.080)
English std test score, Grade 8 0.178** 0.176** 0.184** 0.151** 0.014
(0.074) (0.074) (0.073) (0.073)
Motivation in school (0-9) -0.132 -0.141 -0.131 -0.104 5.678
(0.134) (0.135) (0.134) (0.131)
Class environment (1-9) 0.064 0.061 0.081 0.095 7.935
(0.101) (0.100) (0.098) (0.096)
Teacher helpfulness (0-9) 0.309** 0.301** 0.316** 0.343** 7.031
(0.152) (0.148) (0.145) (0.148)
Help at home with homework 0.024 0.025 0.029 0.034 0.801
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The table reports coefficients from a regression of each outcome variable on standardized class
ability (excluding student i), controlling for school fixed effects. Specification (1) does not
include any controls apart from the pool correction (here school peer ability) suggested in
Guryan et al. (2009). Specification (2) controls for own ability. Specification (3) adds individual
level controls (parental occupation dummies, foreign parents, gender, special education status)
to specification (2). Specification (4) adds class level controls (teacher changes, class size, fraction
of the class without ability data) to specification (3). Standard errors are clustered at the class
level. Evaluation of skills in class is the answer to a question asking where the student is in terms
of skills in the class distribution. Evaluation of skills, Motivation, Class environment and Teacher
helpfulness are indexes built from survey questions asking respectively students: to evaluate own
ability in different domains (math, spelling, reading, etc), their motivation in school (if they
put effort in school tasks, if they give up easily, etc), availability and helpfulness of the teacher,
and how they get along with their classmates.
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3.5 Conclusion
In this paper I use detailed survey data on a cohort of Swedish 6th graders to
estimate the effect of classmates’ ability on students’ choices in compulsory
school. I find that a one standard deviation increase in average class ability
reduces by 2 percentage points the probability of taking an advanced math
course in grades 7 to 9. Peer ability does not affect English course choices in
grades 7 to 9, and whether students choose academic tracks in high school.
I look at underlying mechanisms and show evidence that peer ability nega-
tively affects students’ assessment of own ability. This effect is known in the
psychology literature as the big-fish-in-a-little-pond effect (Marsh, 1987). The
different effects I find on math and English course choice appear to reflect dif-
ferent spillovers in performance: I show that students benefit much more from
from having high ability peers in English, an interactive subject, than they do
in math. Finally peer ability does not seem to affect student’s motivation, class
interaction and parental support, but positively affects teacher interaction.
The core literature on peer effects in education, recently reviewed by Sacer-
dote (2011), finds either positive, zero or non-linear effects of peer performance
on individual school achievement. Consistently with this literature I find posi-
tive peer effects on academic performance only for one subject.
Recent work has focused on a different channel, and shows that school rank,
independently of peer ability, can negatively affect student performance and
academic choices.13 My results are consistent with Elsner & Isphording (2015),
who find that ranking higher in high school significantly affects perceived
intelligence and teacher support, but I do not find a positive effect on long-run
academic choices. I find no evidence of an overall increase in student confidence
(“motivation” in my analysis), as in Murphy & Weinhardt (2014), or lower
academic performance, as predicted by Tincani’s model of rank concerns. I
cannot however exclude that these two effects might be at play, when keeping
ability fixed. All the cited papers indeed look at a pure rank effect. If peer
ability affects performance in the opposite direction, as shown in my results,
the overall effect on performance and motivation can systematically differ.
The contribution of the paper is indeed estimating the net effect of peer
ability on academic choices. Ultimately this is the relevant parameter policy
13See Murphy & Weinhardt (2014), Tincani (2015), and Elsner & Isphording (2015).
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makers should consider when designing tracking and streaming policies.
3.A Indexes
This section presents in detail the indexes I use as outcome variables in the
analysis.
Evaluation of skills in class is the answer to a survey question asking students
to evaluate on a 1 to 9 ordinal scale their position in the class skill distribution.
If students evaluated themselves in an unbiased way the distribution would be
normal. There is instead a tendency to overrate own skills within the class.
Evaluation of skills is a 1-9 index built from 4 yes/no survey questions,
each one assigned 2 points, with the scale properly reversed when the question
implies low skills: do you think that you are good at sums? (+); do you think
that you are good at spelling? (+); do you think that you are bad at reading? (-);
do you think that you do well in school? (+). The distribution is concentrated
on high values, but many students still answer positively only to half of the
questions.
Motivation is a 0-9 index built from 6 yes/no survey questions, each one
assigned 1.5 points, with the scale properly reversed when the question implies
low motivation: do you give up if you get a difficult task to do in school? (-); do
you often think about other things when you do maths and writing in school?
(-); do you think that it is unpleasant to have to answer questions in school?
(-); do you find it difficult to give the right answer, even if you know it? (-);
do you always do your best, even when the tasks are boring? (+); do you get
disappointed if you get bad results in a test? (-). While the majority of students
answer in a positive way to at least 3 items out of 6, there is a nontrivial fraction
of disengaged/demotivated students.
Class Environment is a 1-9 index built from 4 yes/no survey questions,
each one assigned 2 points, with the scale properly reversed when the question
implies low interaction with other classmates: do you like working together
with other children in the class? (+); do you think that other children in the
class like working together with you? (+); do you worry about things that
happen in school (-); do you often spend time on your own during breaks?
(-). The distribution is clearly concentrated on high values, with few students
answering positively only to some questions.
Teacher helpfulness is a 0-9 index built from 6 yes/no survey questions, each
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one assigned 1.5 points, with the scale properly reversed when the question
reflects low teacher helpfulness/availability: do you ask the teacher for help
when you do not understand? (+); would you like to ask the teacher for help
more often than you do? (-); do you think that your teacher cares about you?
(+); do you often think that the teacher should care more about you? (-); do
you think that it is hard to understand when the teacher explains things for
all the class (-); Do you often think that you would like to understand things
better when the teacher explains things? (-). While the majority of students
answer in a positive way to at least 4 items out of 6, there is a nontrivial fraction
of students who answers positively to only three or less answers.
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Figure 3.A.1: Distribution of Evaluation of skills in class
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3.B Rank Deviations
Figure 3.B.1 shows that a substantial fraction of students exhibits nontrivial
deviations between their percentile rank within the class and in the national
distribution. If students form their beliefs about own ability with reference to
their class, their evaluations might be thus biased. Notice that this measure is
to some extent affected by class size, as in smaller classes percentile rank will
mechanically differ from national rank, due to the different support of the
variable.
While the previous picture shows deviations in ranking with respect to the
national distribution, it is important to understand whether class ranking would
differ if students were allocated to different classes in the same school. One way
to see that is to consider the students in the restricted sample, and measure their
ability ranking when randomly assigned to a different class in the same school.
Figure 3.B.2 plots the difference between actual and simulated ranking for these
students. There appears to be still a significant fraction of students whose
ranking nontrivially changes due to different class ability composition. Notice
that in this case the problem of class size is strongly reduced, due to the fact
that there is less variation in class size within school (the average within-school
standard deviation in class size is 1.8).
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